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Climate change is a modern global risk and knowledge of it exists mainly in 
scientific projections. Beck’s theory of risk society, as part of the field of social 
constructivism, implies that in a risk society, responses to risk should result in 
changes to the fundamental causes of the risks, also known as reflexive change. 
Climate change science and responses to climate related risks should therefore 
result in improved understanding of the nature of climate risks and of the 
fundamental causes of climate risks. In practice, the application of the theory is 
less clear, and use thereof as an analytical tool difficult, as is shown by a 
preliminary examination of the official response to climate change in South Africa. 
The research presented here used the risk society theory to conceptualise a 
model framework of how responses to risk manifest in modern societies. This 
framework was then used as reference for a review of the content of the South 
African national policy response to climate change and an evaluation of 
comments obtained from some of the actors directly involved with the response. 
The results indicate that the nature and extent of reflexive change is determined 
by perceptions or definitions of risk as part of a public, political and academic 
debate, as well as a reaction to external opportunity costs rather than ‘pure’ 
climate change threats. Reflexive change is therefore incidental rather than 
intentional. On the other hand, perceptions and definitions of risk impact on 
decisions relating to strategic response directions, such as debates around 
mitigation and adaptation measures. It also shows that a wider practical 
application of the risk society is necessary in order to fully understand its 
relevance in non-European settings. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION: CLIMATE CHANGE AND RISK SOCIETY 
THEORY 
Risk Society, Reflexive Modernity and Climate Change Responses 
As social institutions (including associated social systems, knowledge creation 
and industry) modernise, they create global risks such as climate change as by-
products. The spatial and temporal scales associated with these risks, however, 
imply that they can usually only be known through scientific assessment that 
classifies the risks and provides information on them. Lately though, society finds 
itself in a phase of late modernity, which has achieved a state of flux in which all 
aspects of society, including science, have become uncertain, unstable, and 
ultimately self-critical (Beck, 1992). The freedom for self-criticism actually allows 
science to criticise its own foundations and reasoning, creating uncertainty about 
which scientific opinions are more relevant and legitimate in the process. It leaves 
society with contradictory, yet equally legitimate, scientific opinions that can then 
be applied in contexts where they would support specific interests. Different 
stakeholders in the climate change arena, for example, can argue the merits of 
their particular case, based on selected scientific findings. Uptake of a particular 
viewpoint in terms of government regulation or self-regulation will therefore most 
likely be related to the interests being served or the success of the dissemination 
of the particular knowledge or opinion.  
Regulatory responses to climate change and related policies could therefore 
possibly be mere reactions to particular interests or pressures, as opposed to 
objective and practical guidelines that are devised to best reduce risks (Hajer, 
2003). The question is: Can policies be separated from the influences that shape 
and configure them and can policy, and implementation of policy, objectively 
guide responses to issues, or are there structural aspects inherent in the 
modernisation framework that impose limitations on the scope and effectiveness 
of response strategies in modern society, and especially in modern developing 
states? If so, are there specific aspects that need to be addressed or changes to 
be made?  
The expected immediacy of the threat of global climate change has made the 
climate change debate one of the hottest topics of global discussion due to the 
potential social and economic implications associated with the inevitable need for 
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local and global responses (IPCC, 2007; 2008). Climatic change is a natural 
phenomenon, but scientific consensus has shown that we can expect fairly rapid 
climatic changes during the next century due to recent anthropogenic forcing of 
the climate system’s energy balance (IPCC, 2007). It can therefore be described 
as a very ‘modern’ phenomenon, and typical of the type of modern global risk that 
the German sociologist, Ulrich Beck, considered sufficient to spark the onset of a 
new modernisation process as explained in his social theory of ‘risk societies’ 
(Beck, 1992; Beck, 1999).  
Beck published his perspective on post-modern society and environmental 
politics as a thesis on risk society in 1986 in his book Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem 
Weg in eine andere Moderne (appearing as an abbreviated English version in 
1992 titled Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity) (Beck, 1992). In the theory, 
he argued that the emerging social and political arenas are subject to a particular 
complexity due to the fact that risks are produced by and benefit specific 
interests, yet the consequences are often systemic and hard to measure and 
therefore require new forms of responses. Since then a debate has grown around 
the question of whether our current social context can be fully, or at least better 
understood by reflecting on it as a society functioning on the premise of decision-
making based on risk perceptions (Dessai et al, 2004; Demeritt, 2006; 
Leiserowitz, 2006).  
Beck has drawn a fair amount of criticism – mainly directed at his application of 
specific concepts such as reflexivity and also the less concrete solutions offered 
by his thesis (further discussion of these criticisms is provided in Chapter 2) – but 
offered strong enough re-conceptualisations of society for it to remain a credible 
framework for analysis of the modern social context (Mythen, 2007). In fact, the 
Fourth Assessment Report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) draws on a risk management perspective both to bring its findings 
regarding the expected climate change impacts down to a practical response 
level, and to inform its uncertainty classifications (IPCC, 2007). Evidence of this 
can be found in Topic 5 of the IPCC Synthesis Report which states: 
“Decision-making about responding to climate change involves an 
iterative risk management process that includes both mitigation 
and adaptation, taking into account actual and avoided climate 
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change damages, co-benefits, sustainability, equity, and attitudes 
to risk” (IPCC, 2008). 
In brief, the risk society thesis tenders the following perspective on modern 
society: 
• Society modernises to a point where supranational risks are created as 
by-products of modernisation, and globalisation become all-pervasive. 
• Reflexivity emerges as a universal theme, in the sense that many 
elements of modernity unintentionally and unseen become both the cause 
for, and solution to their own disintegration.  
• Reflexivity eventually becomes increasingly self-critical and reflecting, and 
intentional risk response becomes possible on all levels and in all spheres 
of society1. 
• Globalised risk management subsequently erodes the sovereignty of the 
nation state by simply widening the scope of social action beyond its 
reach. 
Ultimately, what Beck was alluding to is that along with the exponential growth of 
the technological modernisation era came environmental issues of similarly 
growing global universality, but at the same time also environmental risks that are 
time delayed with latent or diffuse causes. In response, the new phase of 
modernisation is undergoing a transition from production of wealth to the 
distribution and management of risks (Beck, 1999). Society has only three 
response options – denial, apathy or transformation (Beck, 2006). The third 
option requires a ‘new’ modernisation because the existing institutions of society 
are incapable of effectively coping with or responding to the new wave of 
projected universal risks. Ecological modernisation, as a general example of such 
a modern response strategy, strives to direct global market strategies and 
regulatory practice in a way that reduces modern environmental risks, thereby 
                                               
 
1
 Application of the terms reflection and reflexivity is contested, and the various meanings 
are unpacked further in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
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changing the nature of the risk in ways that were never possible previously (Mol, 
2001; Barry and Paterson, 2004; Jänicke, 2008). 
Beck’s thesis on risk society can therefore offer opportunities to better match 
climate change response strategies to the realities of a modern society. For 
example, a globalised risk perspective with related innovative cross-boundary 
response mechanisms will serve the needs of a society that faces global 
problems and changeable ecological politics, yet remains limited to local 
implementation actions.  
Research Aim 
Beck himself identified global warming as an example of a recently 
conceptualised and globalised manufactured risk (Beck, 2006). Social 
comprehension of human-induced climatic forcing can therefore be used as a 
proxy of the way in which modern risks are responded to by post-industrial 
society. 
This research report is an attempt to investigate the practicalities of a real-world 
application of the risk society theory in a developing country, namely South 
Africa, by using the South African national climate change response as medium. 
In particular, the focus will be placed on what a risk society perspective can 
illuminate about some of the interfaces between scientific knowledge and policy 
making. The general climate change debate therefore represents the broader 
context and subject field, but a detailed review of the South African National 
Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) (South Africa, 2004) is used as 
localised case study to: 
1) establish whether the risk society theory offers a framework to which risk 
responses conform; 
2) determine to what extent the South African strategy fits the description of 
a risk response; and  
3) identify aspects of the risk society framework that might limit and/or 
enable further direction to climate change responses through structural 
influences on knowledge creation and its use in policy formulation.  
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Furthermore the research records, as a matter of course, the extent to which the 
pure application of risk society concepts can be assumed within the modern 
social context of a developing nation in the global South. Further details of 
research objectives and methods are outlined in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
The interdisciplinary nature of risk society theory, however, means that the 
research also touches on related themes such as ecological modernisation 
(Cohen, 1997, Murphy, 2000, Barry and Paterson, 2004), reflexive modernity 
(Giddens, 1990), political ecology (Greenberg and Park, 1994), constructivism 
(Demeritt, 2001) and social-economic resilience (Folke, 2006). The shared idea is 
that formal and informal political processes shape perceptions and responses to 
modern risks (Hajer, 2003). Pielke Jr. (2005), for example, shows how the 
definition of a concept can lead to the politicization of science, Rübbelke (2005) 
describes how politics can drive response policies, Webster (1999) examines 
how uncertainties around risk are used within post-modern governance systems 
and Demeritt (2006) uses Beck’s world views to evaluate how scientific 
knowledge should be used to inform political decision-making. Further, in terms 
of the perception and conceptualisation of risk, risk perception in the health 
sector is evaluated by McInnes (2005), whilst Dessai et al. (2004) make a strong 
case for a closer investigation into the various forms of risk perception and 
construction.  
As indicated though, the intention of the research report is to acknowledge these 
fields of research (more engagement on them is found in Chapter 3). By using a 
real-world case study the validity of the risk society construct is tested. Similar 
examples of such studies are found in different corners of the world: Murgida and 
Gonzáles (2005) apply risk society principles to risk management in Argentina, 
Bulkeley (2001) to climate change politics in Australia, and Horlick-Jones (1995) 
specifically focuses on risk creation, perception and management in large urban 
environments. Other studies also examine Korea (Han, 1998) and China 
(Wishnick, 2005) as risk societies. 
The work in Buenos Aires in Argentina, for example, used a risk society 
perspective to investigate human security issues related to climate change 
including flooding of coastal areas. It was deemed an appropriate framework due 
to the interdisciplinary nature of modern climate change and the focus that risk 
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society places on the social construction of risk. The researchers conducted 
workshops in order to understand how various social groupings react to 
perceived risks, and found that it is exceedingly difficult to resolve uncertainties 
around response actions, with particular emphasis on the fine balance between 
increased vulnerability and mitigation actions. In the face of rapid and 
catastrophic change, observable trends are no longer reliable indicators, and 
“...social risk knowledge and communication...” starts to determine risk responses 
(Murgida and Gonzáles, 2005). Social construction of risk is also found to be a 
crucial determinant of risk perception and the move towards actual response 
actions, which is in turn closely related to the availability and communication of 
truthful information (Murgida and Gonzáles, 2005). 
Horlick-Jones (1995) describes risk in global megacities as the result of the 
interplay between physical hazards and perceived danger. He also highlights the 
element of uncertainty – that modern cities exacerbate risks even as they strive 
to reduce the risks. This is similar to the notion that modernisation can be both 
the reason for, and the solution to modern risks. A risk-based perspective allowed 
for an assessment of how technological progress and dense urban networks 
contribute to the ‘manufacturing’ of hazards, and illustrated how responses to the 
risks are fraught with the intricacies of risk politics, popular opinion and global 
influences. Responses become predisposed towards fragmented individualised 
management strategies whilst institutional risk management erodes. Actual 
adjustment to perceived risks in megacities is therefore a highly subjective 
process, which requires more awareness of the influences affecting risk response 
behaviour. 
An application of the theory by Bulkeley (2001) focussed on the political 
dimension of modern risk, and in particular how responsibility and obligation is 
created and contested in Australian climate change politics. The case study used 
semi-structured interviews and the analysis of policy material to compare actual 
political definition of responsibilities to Beck’s theoretical construct. The analysis 
uses a graphical framework of the risk society concept to address a common 
concern that the risk society theory can be elusive when it comes to real-world 
application (Bulkeley, 2001).  
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Bulkeley’s research found that although the concepts inherent to risk society did 
not necessarily lead to substantial change in the ultimate climate change policy 
directions, the risk society thesis did offer some explanation of the present 
climate change debate. A risk perspective, for example, gives insight into the 
relationship between the inherently variable spheres of risk politics and risk 
perception, and on how this relationship determines or is determined by positions 
of social dominance. It is, however, not a completely new explanation of social 
institutions such as subpolitics, since the institutions have been present for some 
time and have not been affected by the growing perception of the new global 
risks posed by climate change. What was evident though is that new 
interrelationships between formal and informal politics are emerging. This is 
indicated by the finding that the formal legitimisation of the causes of climate 
change (e.g. energy use) has to engage the institutions and agents responsible 
for the exacerbation of the risks (e.g. industry and community) (Bulkeley, 2001).  
The conceptual framework of the risk society theory proves to be an invaluable 
reference in this type of research since it allows the researcher to begin to locate 
actions and actors within a broader framework of determinants. It also prevents 
an analysis from imagining a correlation between evidence and explanation that 
disregards the wider context possible alternative social scenarios. An example of 
this is in Bulkeley’s finding that subpolitics might not be an absolute indicator of 
the applicability of the risk society idea since there are other social 
contextualisations that would also provide scope for subpolitical presence 
(Bulkeley, 2001).   
Risk society can be viewed as the flipside of spectacular technological and 
industrial advancement, as is shown by the case studies in China (Wishnick, 
2005) and Korea (Han, 1998). The Chinese emergence as an economic power 
has also brought about ecological impacts that find expression in neighbouring 
states, and indeed on a global scale. The modernisation, therefore, leads to 
precisely the supernational risks that Beck envisaged, and the need for 
innovative supernational coping strategies (Wishnick, 2005). The international 
coping strategies have to adjust to non-military challenges, as opposed to the 
fear of a Chinese military threat that dominated the Cold War era. In the mean 
time, and as Beck predicted, the Chinese regulatory structures fail to adequately 
cope with the modern risk context.  
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In much the same way, risk is seen as a consequence, and not a failing, of the 
accelerated modernisation process in Korea (Han, 1998). The Korean context of 
rapid economic development, political liberalisation and an East Asian religious 
and cultural morality are considered as forces that help shape the creation and 
definition of risk. As science and social awareness progress, the definition of risks 
changes, resulting in a need for new social patterns of risk response and coping 
strategies, although in the study by Han (1998), emphasis is placed on moral 
cooperation. 
It is therefore worthwhile to widen the evaluation of the application of the thesis in 
the climate change arena to see how generally the theory can be applied, how 
important the elements of uncertainty, perception and globalisation are, and to 
examine whether there are other aspects of risk societies that are material in 
determining climate change response strategies. This responds to the call by 
Mythen (2007) for research into the problems and issues raised by the theory, in 
order to determine which concepts might be fruitfully scrutinised. It is also 
unusual to attempt to apply the concept to a Third World scenario, given that it 
has its origins in a post-welfare state Europe of the 1980s (Beck, 1999).  
Overview of the Research 
Since the basic intention of this work is to investigate the practical application of a 
theoretical concept, it is inevitable that the research first had to provide a clear 
conceptualisation of the theory before progressing to a practical application and 
case study. The research was therefore conducted in three phases – 
conceptualisation, data collection and data analysis.  
Firstly, there was a need to probe into what the concepts of risk society and 
reflexivity mean for the climate change debate. A literature review provided this 
context, and highlighted aspects that are relevant to climate change and our 
modern response to its risks. Writings by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, as 
well as the discourse that evolved around their work were used extensively. 
Various aspects of risk societies were lifted from these texts to explain the 
process of reaching contested scientific perspectives on climate change. This 
conceptualisation is presented in Chapter 2, and is used in Chapter 3 to put 
forward a theoretical framework for climate change responses.  
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Ultimately, the framework is applied in a case study, by analysing and evaluating 
the South African National Climate Change Response Strategy in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5. A questionnaire was used by the author as a detailed analysis of the 
NCCRS document, and thereafter distributed to a small control group in order to 
confirm or refute the author’s assessment of the strategy and to identify further 
intricacies of the concept. The control group was representative of civil society, 
academia and government sectors and all closely connected to, or involved in, 
climate change science or policy in the country. The questionnaire is based on 
the information gathered in the conceptualisation phase, and is specifically aimed 
at trying to find risk society indicators in the subject document. The detailed 
analysis of the NCCRS document is provided as Appendix 2.  
An internal ethics process was followed in order to ensure that the participation of 
respondents was transparent and fair. Respondents were selected through a 
process of referrals and telephonically invited to participate in the research, and a 
short background document was provided to willing participants as a brief 
introduction to the risk society concept and the aim of the research. Only 
respondents who agreed to participate at this point were then involved in the 
research project. As part of the ethics process of the School of Geography, 
Archaeology and Environmental Studies, a consent form was also provided that 
introduced the author and emphasised that participation was voluntary, not 
binding on any respondent, and will not result in references to specific 
respondents in the final report. 
Chapter 5 of this report compares and analyses the data in order to answer, or at 
least elucidate, the application of the risk society concept to a developing nation’s 
climate change response strategy. Finally, in Chapter 6 these findings are related 
to the core research question of whether the characteristics of risk societies play 
a determining role in the comprehension of, and responses to climate change 
threats. 
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CHAPTER 2  CONTEXT: MODERNISATION, CLIMATE CHANGE 
RESPONSES AND RISK SOCIETY 
Although the theory of Risk Societies is more than two decades old, it is not 
widely known outside of academic circles. Nevertheless, most people, whether 
they are fully aware of it or not, are living in what can be classified as a global risk 
society, under the constant threat of modern global risks. One of these risks, 
climate change, has recently become central to many international deliberations 
on the environment, politics and economic development, and a debate is raging 
around the required responses to the risk.  
It is the intention of this research to investigate the nature of some of these 
debates using various lenses provided by the risk society thesis, and thereby 
providing some introduction to the concepts of modernisation, climate change 
responses and reflexivity. Firstly, a contextualisation of the risk society debate is 
provided by a brief look at modernisation, globalisation and the rise of global risks 
such as climate change. Secondly, the relevance of the risk society idea to the 
climate change field is touched upon, with particular reference to the vulnerability 
and adaptation debates associated with climate change. 
The primary purpose of this descriptive chapter is, however, to ensure that the 
application of the risk society theory is as unambiguous as possible, given that 
some of its core concepts (such as reflexivity) have either been contested, or 
differentially applied by different authors. This is achieved through a brief 
overview of the main themes that are used in the conceptualisation of the theory, 
but also some consideration of the major lines of criticism that have been raised 
against the concept. The core of the chapter is, however, devoted to a summary 
of the risk society construct, as understood by the author, and based on a 
synthesis of work by Beck (1992, 1994, 1999 etc.), Giddens (1994), Lash (1994, 
2000), Scott (2000) and others.  
Globalisation of the Environmental Debate 
During the past four decades the environmental debate progressed through three 
general phases. In the 1970s, a growing awareness of environmental impacts 
was responsible for society starting to question the process of unbridled 
development and industrial advancement (Hajer, 1995; Blowers, 1997). Along 
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with the growth in environmental concerns came a demand for appropriate 
solutions, and consequently environmental thinking became an integral part of 
the modernisation process in the 1980s (Howes, 2005). Finally, as 
environmentalism gained mainstream status in the 1990s, society gave birth to 
modern environmental politics with a real influence on economic and social policy 
and an ability to interrogate the finer details of the modernisation and 
environmental spheres (Hajer, 1995; Blühdorn, 2000) (See Table 2-1 below).  
Table 2-1 Progression of the environmental debate 
1970 1980 1990 onwards 
Environmental 
Awareness 
Environmental Solutions Environmental Design 
Ecology Ecological modernisation Ecological politics 
 
During the same period, the world experienced widespread and rapid 
globalisation. Most facets of society achieved some level of globalisation, be it in 
the disaggregation of production processes or merely in communication 
networks. The combination of globalisation and the growth in environmental 
awareness and environmentally influenced actions is responsible for an 
environmental debate that is becoming increasingly global and complex. It is also 
becoming more focussed on global rather than local issues, but at the same time 
makes local issues part of the global agenda (Giddens, 1990; Blowers, 1997). 
Beck (2002, 6) refers to a “community of common destiny” which describes the 
new global citizenry, in which all people will be subject to the same global 
environmental problems, irrespective of their location. Local issues, however, 
colour the global debate – for example regionally uneven resource use (Beck, 
2002), unequal spread of base raw materials and fuel sources (Mercer et al., 
2006) and the issue of environmental refugees (Paterson, 2002).  
As will be shown here, the South African National Climate Change Response 
Strategy (NCCRS) came about partially because there was a perceived need to 
address the local impacts and opportunities related to globally universal risks 
emanating from the modernisation process. The globalised nature of the threat is 
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mentioned in the very first lines of both the summary and the main document text, 
but throughout the strategy, the threats are contextualised by local issues such 
as the drive for sustainable development, poverty alleviation and provision of 
housing (South Africa, 2004).  
Spaargaren et al. (2000) argues that a growing reliance on globalised systems of 
production and interrelationships between international economic entities have 
made environmental issues that affect other parts of the globe part of our local 
agenda. This reciprocal relationship results in an infinitely interrelated world and a 
vast amount of information being available to inform opinions and decision-
making. 
The complexity and diversity of opinions is a good thing on the one hand, as it 
furthers the integration of different opinions and ideas, but on the other hand it 
could potentially lead to a state of uncertainty in which we lose control over what 
is considered common truths (or maybe it already has). Integration of information 
and ideas will, however, see the globalised environmental debate directing the 
decades of experience in ecological modernisation and politics towards 
increasing levels of international debate and problem-solving. This would be a 
natural reaction to the increasingly global nature of the environmental issues of 
our time such as poverty related resource degradation, reliance on carbon-based 
fuels, depletion of international marine resources and, of course, climate change 
(Munnichs, 2004).  
Climate change is probably the ‘most global’ of the global issues. It has relevance 
for everyone on the planet, operates on a planetary scale, and is dependent on 
the dynamic relations between the human population, water, air and landmasses. 
In addition, it promises effects that will extend well into the future beyond the lives 
of the currently living generations (IPCC, 2007; 2008). Consequently, global 
acknowledgement creates a fertile field for the cultivation and cross-pollination of 
ideas and opinions on climate change, as well as the scope for global co-
ordination in the generating of responses. This is shown by the current 
international climate change debate which is given structure by the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the subsequent 
Kyoto Protocol and the scientific co-ordination of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change. Together, these three arenas manage to divide the countries of 
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the world into two ‘camps’ – those who support the Kyoto Protocol and its 
strategies for global emission mitigation, and those who choose to set their own 
responses and emission reduction schedules. Preference for one or the other 
group is largely determined by local economic considerations, but the economic 
ties that are affected are of global scale, as are the negotiations and politics that 
inform the framework actions of the conventions (UNFCCC, 2003).  
Climate Change Response Strategies 
With the debate about climate change having been around for some time, a 
myriad of parties and opinions have been drawn into the deliberations. What 
makes the topic so universal is the understanding that climate change will, to 
varying extents, affect everyone and everything that is reliant upon natural 
resources and vulnerable to natural hazards (IPCC, 2007 a and b; 2008). Climate 
change therefore constitutes a form of threat to anyone or everyone, whether a 
person believes that climate change represents a global catastrophe or simply 
another popular opinion panic. What will be different for each individual is the 
perceived significance of the threat, the real extent to which any party will be 
affected, as well as the opportunity costs of using climate change as an economic 
or political vehicle. To individuals, climate change might imply rising fuel costs, 
whilst larger institutions could find that carbon trading mechanisms are affecting 
their market penetration strategies. Governments on the other hand could 
consider the opportunities created by the Clean Development Mechanisms 
(CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol as drivers for increased foreign investment and 
trade. It is therefore inevitable that strategies be developed to deal with whatever 
perceived or real threat climate change might pose, and to understand and 
optimise the opportunities created by a globally integrated issue.  
The global nature of risks in modern society is discussed in Beck’s return to his 
original work on risk society, namely World Risk Society (Beck, 1999). He 
explains that the risks produced by society do not remain risks solely for the 
producing entity, but actually for the entire world. Class distinctions are removed 
due to the overlap between class and risk (i.e. risks are posed to everyone, 
irrespective of social status). Hence his catchphrase “poverty is hierarchical, 
smog is democratic” (Beck, 1992, 36). Risks may be created anywhere in the 
world as point sources, but the effect could be global (Beck, 1999, 2). Non-risk 
 14 
producing nations therefore face the same challenge as the risk producers, and 
hence should also be evaluated within the risk society framework (Beck, 1999, 3).  
What should not be forgotten though, is that the modern risk society creates a 
fertile field for First vs. Third World inequality due to their differing vulnerability 
and resilience ratings. Poverty and underdevelopment are conditions under which 
risk-producing activities flourish, creating yet more risks or adding to the drivers 
of existing risks. The consideration of risk society principles also applying to the 
Third World is potentially important:  
“To situate the non-Western world firmly within the ambit of a 
second modernity, rather than of tradition, allows a pluralisation 
of modernity, for it opens up space for the conceptualisation of 
divergent trajectories of modernities in different parts of the world” 
(Beck, 1999, 3). 
Beck suggests, however, that responses need not be intentional (Beck, 1992). 
The institutions of industrial society remain with the potential to react to the new 
state of risk, without necessarily acknowledging or engaging the exact 
characteristics of the new modern risks. No ‘risk perception’ is therefore involved, 
since the responses are automatic (in the sense that the reaction follows existing 
patterns of response). Using climate change as context, an example would be the 
adaptation to rising sea levels, due to increased storm surges. The reaction is 
unaware of the nature and wider climate change-related origin of the risks, but 
because of the costs of seawall protection, fewer people would settle in the risk 
zone. The consequence is a change to the ultimate risk exposure, but not the 
nature of the risk itself. Should climate change debates, however, permeate 
political and social debates, it could change the manner of response and question 
the very drivers of climate change that are ultimately responsible for the climatic 
changes. The response would then be very much aware of the problem and 
attempt to address it by focussing on the drivers of climate change as opposed to 
mere adaption to it.  
Climate change responses by different sectors of government, business and civil 
society will consequently cover a wide spectrum, but may vary on any number of 
different levels - for example, from precautionary approaches aiming to avert a 
global catastrophe to adaptation measures that may save on individual insurance 
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premiums. The particular response is determined by whether or not the risk is 
‘perceived’ and therefore engaged with, and thereafter by the perceptions held by 
the person or institution that needs to react, since it is the perceived severity or 
immediacy of the expected impacts of climate change that will influence the 
decision to act as well as the ultimate actions. Perceptions are therefore central 
to the conception, constitution, implementation and ultimate effect of particular 
responses (Yohe and Dowlatabadi, 1999, Leiserowitz, 2006).  
Having given some background to broader global climate change response 
strategies attention now turns to examine the creation, compilation and broad 
architecture of climate change strategies in South Africa. 
The South African climate change strategy was published in 2004, based on the 
country’s first submissions to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, and following ratification of the UNFCCC (1997) and the related 
Kyoto Protocol (2002) (South Africa, 2004).  
The strategy, however, has its roots in the Interdepartmental Co-ordinating 
Committee for Global Environmental Change (ICC) which was established in 
1991 by DEAT in preparation for the 1992 World Summit (Shackleton et.al., 
1996). The ICC advised government on matters pertaining to climate change, 
and produced various specialist advisory documents that culminated in a draft 
climate change policy in 1993. Following the coming to power of the 1994 
democratically elected government, however, the ICC was replaced with a more 
representative structure in the form of the National Committee on Climate 
Change (NCCC). This committee still operates under the chairpersonship of 
DEAT and remain the most central debating arena for the climate change field in 
South Africa. 
The replacing of the ICC with the NCCC, and the sudden change in 
governmental policies and priorities, meant that the finalisation and official 
publication of the strategy only took place in 2004 following several interim 
publications and historic world events in the climate change arena. Amongst 
other reasons, the delay was related to final parliamentary adoption processes 
that took more than a year to conclude (Turner, 2008). 
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The compilation of the relevant Country Studies reports during the period 
between the ICC draft strategy and the final NCCC version, and especially the 
“South African County Study on Climate Change: Synthesis Report for the 
Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment Section” (Kiker, 1999), laid the 
foundation for the development of the final strategy (South Africa, 2000). It was 
followed by the Initial Communication (IC) provided to the UNFCCC (South 
Africa, 2000) as well as the more detailed Adaptation study under the auspices of 
the Country Studies project (South Africa, 2002). All of this occurred against the 
backdrop of the scientific effort on the part of the IPCC which published the 
Second Assessment Report in 1996 and the third instalment in 2001 (IPCC, 1996 
and 2001). 
South Africa does not qualify as an Annex I country in terms of the Kyoto 
Protocol, and therefore is not under obligation to reduce its own contribution to 
climate change inducing actions and emissions. However, climatic change could 
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have a dramatic effect on the South African industrial and resources sectors as a 
result of the relatively high vulnerability of the subcontinent (South Africa, 2003). 
The strategy was therefore compiled in order to steer economic and social 
development in the country in a manner that will be able to adapt to the projected 
climate change risks (South Africa, 2004). This objective is not far from the 
approaches taken by Australia and the United States (Bulkeley, 2001). As a 
developing country, however, South Africa should be an enlightening case study 
of the practical application of the risk society concept since, as Bulkeley (2001, 
431) finds:  
“The challenges of governing climate change have been apparent 
as nation-states struggle to come to international agreement and 
take domestic action. These struggles have been particularly 
evident in contexts where environmental and economic interests 
are seen to be in conflict…”  
Mitigation and Adaptation 
Just as the general environmental debate progressed from simple awareness 
and solutions based on adaptation to truly integrated environmental management 
and design, so too do distinctions appear between different climate change 
responses. The responses can be broadly classified in two ways – either as 
mitigation or adaptation (IPCC, 2008). Mitigation refers to strategies that 
advocate immediate action to limit the extent to which climate is likely to change 
through actions such as emissions reduction and alternative energy solutions. It 
is aimed at the primary causes of risk, with efforts invested in directly reducing 
the scale of climatic change. In contrast, adaptation strategies are solutions that 
give society a greater capacity to absorb the effects of climate change impacts. 
Instead of utilising resources in slowing down climate change, resources are 
applied to find strategies through which communities can cope with, or avoid 
adverse climatic conditions. Adaptation can therefore broadly be likened to the 
environmental awareness phase, where end-of-pipe solutions were found, whilst 
mitigation represents more involvement in the design of systems that rely on 
natural resources (Tompkins and Adger, 2005).  
In all likelihood, different policies will achieve a greater or lesser extent of each of 













Figure 2: Mitigation and adaptation strategies 
The choice between adaptation and mitigation is determined by the perception of 
both risks and opportunities. In terms of the perception of risks, the elected 
reaction is determined by the immediacy and severity of the identified threat. The 
logic is simple – if the impact threatens any important life, business, political or 
other interest, then action will follow to lessen the impact. The timeframe over 
which climate change impacts will play out will have an influence though. The 
shortest period for climate change impacts is a scale of decades (United States, 
2002), and consequently mitigation might not be selected as the best strategy 
since the impacts will not affect the individuals who are currently comparing the 
threat of future impacts to the costs of immediate large-scale economic 
transformation (Tomkins and Adger, 2005). In the NCCRS (South Africa, 2004, 6) 
this is suggested by the following statement:  
“Some mitigation actions may yield extensive benefits in areas 
outside of climate change such as health, employment 
opportunities and reducing negative environmental impacts. 
However, the costs incurred by such actions may be excessive 
and render the actions unattractive.” 
This decision is, however, further complicated by the opportunity costs offered by 
climate change. The South African approach, for example, specifically states:  
“While it is extremely important to understand the reality and 
constraints of the South African economy, no door must be closed 
to any action based on sound economic principles, which can 
bring tangible benefits to the country and its people” (South Africa, 
2004, 34). 
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This allows for immediate responses in order to speed up technological change 
that may improve production processes in a way that can improve profits, or gain 
valuable stakeholder support if there is pressure for appropriate change. 
A strategy that tends towards adaptation, however, seems to suggest a more 
conservative approach that involves more opportunism. Adaptation focuses 
attention on strategies to cope with the effects of climate change over shorter 
periods. Such an approach has proven popular with developing nations seeking 
assistance in order to pursue a high rate of industrialisation and modernisation, 
as well as well-modernised countries such as the United States who rely on their 
industrial strength to keep their economy healthy (Bulkeley, 2001). Adaptation is 
therefore preferred in cases where stakeholders need to be assured that they will 
not face immediate penalties, and that contributions to a climate change 
response will be deferred to long-term strategies.  
The decision-making and trade-offs regarding adaptation and mitigation on the 
whole are borne out by the contextualisation provided by the NCCRS and its 
actual contents (South Africa, 2004). The strategy indicates that its main driver is 
the need for the South African economy to adapt to the likely physical and 
economic impacts of climate change, but climate change mitigation actions are 
possible as a long-term macro-economical shift in the economic base sectors. 
Both adaptation and mitigation in the short term would, however, only be 
considered if they are shown to be economically beneficial and compliant with the 
various economic development strategies of the country. The end result is a 
policy that applies climate change response measures conservatively, in order to 
accommodate the impacts, whilst maintaining the capacity to adopt more 
progressive measures as the economically viable opportunities present 
themselves through funding and international production or technology transfers.  
The stronger focus on adaptation, as opposed to mitigation, is a theme that is 
already clear in the Country Studies report submitted by South Africa to the 
UNFCCC (South Africa, 2003). In the report, it is stated that despite mitigation 
options existing, the national focus will remain on priorities such as poverty 
alleviation, basic facilities and health.  
Both approaches to climate change responses use scientific uncertainty as 
motivation for action or inaction. Promoters of mitigation will argue that the 
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uncertainty implies that we do not know whether there are certain climatic 
thresholds that could spell disaster, and that we do not know how far we are from 
breaching the thresholds. A precautionary approach is therefore employed to 
avoid unknown impacts. In contrast, a conservative approach in respect of 
unnecessary resource allocation is advocated by the supporters of adaptation 
strategies. It is argued that the uncertainty means that the threat cannot be 
adequately quantified, and that a hasty allocation of resources is foolish. Rather, 
it is claimed, these resources should be directed towards coping with the likely 
inevitable impacts until more certainty is achieved.  
Risk Society and Reflexivity 
How then, is society to understand and make sense of the climate change 
problem and the responses thereto? What yardstick can be used to judge the 
appropriateness of the responses? Or even, how do we go about conceiving 
such a measure? 
In this research report, the possibility of using the concept of risk society as an 
analytical tool to gain a better understanding of the construction, perception and 
responses to climate risk is given consideration. Any insight into the nature of 
modern risks experienced by developing societies could translate into more 
appropriate strategies through which the vulnerability of marginalised members of 
these societies can be reduced. As is discussed later on in this chapter, criticism 
raised against the theory makes it necessary that the research be specific in the 
approach it takes with regards to disputed concepts inherent to the risk society 
approach, and in particular, the difference between ‘reflexivity’ and ‘reflection’. 
It is, therefore, necessary to briefly consider the core elements, concepts and 
relevance of the risk society theory, before the attempt is made to apply the 
theory in practice.  
Risk Society 
Beck (1992, 27) advanced the idea that our current state of ‘late’ modernity has 
moved away from being structured by industrial era ideology: 
“If modernisation is understood as a process of innovation which 
has become autonomous, then it must also be accepted that 
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modernity itself ages. The other aspect of this ageing of industrial 
modernity is the emergence of risk society.”  
His premise is that the core characteristics and operating principles of society has 
changed, or are changing in a way that society can no longer be understood or 
managed by the social theories of the industrial era (Giddens, 1990; Lacy, 2002). 
The world now finds itself in a state where industrial and post-industrial hazards 
and threats are becoming increasingly important in decision-making, thereby 
usurping a fair amount of the power of wealth and social class that are inherent to 
industrialisation and modernisation: 
“The concepts of ‘industrial’ or ‘class society’, in the broadest 
sense of Marx or Weber, revolved around the issue of how socially 
produced wealth could be distributed in a socially unequal and 
also ‘legitimate’ way. This overlaps with the new paradigm of risk 
society which is based on the solution of a similar and yet 
different problem. How can the risks and hazards systematically 
produced as part of modernisation be prevented, minimised, 
dramatised, or channelled? Where do they finally see the light of 
day in the shape of ‘latent side effects’, how can they be limited 
and distributed away so that they neither hamper the 
modernisation process nor exceed the limits of that which is 
‘tolerable’ – ecologically, medically, psychologically and socially?” 
(Beck, 1992, 19) (Emphasis by original author) 
Modern ‘risk’ society supplements industrialisation ideology with ‘risk perception’ 
and ‘risk management’. This is a direct consequence of a modernisation process 
that brought about an array of unintentional and unexpected latent side-effects in 
the form of global risks. Beck (1996, 13) summarises his reasoning:  
“The argument is that, while in classical industrial society the 
‘logic’ of wealth production dominated the ‘logic’ of risk production, 
in the risk society this relationship is reversed...The productive 
forces have lost their innocence in the reflexivity of modernisation 
processes. The gain in power from techno-economic ‘progress’ is 
being increasingly overshadowed by the production of risks. In an 
early stage, these can be legitimised as ‘latent side effects’. As 
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they become globalized, and subject to public criticism and 
scientific investigation, they come, so to speak, out of the closet 
and achieve a central importance in social and political debates.”  
It is crucial for a comprehension of the transition to a risk society state to 
understand that the concept of a ‘risk society’ should not be seen as a particular 
‘end state’. The emergence of risk societies should be envisaged as a 
diversification of the traditional evolutionary development model that is 
characteristic of industrial modernisation (Beck and Willms, 2004). Even as 
‘normal’ modernisation takes place, risks are produced that cannot be adequately 
responded to by the systems and practices of the existing modernisation process. 
These risks therefore require novel responses that transcend national 
boundaries, demand innovative solutions and are very likely to be driven by or 
based in social spheres that are outside of the official authoritative structures.  
A ‘risk society’ is likely to have three forms of modernisation present 
simultaneously (Beck, 1999): 
• A first modernity that relies on traditional modernisation to deal with modern 
risks (residual risk society) 
• A second, or ‘late’ modernity that faces risks that outgrew the ability of the 
existing institutions of industrial society to control them 
• A third form where risk response becomes the object of public, political and 
academic debate 
In the first ‘phase’, society employs an automatic response in the form of existing 
problem solving techniques (technological and industrial modernisation) in order 
to react to risks. The only knowledge or perception of risks exists within 
descriptions obtained from scientific forums, yet perceptions begin to shape 
responses. The size or extent and nature of the risks will change over time 
though, since the responses do not directly address the risks, but rather add to 
the main driver of the risks by relying on a sustained modernisation drive to deal 
with the risks. Progressively, existing social institutions lose control over the risks 
due to the imperceptible nature and global scale of the new modern class of risk 
and the inadequate scope of ‘normal’ modernisation responses. At this point 
modernisation will, according to the risk society theory, give rise to risk responses 
that necessarily have to transcend the boundaries imposed by national borders 
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and formal politics. The responses to risk, however, remain automatic in the 
sense that existing modernisation thinking is used to define the risks and to find 
solutions to the problems. Importantly though, these responses will now start to 
change the nature of the modernisation risks in a reflexive manner. This implies 
that the responses self-critically change the risks in ways that lead to 
fundamental changes to the risks, leading to new forms of risks and new social 
institutions. Risk societies can therefore be described as having reached a state 
of reflexive modernisation.  
Although, in the reflexive state, the dominance of the authoritative structures in 
modern society is being eroded, the risk responses remain to a large extent 
outside of public debate. Ultimately, however, once the new risks become known 
to a wider audience, the decline of the ‘modern’ governance structures will result 
in the creation or emergence of new social structures and institutions, and 
responses that are based on social definitions of risk. Such risk perceptions in the 
public and academic domains will result in conscious decision-making and 
engagement on the risks prior to responses, also termed ‘reflection’ by Beck. 
Reflection is therefore a different response to risk than reflexivity, in the sense 
that it involves an awareness of the risks and their nature, as opposed to 
‘unawareness’ that characterises reflexivity (Beck, 1999).  
It must be stressed though that this distinction between the phases is described 
as a heuristic device that makes the description, understanding and analysis of 
the transition to risk society possible (Beck and Willms, 2004, 32): 
“Its purpose is methodological and pragmatic. It enables us to 
pose the question of new categories of thought and a new frame 
of reference in the clearest possible terms. It allows us to conceive 
of frameworks in emergence, and of frameworks in overlap, and of 
both at the same time, which in the end is what we’re actually 
dealing with. It should in no way be misunderstood as an 
evolutionary periodization.” 
The distinction should therefore be used with caution when applied to real-world 
situations, as all three forms of response could be present at the same time, and 
within the same social context.  
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According to Beck (1996), the inability to insure modern risks is the best proof of 
the existence of a risk society. Although the individual risks of climate change 
prevailing at any one time can be insured in the short term, evaluation and the 
correct pricing for the long-term risks of climate change is extremely difficult. This 
is borne out by a recent publication from the insurance company Lloyds that 
raises the concern that continued climatic change or improper regulatory action 
could change their view that the associated risks are insurable (Lloyds, 2006). 
Risk society has therefore essentially taken over from the welfare state context 
as the defining characteristic of the most developed countries during the past few 
decades (Beck, 1999). Societies are now starting to use risk perception to inform 
decisions and actions on all levels, since the existing social security mechanisms 
are not equipped to deal with the new scale of risk. As Beck (1996, 27) states: 
“This concept describes a phase of development of modern 
society in which the social, political, ecological and individual risks 
created by the momentum of innovation increasingly elude the 
control and protective institutions of industrial society.”  
Climate change, as example, cannot be insured due to the scale and uncertain 
nature of the risk. Risk society therefore leaves individual actors or parties in 
society with a personal or individual need for reaction to the risk if they are to 
reduce their vulnerability to, or the impacts of climate change.  
Reflexivity 
As indicated, the need to respond to the consequences of modernity has 
advanced society from simple industrial modernisation to a state of reflexivity. 
Generally speaking, reflexivity in modernisation refers to a state of affairs in 
which problems related to progress and development are identified, but at the 
same time the solutions to the problems are found within the same process of 
development. A reflexive society therefore reacts to the risks produced by its 
progressive modernisation, but is forced to rely on further modernisation to 
correct the problems through an iterative self-critical process. Society no longer 
modernises towards a certain goal, but instead continuously reacts to new 
information coming in about social practices to redefine itself and adjust the 
practices (Matten, 2004). Reflexivity is therefore internal to society and society 
consequently becomes an object of modernisation at the same time as being a 
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driving force for it. This reflexive process can, and should, change the principles 
of development and modernisation, thereby leading to a completely new state of 
existence. As a consequence, the modern social context challenges and changes 
the foundations of the social, economic and political spheres. 
South Africa’s climate change strategy, as is shown here and later in this report, 
is an example of reflexive modernisation. Despite the fact that it acknowledges 
modernisation as the root cause of modern climate change risks, the climate 
change response strategy, in the main, also views modernisation as the primary 
‘solution’ to the local vulnerabilities to climate change (South Africa, 2004). 
Therefore, modernisation becomes self-critical and reflexive. As a result, 
economically viable and beneficial development and modernisation is 
recommended through actions such as technological innovation and transfer, 
adaptation of production techniques and social systems and restructuring of the 
energy sector. 
Reflexivity actually features as a universal theme of modernity. For instance, 
science creates and conceptualises modern risks, but is then also employed to 
find solutions to the risks such as in the case of the IPCC work. In the same 
manner, it is found that the success of the democratic political system causes it to 
lose its centralised locus of control, but the complex decentralised political 
system then has to deal with the resulting uncertainty of control and regulation 
(Webster, 1999). Generally, society turns reflexive, since its increasing flexibility 
allows it to create new problems, but also an infinite ability to adapt to the new 
uncertain and globalised nature of risks.  
A particular intricacy of the risk society concept, however, deals with the 
difference between, and transition from, ‘unawareness’ of modern risks to self-
criticism and knowledge. In contrast to another promoter of the concept of 
reflexive modernisation, Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck repeatedly explains that 
reflexivity is about more than just ‘reflection’ (Beck, 1999, 73):  
“If we call the autonomous, unintentional and unseen, reflex-like 
transition from industrial to risk society reflexivity – in distinction 
and opposition to reflection – then ‘reflexive modernisation’ 
means self-confrontation with the consequences of risk society 
which cannot (adequately) be addressed and overcome in the 
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system of industrial society... At a second stage this constellation 
can, in turn, be made the object of (public, political and academic) 
reflection, but this must not cover up the unreflected, reflex-like 
‘mechanism’ of the transition.” (Emphasis by original author) 
According to Beck, ‘reflection’ is present as soon as a decision is faced on 
whether or not, and how, a particular risk should be responded to. This decision 
needs to be informed somehow, and consequently scientific description, social 
awareness and political uptake become inherently part of the risk response 
process. He adds: 
“With Tony Giddens, it’s actually reflective modernisation that’s 
his main concern, in the sense of self-reflection on the foundations 
and consequences of modernity. He sees this as anchored in 
systems of experts who are continually analysing and then 
overthrowing their old conceptual foundations and thereby making 
new structures possible...[I]f we make this the central identifying 
feature, it becomes almost impossible to draw a distinction 
between reflexive modernity and normal modernity” (Beck and 
Willms, 2004, 32)(Emphasis by original author). 
What is not clear in Beck’s work though is exactly where the transition between 
the two states lies, and what it looks like. Completely ‘unintended and unseen’ 
social change without some degree of self-awareness is unlikely. It is possible 
that the transition can be fluid, allowing the two concepts to overlap within the 
same dynamic process of change. The initial, reflexive response by society to 
self-conceived modern risks is, however, envisaged as an unintended reaction to 
stimuli that changes the very foundations of the reaction triggers as opposed to 
conscious deliberations.  
As indicated by Beck (1999), all aspects of society, including industry and 
science, modernise to a point where they become self-critical and therefore 
‘reflecting’. Science, for example, becomes self-critical in the sense that it can call 
into question its own foundations. This means that completely opposing scientific 
opinions or reasonings may exist concurrently, and yet remain equally valid. A 
good example of this is the ability of the social sciences to critically examine the 
relationship between policy and the natural sciences (Blowers, 1997). Also, 
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climate change is such a popular debate precisely because no one seems to 
agree on the nature and scope of its threat even considering the vast amount of 
global resources that is being applied to climate change research. 
According to Beck’s second form of late modernity, therefore, modernised society 
becomes reflecting, scrutinising its social systems and character, and starts to 
criticise aspects of the social environment that form part of the modernised 
reality. This is more a descriptive process than an active effort at change, where 
all efforts are aimed at trying to gain a better understanding of the identified 
problems. In due course, however, the scientific knowledge will intentionally, and 
with a wide ranging awareness of the issue in various levels of society start to 
influence and change the social drivers of unwanted effects. The end result is 
infinite possibilities for adaptation and change, and probably a complete loss of 
the traditional linear progression of ‘social development’ or modernisation. It 
should, therefore, be considered that reflexivity can form part and parcel of a 
reflective state, and vice versa. They are specifically not considered as 
autonomous components of risk societies. Such an analysis would fail to identify 
and frame the consequences and opportunities of the new modernity adequately 
but instead revert to an analytic form relevant to early modernisation.  
In the reflective state, the individual actors (individuals or institutions) achieve a 
freedom to choose from infinitely flexible reaction or adaptation strategies, as 
opposed to the previous traditional or modernised states where shared interests 
based on localised social institutions and nationality were the defining aspects. 
Beck (1999, 9) describes this second modernity as follows:  
“…a ‘new period of human freedom’, a post-disciplinary age, 
where the foundations of national identity, family, gender, sexuality 
and intimacy are being renegotiated and reconstructed, with 
human beings beginning to develop a sense of global 
responsibility, sensitive to the demands of an ethical globalization.” 
He describes an idealised new modernity in which people strive for a collective 
global benefit. In practice, however, we can assume that individual values and 
interests would feature alongside the global interest. If, as is implied by the risk 
society concept, we are responding to risks rather than ideology then social 
action must be based on risk to the self. If the risk is, however, global, then the 
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universal global response would create a new global identity, thereby matching 
what Beck was proposing.  
The postmodern individualised freedom is a consequence of the advent of 
globalised communication and ever-freer flow of information, capital, goods, 
services, and people (the information society) (Van Gennip, 2005), and a 
concomitant access to a myriad of opinions and views that allow individuals to 
critically assess their context. Or, as Beck (2002, 6) puts it:  
“…it is the reflexivity of the world risk society that breaks the 
silence of words and allows globality to become painfully aware of 
itself in its own context and builds new approaches to conflicts and 
alliances.”  
Critical individuals can reflect on the knowledge about their relationship with 
institutions and question the implication thereof for their own self-realisation. 
Hence, the ‘reflecting’ individual becomes part of a ‘reflexive’ society, where 
reflexivity refers to a self-confrontational active adaptation to, or of, rules and 
resources. As a result individuals or social institutions and structures make sense 
of the environment in different ways, and respond differently to the disparate 
aspects that might be perceived as problems. Different perspectives will therefore 
see different problems, but also frame different solutions to the same problems, 
depending on how sense is made of the uncertainties that surround 
environmental issues. 
In a risk society there are three important uncertainties when reflecting on climate 
change risks. Firstly, the risks themselves are uncertain (IPCC, 2008). Secondly, 
actors are free to determine their own perception of the nature and scale of the 
threat (Leiserowitz, 2006), and thirdly, actors may also decide on the appropriate 
response to the risk perception (Tompkins and Adger, 2005). Consequently, the 
evaluation of risks needs to consider whether climate change will have direct or 
indirect impacts, and has to inform a process that subjectively set thresholds at 
which a reaction to the perceived risks becomes individualised. Blowers (1997) 
describes the thresholds of acceptable risk in the form of tolerance to risk as 
used by the nuclear industry. According to this framework, risk will fall in three 
zones, namely a broadly acceptable region, one where risks need careful 
consideration and a region where risk is unacceptable. The variable limit of 
 29 
acceptable (tolerable) risk would fall in the middle category, and chances are that 
paradigms will only change if the risk is very obviously greater than short- to 
medium-term personal, economic or political interests. An important note here is 
that human lifetimes are so much shorter than climate change cycles, which 
means that modern society can afford to be self-centred in response, thereby 
limiting the response to actions that defer the risk to later generations. This is 
another example of how the trade in produced goods typical to early 
modernisation is replaced by a trade in risk in risk societies (Beck, 1992). 
The greater the reaction to the risks though, the less real the original risk 
becomes since the response will reduce the severity or significance of the risks. 
Consequently, both reflexive and reflecting society finds itself facing a 
personalised reality in which both perceptions of risks and reactions thereto are 
ever-changing. This results in a social context where a universal truth free of 
intellectual determination or set pattern of development of the political ecology 
cannot exist. 
Criticism of Risk Society 
Beck’s work is not universally accepted and applied though. As Mythen (2007) 
points out, Becks style of writing and lack of empirical substance opens the work 
up for criticism. The apparent weaknesses of the thesis, or ‘fissures’, 
nevertheless have “...opened up the exchange of ideas and stimulated the 
advancement of social knowledge...” (Mythen, 2007, 803). Three broad areas of 
criticism of Beck’s ideas exist. Firstly, he is criticised on the basis of his 
theoretical reference frameworks, secondly on the basis of an uncertain real-
world application, and lastly, on the nature of the various concepts used as part 
of the risk society theory.  
The first criticism that Beck acknowledges (Beck, 1999; 2000) relates to the 
philosophical reference framework that gives structure to his theory. In particular, 
his conjoined use of realist and constructivist interpretation (Mythen, 2007).  
Critics argue that he is too realist in his world-view, thereby limiting the 
understanding that can be gained from more constructivist perspectives on risk 
perception. Whilst he uses realist cause-and-effect reasoning to blame positivistic 
science for the rise of modern global technological threats, he neglects the 
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process where these threats are turned into risks by social perception (Healy, 
1997). Beck’s response is that he is equally comfortable with the use of either 
device, as he does not want to be limited to the enlightenment offered by only 
one of the tools. His use of realism allows the risk society concept to map out the 
progression and process flow of information flow, risk creation and risk response 
behaviour in modern society, but he acknowledges the ‘practical’ reality that 
perception (i.e. constructivism) adds to the premise (Beck, 1999). Adam and Van 
Loon (2000) support Beck in this argument, with their view that the distinction is 
irrelevant, because what matters is the actualization of risk.  
Any application of such a dualistic framework therefore needs to be fully aware of 
the limitations of both perspectives – i.e. the ‘unrealistic’ world-view of realism, 
and the ‘uncertain’ nature of constructivism. Beck (1999) does assert though that 
the two perspectives ultimately agree in their diagnoses of society in the sense 
that they both justify the use of the concept of a risk society.   
In addition to the aforementioned debate, there are several voices of concern 
regarding the context in which the risk society theory originated (Scott, 2000, 
Beck, 1999). During the 1980s, when Beck was working on the first risk society 
publication, Europe was still living under the threat of violent ideological clashes 
between East and West – the cold war was still in full swing, and the USSR 
remained in firm opposition to all the Western nations. At the same time, 
Germany became environmentally aware in a way that manifested in ‘ecological 
politics’ (Beck, 2000). It is therefore easy to read Eurocentric or Germanocentric 
paranoia into Beck’s work (Bulkeley, 2001). Beck is quick to point out though that 
most of his examples of modern global risks are either located outside of 
Germany, or have effects that impact on a global scale. In this manner, for 
example, no amount of Germanocentrism can be blamed for an analysis of mad 
cow disease (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or BSE) in the United 
Kingdom (Beck, 1992; 1999; 2000).  
The reality check does mean that the applicability of the risk society theory in 
non-European, or non-Western locations can be questioned (Blowers, 1997; 
Bulkeley, 2001; Mythen, 2007). Beck fails to engage to any degree on the so-
called developing world, and how nations that follow a delayed process of 
industrialisation fit into his vision of a late modernisation period. In fact, some 
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even point to Beck’s limited attempts at applying his theory to real-world case 
studies whether in non-western nations, or not (Benn et al, 2008). According to 
Benn et al (2008), patterns of cooperation between companies and loci of 
influence cannot be assumed to be universal. The evaluation of actual cases 
should therefore be encouraged.  
As a consequence, there exist an opportunity for research that can have global 
relevance. Specifically, there is a need to show how much, if any, of the risk 
society theory applies in developing nations through actual case studies. Blowers 
(1997, 858) raises the concern that the risks faced by developing nations make 
the risks in Western countries seem “almost luxurious”. Risk perception in the 
global South therefore takes a much more complex shape as a result of the 
multiple personalised ‘survival’ risks such as war, famine and disease. 
Investigations into risk perception in a more desperate socio-economic context 
would offer insights into whether the risk society perspective needs to be adapted 
to accommodate modernisation trajectories that are similar, yet fundamentally 
different, from the Westernised contexts that Beck used as his references. This 
would, as a matter of course, also address critics that find that all the 
characteristics that Beck uses to define a risk society can be readily identified 
from any phase of industrialisation (Blowers, 1997; Scott, 2000).  
Some of the concepts inherent to the risk society perspective also come under 
cross-fire. These include the dialectic between reflection and reflexivity (Bulkeley, 
2001), particular views regarding the cultural aspects of risk societies (Lash, 
2000), subpolitics (Bulkeley, 2001) and manufactured risk (Lacy, 2002).  
The distinction between reflexivity and reflection proves to be one of the most 
hotly debated components of risk society, as it appears that every commentator 
has his or her particular view of what the two terms denote. Reflexivity, in its 
purest form, refers to any process that is turned back onto itself in a self-reflective 
manner. However, as part of the risk society thesis, Beck narrows the definition 
down to apply only to autonomous, unintended, reflex-like modernisation 
reactions (Beck, 2004). This is in direct contrast to Giddens (1994) who applies 
the concept in a way that also covers the considered, conscious decision-making 
which Beck defines as ‘reflection’. A similar distinction is used by Lash (2000) 
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who refers to ‘determinate judgement’ as opposed to ‘reflexive judgement’ as his 
particular take on risk construction and definition.  
The heart of the debate is, however, the failure on Beck’s part to show where 
reflexivity turns into reflection. It is unlikely that responses would exist in real-
world situations without some degree of awareness, which means that Beck’s 
insistence that the concept of ‘reflexivity’ be used simply as an analytical device, 
and not an actual reflection of society, is rather important (Beck and Willms, 
2004). What is required, are case study examples of risk society where it can be 
shown what the distinctive differences are between the two concepts. In that way, 
Beck’s reflex-response definition will become increasingly tangible and useful as 
a tool.  
In terms of the definition of risk society, Scott Lash argues that the concept of a 
‘risk culture’, which denotes and places emphasis on the constructed nature of 
risk, should rather be used (Lash, 2000). His premise is that the concept of risk is 
inherently an imagined and emotional construct, and therefore should not be 
seen in any realist manner. Beck’s (1999, 135) response to this argument is 
simply:  
“I do, however, find Lash’s discussion valuable in that he has 
highlighted the radicalization of the cultural framework of risk by 
cultural theory and cultural studies…So ultimately: it is cultural 
perception and definition that constitutes risk. ‘Risk’ and the 
‘(public) definition of risk’ are one and the same”. 
With this, he embraces Lash’s contribution not as criticism or as challenge to risk 
society, but as part of the discourse that adds dimension to the theory. He also 
indicates that a focus on cultural definition of risk fails to acknowledge the 
institutional dimensions of risk and power that are as important in constructing 
and defining risk (Beck, 2000).  
Bulkeley (2001) identifies a further weakness in Beck’s work in her investigations 
into the presence of so-called ‘subpolitics’ in the environmental debate in 
Australia, namely his approach to the manufacturing of risk societies. She finds a 
“...fair degree of confusion and ambiguity in Beck’s writing over the political 
consequences of reflexive modernisation and the evolving ‘subpolitics’ of risk 
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society” (Bulkeley, 2001, 434). On the one hand she points out how Beck 
suggests that subpolitics will take over from formal politics but at the same time 
also that the existing formal political system will retain power and connections in 
society. On the other, her research indicates that the presence of subpolitical 
structures cannot be assumed to be exclusive to late modernisation. A similar 
view is aired by Lacy (2002) who fails to see how subpolitical bodies relate to 
capital interests, and by Benn et al (2008) who ask for more investigation into the 
relationship between local individualised risk and globalism in the subpolitical 
arena.  
The concept of subpolitics, therefore, appears to be another aspect of risk society 
that needs description in real-world scenarios, in order to give further dimension 
to the concept. The application of the theory to different case studies would allow 
the academic discourse to define the term better, and in so doing add value to, or 
better describe risk society as a whole. 
The final avenue of criticism relates to Beck’s failure to offer an adequate 
alternative social construct as counter for the uncertain and ‘risky’ late modernity. 
Lacy (2002) asks whether Beck goes far enough in his ‘risk awareness’ since the 
wide scope of modern risks could imply that a completely new economic and 
social order is required. A similar question is posed by Levitas (2000) in terms of 
Beck’s vision of a rational and risk aware responsible modernity (Beck, 1998). 
Beck also professes to bring hope to a society facing uncertainty (Beck, 1998), 
yet expresses a sceptical position towards science and technology as solutions to 
ecological problems (Blowers, 1997; Cohen, 1997). 
Beck’s answer to his critics lies in his more recent use of the concept 
‘cosmopolitanism’ as the description of his envisaged utopia (Beck and Willms, 
2004). What he would like to see is a society that does not function on the basis 
of individualism, but instead a democracy of self-reflecting decision-making. It is 
Beck who defends himself by indicating:  
“What I suggest is a new model for understanding our times, in a 
not unhopeful spirit...To me, technical (or ecological) democracy is 
the utopia of a responsible modernity, a vision of society in which 
the consequences of technological development and economic 
change are debated before key decisions are taken...Many 
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theories and theorists do not recognise the opportunities of risk 
society.” (Beck, 1998, 20-21) 
In practical terms, a society where politics, science, technology etc. are not 
produced or used without being self-aware as a result of risk awareness that 
shifted the loci of power away from traditional institutions of power. In this way he 
does offer some more concrete view of what society should look like, but the 
image is not yet tested, nor can it be assumed to be universal. As indicated in an 
earlier point, Beck’s ideas have not been tested widely in actual situations and 
therefore lack empirical substantiation (Mythen, 2007). The details of his 
explanations of current social contexts and potential future idealised states need 
to be identified from more widely diverse settings and applications.  
In summary of this Chapter, in order to move from the idea that 
responses to modern climate change can be explained through 
the application of the Beck’s Risk Society concept, to the actual 
application of the theory, a thorough understanding of the central 
themes of risk society theory is required. These include aspects of 
the modern social context such as globalisation and 
modernisation, as well as risk society-specific aspects such as 
reflexivity and ever-present uncertainty. The concepts and 
characteristics, arguably, interact to form part of the ‘drivers’ that 
shape the nature of responses to climate change risks.  
If the interaction can be mapped in some way, then a reference 
framework can be established that will allow for a critical 
assessment of a climate change response through evaluation 
against a background of various decision steps and the 
identification of the various influences that determine the 
perspectives that ultimately shape the specific responses. Based 
on the description of the nature of a modern risk society, Chapter 
3 attempts to present such a risk society framework for climate 
change responses. The framework is graphically represented in 
order to review the preceding characterisation of risk society 
reactions, as well as describe further aspects that are material in 
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CHAPTER 3  FRAMEWORK: RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN A RISK 
SOCIETY 
This chapter aims to detail a reference framework that will show how responses 
to modern risks are shaped in society, and locate climate change responses 
within the broader context of reflexive modernity. It starts off by comparing the 
pre-modern concept of linear developmental progress to reflexive modernisation, 
in order to highlight the changes in modernisation thinking that are advocated by 
the risk society theory. From this comparison, it becomes possible to identify the 
various aspects that contribute to risk responses, and each is discussed with the 
aim of furthering the understanding of their influence on risk responses. The 
critical difference between reflection and reflexivity, as described above, is also 
added to the new modernisation process. A framework is consequently 
developed that uses real-world practices or processes to frame the South African 
climate change strategy as a response to risk. 
Framing Risk Society  
The reflexivity inherent in a risk society differentiates it from traditional or earlier 
‘modernised’ societies. Modernisation was previously visualized as a linear 
(evolutionary) social progression towards a particular developed ideal or shared 
meaning (Figure 3). 
According to risk society theory, however, this progression is a cyclical process. 
Modernisation in its current dynamic form gives rise to unintended ‘latent side 
effects’ in addition to the intended technological advances. These risks have to 
be responded to in some way or another, but the scale (often global) and nature 
(systemic, unseen and unpredictable) of the risks make the application of 
traditional institutions of modernisation inadequate (Beck and Willms, 1994). This 
‘second modernity’ now requires new forms of social reaction or coping 
mechanisms. Consequently, instead of aiming for a specific destination state, a 
risk society applies modernisation as a response to modernisation risks in a way 
undeveloped modernisation developed 
Figure 3: The linear progression model of early modernisation 
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which effects changes to the foundations of the modernisation process (Beck and 
Willms, 2004; Matten, 2004).  
Beck does accede though that the two forms of modernisation exist 
simultaneously in modern societies as the distinction is specifically intended as a 
tool to facilitate a better understanding of the various integrated processes within 
a changeable modern social context that led to a deviation in the way in which 
society reacts to pressures (Beck and Willms, 2004). The presence of the 
reflexivity in modernisation is critical to the understanding of modern risks and 
responses, such as responses to climate change, since it is the reflexive 
characteristic of responses that would have them qualify as risk responses.  
Between, and within the various components of reflexive modernisation a risk 
society, however, there exist processes of knowledge creation and application 
which take the knowledge of risks and transform it into a social response. This 
transformation is characterised by the interplay of diverse perspectives and 
interests that ultimately lead to the reflexive (or reflective) application of 
knowledge and change. Therefore, if a framework can be conceived that can 
provide an explanation of the dynamic process that lies between the creation of 
risks and the generation of appropriate responses, then a better understanding of 
the operation of a risk society will be possible. It will also necessarily have to 
provide for a description of the process that diverts risk responses into reflective 
self-confrontation, and give direction to initiatives that aim to pursue Beck’s ideal 
of a truly democratic self-critical society.  
The following section consequently sets out to investigate some of the key 
aspects that influence the formulation of climate change risk responses in order 
to define and populate such a framework.  
Risk Society Characteristics in the Climate Change Response Framework 
Climate change responses in a reflexive risk society are determined by various 
characteristic processes inherent to the risk society concept. These have been 
identified and described by Beck (1992; 1999; 2004), Giddens (1990; 1994) and 
others (Lash, 1994; Bulkeley, 2001) as part of the discourse on risk society.  
Broadly categorised, the main processes intrinsic to risk society, as illustrated in 
Figure 4, can be described as: 
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• Modernisation, in the form of social and industrial development 
• Globalisation, and/or the reorganisation of social institutions in order to 
accommodate new forms of risk  
• The creation and conceptualisation of risk (manufactured risk and 
manufactured uncertainty) 
• Unintended (reflexive) response to risks 
As indicated earlier, however, reflexivity does not exist unopposed within a risk 
society. Social, political, academic and scientific ‘reflection’ is considered a 
related but separate component of the late modernity of a risk society (Beck and 
Willms, 2004). How can the politicising of risk and its embeddening in society 
(political economy and social responses) as a ‘reflection’ on risks and risk 
perception therefore be fitted into the risk response framework so as to allow an 
understanding of the dynamic between it and reflexivity?  
In order to answer this question, each aspect of the proposed framework is 
explored against the background of risk society. This offers insights into the 
interactions between the various components of the framework, as well as the 
roles that reflection play within the structure of a risk society. Accordingly, the 
narrative will first consider the role of globalisation, then the nature of risk 








Figure 4: The basic cyclical process of risk response in a risk society 
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Globalisation 
The driving concept behind the risk society theory is the growing inability of 
society to cope with the effects of modernisation (Beck, 1996). Industrialisation 
and modernisation during the past century has become so successful that it is 
creating systematic unforeseen, unintended and unseen consequences or by-
products of modernisation that cannot be adequately controlled, processed or 
absorbed through existing or traditional response systems. One of the ways in 
which the new risks are both created and, at the same time, accommodated in 
society is through globalisation (Giddens, 1990; Blowers, 1997). Put differently, 
globalisation in this context refers to the deconstruction and reconstruction of 
time and space in order to respond to equally disaggregated modernisation and 
risks.  
In modern society, time and space have ceased to be static, unchangeable and 
limiting. Modernity has created connections between different times and spaces 
through means of global transportation, communications and inter-generational 
timelines. As a consequence, spatial and temporal limitations were removed from 
the modernisation process, and opportunities were created for organisations to 
operate independently of space and time in a universal globalised context. 
National boundaries have also receded as determining factors during the past 
century which saw the rise of global institutions, industries and corporations, the 
rise and fall of socialism and the conquests of capitalism. This mix created 
business empires that stretch across the globe and between multitudes of 
economic layers.  
Unfortunately, this also means that the unexpected or unwanted by-products of 
industrialisation become as great in scale and pervasiveness. On a global scale, 
we are faced with a host of diffuse sources of pollution and degradation, with a 
sum total or cumulative effect that has implications on a similar global scale.  
In the case of climate change, for example, we know that the burning of fossil 
fuels releases great volumes of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere. The 
global increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations is one of the lead causes of 
global warming, and has been clearly shown to be directly related the rapid 
industrialisation of the past century (IPCC, 2001; IPCC, 2007). Globalisation, 
however, makes it possible for companies to either source cheap fossil fuels 
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from, or locate polluting production processes in countries where the sourcing 
and burning of fossil fuels are the cheapest (Jotzo, 2004; South Africa, 2004). It is 
therefore likely that companies can pollute more on a global scale than if all the 
processes were located in a country with stringent emission controls, but this is 
difficult to prove conclusively as a result of the diffuse nature of globalised 
business (Oikonomoua et al., 2006). The number of industries in the world further 
means that although individual companies might be compliant with standards, the 
cumulative effect on the globe is the substantial increase in carbon dioxide levels 
without any real mode of overall control. The problem is therefore of such a 
diffuse origin that effective control becomes difficult (Matten, 2004). Other 
examples of time and space independent consequences of modernity with 
definite relevance to climate change are globalised transportation systems, a 
consumer society, generally inefficient waste disposal systems, a reliance on 
carbon-based fuels, and a rising world population. All of these generate impacts 
of great magnitude that have an impact on our climate, but none of them can be 
effectively controlled due to the diffuse origins and global distribution of the 
impacts. 
The disaggregation of time and space also means that industries and 
corporations now carry with them the ability to externalise unwanted effects. 
According to this business principle, ‘bads’ such as pollution, chemical 
contamination and resource degradation can be distributed amongst other parties 
or areas in order to disassociate the company from the cost of disposal or 
remediation. The nature of the global economic system offers multinational 
companies many opportunities for the division of production processes, and 
therefore also the ability to locate particular processes in areas or countries 
where the by-products will be easier and cheaper to dispose of. This process is 
an example of how globalisation can compound the unwanted effects of modern 
risks. The ability to globally redistribute negative effects means that global 
systems of inequality or differential development strategies can act as channels 
for the concentration of unwanted effects (Lacy, 2002; IPCC, 2007). Risks are 
really determined by actions within particular contexts, and therefore it can be 
said that where you live and how you do things will determine your particular risk 
situation. A developing nation that depends on primary economic sectors with no 
opportunity for voluntary, non-essential environmental improvement that could 
lead to sub-optimal profits, for example, will necessarily be more vulnerable to 
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climate change related impacts, but at the same time also more guilty of 
contributing towards it. This gives rise to the suggestion that pollution favours the 
poor, as the ‘beggar’ nations of the world cannot be ‘choosers’ when it comes to 
foreign investment, irrespective of the pollution it may bring along (Beck, 1992; 
Blowers, 1997). 
Another aspect of particular importance is the latency of climate change impacts. 
Many modern industrial or business systems will generate large-scale impacts 
that will possibly only become substantive sometime in the future (Lacy, 2002). 
This intergenerational aspect of climate change impacts is very relevant when 
considering response strategies, as the reactions need to take cognisance of 
these time-independent impacts, and offer long-term strategies on how to deal 
with them (Layton and Levine, 2003). 
Globalisation does not solely represent growing problems though. In very much 
the same manner in which it adds to modern risks, the growing interrelatedness 
of the modern world can offer innovative solutions to problems based on global 
cooperation and systems. This is one of the ways in which the ‘normal’ industrial 
era responses can expand beyond their customary ranges, and necessarily 
become part of a reflexive modernisation responses.  
The global economic system, as an example, offers developing countries the 
opportunity to access development funding and foreign direct investment based 
on advanced technological expertise that would otherwise never have reached 
these countries. As a consequence, this partly assists developing countries to 
make their industrialisation process both faster and less environmentally 
damaging than what was true for the countries that industrialised during the 20th 
century. Global cooperation in the realms of science and information sharing 
further means that efforts at understanding and responding to climate change 
risks can become international, and based on a better spread of information 
sources.  
Considered as part of a climate change response framework, globalised 
innovation becomes part of a link between an awareness of risks and an eventual 
innovative response.  
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Manufactured Risk 
The knowledge that society has of modern risks is predominantly shaped by 
expert systems that define what the risks look like and how significant they are 
(Blowers, 1997). It is this knowledge that defines the outcome of the self-
confrontational ‘reflecting’ on modern risks. Two concepts, namely expert 
systems and manufactured risk, need to be investigated as main contributors to 
the comprehension of risk, and as further illumination of where and how reflexive 
responses branch off into reflective reaction, and adding to a description of the 
reflecting process as part of the risk response framework.  
 Expert systems 
Modernisation involves disembeddening, which refers to a process whereby 
actors in society are distanced from specialist knowledge or complex processes, 
to the point where they have to rely on representations and proxies in order to 
relate to the highly diverse and dynamic modern social order (Giddens, 1990). 
We can, for example, no longer claim to have in-depth understanding of climate 
change. Instead, we are reduced to relying on the opinions of the participants of 
various expert systems who are supposedly more knowledgeable. Giddens 
(1990, 27) defines expert systems as: “…systems of technical accomplishment or 
professional expertise that organise large areas of the material and social 
environments in which we live today.”  
The emergence of expert systems is due to the highly diversified nature of our 
modern world, and the concomitant rate of specialisation. It means that 
knowledge niches are created in all aspects and spheres of society, and that 
these become the domains of those who have the relevant specialist credentials. 
Without the necessary credentials, one cannot be considered a specialist, and 
society will not allow you to operate an expert system as one. The end result is 
that we become reliant on the information, advice, support, and associated 
networks of other expert systems in order to function in our own niche.  
The complication that arises, however, is that expert systems also possess the 
specialist knowledge required to critically evaluate them (Demeritt, 2006). This 
means that non-experts have to rely on expert knowledge of the expert systems, 
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in order to make an informed decision about the appropriateness or correctness 
of the knowledge or expertise held by the expert system.  
The implication for climate change response strategies is that non-expert policy 
makers need to rely on expert scientific fields to inform their policies. However, 
the only way to know whether these advices are correct and relevant is to obtain 
advice from even more experts (McCright and Dunlap, 2003). Beck (1999) 
considered such critical self-confrontation to be separate from the reflexive 
response that a risk society displays. According to him, this awareness of 
shortcomings and conscious decision-making about risks represents reflection 
rather than reflexivity. The reflection adds to an inherent uncertainty in policy-
making and its eventual uncertain effect.  
Of particular concern is the fact that the reliance on expert systems in modern 
climate change and risk society contexts means that areas such as the definition 
and conceptualisation of risks become areas of specialist knowledge and the 
information generated in these areas become the foundation of all other 
processes of policy compilation, without any external review being possible 
(Munnichs, 2003). 
 Manufactured risk 
Beck’s ‘risk society’ is characterised by the advent of globalised, intergenerational 
risks (Beck, 1992; Bulkeley, 2001). As opposed to environmental risks that 
previously threatened individual communities, settlements or regions, the new 
category of risk poses a hazard to multiple nations or even the entire world with 
effects that can extend beyond one generation. Beck evaluated the examples of 
acid rain and nuclear installations, but also referred to climate change and global 
warming (Beck, 1992, Beck, 2006). These risks are all ‘manufactured’ in the 
sense that they generally exist as by-products of industrialisation and 
modernisation. Although the sources of the risks are usually found on local 
scales, accumulation and interaction with global distributative forces have the 
potential to affect the livelihoods or conditions of societies across the globe.  
The threat of climate change has to do with a global shift in climate patterns, due 
to changes in key constituents or interactions of the climate system. Climate 
change is therefore inherently global. Global circulations will redistribute any 
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factor that forces changes to the system or pollutants through climatic forcing 
effects. The impacts can therefore manifest at a completely different part of the 
globe (ozone layer depletion), or at several interconnected locations (El Niño 
effect), or even be universally distributed to affect all parts (global warming) 
(IPCC, 2001). Small-scale regional changes due to direct influences are therefore 
not the concern – rather the global patterns of surface or atmospheric 
temperatures, precipitation and oceanic circulations. This implies that climate 
change has globalised risks that neatly fit into the risk society framework.  
Science is particularly to blame for the manufacturing of unintended 
consequences that affect our climate (Beck, 1992). CFCs for example, were 
originally developed as very stable, cheap and effective propellant and cooling 
agents. However, as time went by, science realised that the previously ‘harmless’ 
group of chemicals were dissolving the protective ozone layer. The impact was 
unexpected, globally significant, and required concerted global efforts to reverse 
(Beck, 2006). Similar unexpected chemical reactions are undoubtedly occurring 
as a result of the release of increasingly more artificial and complex chemicals 
into the environment as by-products of scientific and industrial progress.  
The label ‘manufactured’ also refers to the knowledge we hold of the risks. Who 
knows what climate change impacts can be expected? International donors, 
development planners, conferences and academic papers, governments and 
both developmental and environmental activists alike wave the banner of climate 
change in support of their particular call for action, but although there is a general 
sense that climate change is real, no consensus has been reached on the exact 
dimensions of the threat (Giddens, 1994; IPCC, 2001; IPCC, 2007). Many 
scientific findings are available to prove or disprove claims and statistical 
analyses are used to the same effect. This is clearly a case of expert systems, as 
conceptualised by Giddens (1990), being in control of both the technical 
knowledge of, and professional expertise around a particular facet of modernity.  
Ultimately, society has to be satisfied with the use of perceptions, more than 
expert knowledge and certainty, to determine what is accepted as truth. Our 
world of uncertainty therefore creates socially constructed hazards and quasi-
objects (manufactured uncertainty or risk) that are used to invoke change. This is 
realized by allowing perception of future impacts to determine and define present 
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management of the risks. A risk society comes about through modernisation that 
has progressed to the point where it is not trying to use or master the 
environment, but rather to minimise the risks that ‘natural’ hazards pose to 
production – e.g. environmental disasters or loss of access to resources. Risks 
can therefore become a new source of conflict and social formation. Interestingly, 
the new state of society has to adjust to a negative trade in an unwanted good, 
as opposed to previous attempts to monopolise goods and services (Van Loon, 
2000; Matten, 2004). Risks are therefore managed (delimited and redistributed) 
to achieve two things (Beck, 1992): 
• They may not hamper the process of modernisation 
• They may not exceed what is ecologically/medically/psychologically/ 
socially acceptable 
The risks that we do respond to are, however, determined by our place in the 
global system. Although everyone faces the same global warming risk, not 
everyone feels compelled to do anything general about cutting the emission of 
greenhouse gasses. In South Africa, the focus is more on the risks posed to local 
development issues.  
The ‘Big Question’ to be answered, however, is how do we define the parameters 
of ‘significant risk’? Self-confrontation in science immediately comes to mind 
since, as creator and conceptualisor of the risk, it should also have the power to 
define the parameters of a particular risk. However, as argued by Beck (1999) 
society seldom uses science as the only foundation for decision-making in a 
reflecting state. Other influences that include politics, economic interest and 
limited legal definition contribute to a final knowledge of risks. Consequently, 
many subjective influences may determine the immediacy and extent of 
conceptualised risks, and hence also the response thereto. The uncertainty that 
is created or employed throughout this process therefore needs to be considered 
as an integral part of the risk response framework since it may prove central to 
identifying gaps, weaknesses or inconsistencies in climate change responses.  
Contradictory Science 
The understanding that society has of modern climate change risks is presently 
characterised by uncertainty and conflicting scientific opinions. Nevertheless, it 
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remains these perceptions that shape responses to risks. The framework of 
Figure 4 can therefore be expanded yet more, by adding scientific self-
confrontation and risk perception to the missing ‘reflecting’ state.  
 Manufactured uncertainty 
The basic inability to accurately define and prove climate change risks empirically 
increases the uncertainty around those risks. This inability is due to the future 
threat of climate change ultimately only existing in computer algorithms or 
theoretical arguments. Any research on the subject is therefore nothing more 
than an attempt to see into the future. Decision-makers have to rely on proxy 
indicators such as historical scenarios or mathematical representations of an 
inherently chaotic climate system. It therefore generates uncertainty by creating 
or conceptualising risks that can never be entirely exact, since (according to risk 
society theory) the response to the risk will prevent verification thereof. The 
elimination of ozone-depleting substances, for example, prevents science from 
knowing the real extent of their threat. The risks are therefore artificial or 
manufactured, as they are known only through conceptualisation by science or 
popular opinion. Within such prediction models, it becomes painfully obvious that 
any uncertainty in base data will be present in the ultimate findings as well.  
The inability to isolate ‘nature’ from the social sphere has also gone beyond a 
positivistic perspective regarding social manipulation and impacts on what we 
consider ‘natural’ (Beck, 1999; Beck, 2000). Recently, the differentiation between 
the products of society and what is considered natural eroded, allowing the 
concept ‘environment’ to replace ‘nature’ (Escobar, 1996). The ‘super concept’ of 
a social environment has therefore become self-confrontational in that it is both 
the cause and response to its greatest environmental threats and risks. Since we 
cannot differentiate between a natural risk and a man-made one, it is easier to 
argue that all risks can be accepted as extensions of natural risk over which we 
should not have control. Such a re-definition can also serve to redefine the risk 
relative to the context in order to make it more acceptable, or keep it within limits.  
The risks that we identify should, however, not be confused with the uncertainty 
through which they are known (Stirling, 2003). If the extent of the uncertainty is 
known, then it increases the understanding and comprehension of the actual risk, 
which allows for more appropriate responses.  
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The problem that arises is that globally universal problems become increasingly 
intangible, and therefore harder and harder to regulate effectively with local or 
even regional controls (Beck, 1999). As the divide between the comprehension of 
the environmental issues and their regulation deepens, so too does the 
separation between intention and action. Global agreements suddenly need to be 
devolved down through regional organisations, national governments, local 
regulatory levels, industry organisations and then individual actors who make the 
actual changes. The actors therefore might be too far removed from the original 
deliberations of the problem to really care about the implementation of the 
solutions. Such a state of uncertainty will potentially be easier to manipulate to 
the advantage of powerful players in the environmental politics arena. 
 Sociology of science 
Science by definition is realist, which implies that climate change science should 
be universal, unambiguous and unchallenged. The only basis for uncertainty in 
the climate change field would be “…attributed either to ignorance when non-
experts misinterpret the probabilities, or a lack of data that prevents rigorous 
calculations” (Howes, 2005, 5-6). In a reflecting risk society, however, risk 
perceptions are more than just definitions of hazards or threats. Modern risks are 
perceptions – social constructions infused with politics, opinions, half-truths and 
uncertainty. This constructionist view holds that different social systems will 
‘construct’ risks according to subjective recognition and understanding, as well as 
give them meaning in relation to a specific context (Howes, 2005). This apparent 
divide leaves science in a state of uncertainty, since value-laden perceptions 
require value-added analysis that rational science is not necessarily equipped for 
(Demeritt, 2001).  
In trying to bridge the divide and account for socially divergent perspectives on 
the risk that climatic change poses, climate change science has to renounce its 
monopolistic claim to rationality since science itself is “…one of the causes, the 
medium of definition and the source of solutions to risks…” (Beck, 1992, 155). 
Conflicting claims, interests and viewpoints of the various agents of modernity 
therefore needs to be considered as a valid part of the conceptualisation of 
climate change risks. The resulting self-reflection ultimately becomes part of the 
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reflexivity of modernity, and has far-reaching implications for the sanctity of the 
scientific realm: 
“Where the sciences and expert disciplines take up and examine 
their foundations, consequences and errors in reciprocal 
relationships, the same thing happens to expert rationality as 
happened to lay rationality in the triumph of science: its defects 
become recognizable, questionable and capable of arrangement 
and rearrangement. The environmental issue penetrates into all 
occupational fields and becomes concrete and manifest in 
substantive controversies regarding methods, orientations, 
calculation procedures, objectives, standards, plans, routines, and 
so on” (Beck, 1999, 99). 
Beck (1999, 58) makes a further strong point when indicating “It is the success of 
science which sows the doubts as to its risk predictions.” In terms of climate 
change risks, it means that the growth in climate change science (in terms of both 
understanding and uncertainty), in combination with the self-criticism of the 
scientific method have led to an undermining of the basic principles of the field 
(Giddens, 1994; Healy, 1997). The end result is divergent scientific answers or 
contradictory certainties that are all equally feasible and credible, since they are 
all based on reliable and acceptably reasonable assumptions (Stirling, 2003). 
This insight should not be regarded lightly, as diverse opinions can be abused in 
many ways.  
The implication for the risk society thesis is that the concept of risk cannot be 
accurately defined and measured, hence leaving the decisions drawing on the 
risk evaluations highly susceptible to subjectivity and consequently ‘unreliable’ or 
contestable. As Stirling (2003, 38-39) indicates:  
“…there can in principle…be no effective analytic means 
definitively to compare the intensities of subjective preference…” 
and “…[it] is impossible under the rational choice paradigm to 
guarantee any definitive aggregation of preference orderings in a 
plural society.”  
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The contestability of climate change risks naturally slows down responses, and 
allows the risk to grow amidst the uncertainty. This occurs on several levels. 
Firstly, the existence of the threat can be denied until ‘scientifically’ proven. 
Science remains the only way in which we can verify the existence of climate 
change, since climate change has no symptoms that can be discerned by human 
senses. One could argue that the effects of climate change will be experienced, 
but even climatic variables need to be proven to be statistically meaningful before 
we have ‘proof’ that climate change actually exists. Thus, until enough scientific 
consensus is reached, we will not be in a position to argue against the causes of 
climate change, and the dangers can grow. Beck (1992, 71) puts it rather 
succinctly:  
“Sooner rather than later, one comes up against the law that so 
long as risks are not recognised scientifically, they do not exist – 
at least not legally, medically, technologically, or socially, and they 
are thus not prevented, treated or compensated for” (Emphasis by 
original author). 
Secondly, adherence to scientific rigour implies that the more we intensify the 
inquiry, the harder it becomes to maintain a global understanding of the complex 
dynamics inherent in the global interactions that drive climatic processes. This is 
a direct result of the unearthing of a multitude of variables due to a quest for 
greater scientific accuracy, without actually getting to a point of completing the 
puzzle. Ultimately, this reduces the number of risks that justify reaction, whilst at 
the same time legitimising the rest through the scientific uncertainty (Beck, 1992).  
Scientific self-confrontation becomes a third delaying tactic. Science of a higher 
standard of accuracy is allowed to level criticism at less detailed work, since the 
more detailed work is likely to question the broad assumptions used by more 
general science. This places the conclusions of the original work in doubt, and 
again offers opportunity for risks to escalate until sufficient consensus has been 
reached (Beck, 1992).  
A last point that is very relevant to the creation of scientific knowledge is related 
to the dissemination or use of the knowledge. One of the assumptions of 
statistical risk science (the need to understand risk so that it can be controlled), 
as a form of pure positivistic science, is that we are able to communicate 
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scientific findings and recommendations adequately (Patt and Dessai, 2005). In a 
fast-paced modern society though, the information used to inform opinions and 
decisions are generally obtained from mass media. Mass media is, however, 
subject to public opinion in terms of decisions over what is considered 
communication-worthy, and has to abbreviate scientific information and 
interpretations. Since climate change risks are invisible and based on causal 
interpretations – in other words, they exist only on paper or through scientific 
deductions and thus subject to social definition - the severity of a risk can be 
misrepresented or misunderstood, or the explanatory detail lost (Lomborg, 2001).  
The uncertainty that has become inherently part of late modernity creates 
conditions that are favourable for the presence of reflection as a counterpoint to, 
or even a component of reflexivity. As the discussion above explored, it is the 
certainty of uncertainty that makes it possible to vary our knowledge of risk 
almost at will. As the debate grows, so does the scale of reflection, and hence the 
amount of risk response that is diverted from the unaware, reflex reaction cycle to 
a more conscious and deliberated response that might not lead to reflexive 
modernisation.   
Ecological Political Economy 
 Knowledge and power 
A fundamental aspect of a reflecting (self-aware and self-confrontational) risk 
society is the understanding that decision-making is driven by politics rather than 
rigorous scientific discipline. What this means is that popular and political 
intentions, and by implication dominant social power structures and influential 
groups, steer consensus over what are considered the most important social, 
economic and environmental problems and therefore what should be done about 
them. This perspective on decision-making can be seen as an analysis that 
ascribes power to the combination of various powers and knowledges in society, 
typical of the worldview held by Michel Foucault (Hajer, 1995). According to 
Foucault, socio-political and historical forces shape power systems in society 
through the use of reasoning that both defines and legitimises them. The 
‘reasoning’ resides in the monopolisation of knowledge in a manner that will 
maintain the existing power base – described as a process of epistemic 
sovereignty (knowledge that is sanctioned) (Rouse, 1994). Knowledge and 
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information can be monopolised by steering disciplined investigations according 
to what is considered ‘serious’ and useful to whoever is doing the directing, since 
scientific or academic research are usually slanted towards topics of popular 
interest, or directed by the financial or other interests of corporate funding or 
research institutions. The power structures that operate within society therefore 
also holds sway over the conceptualisation of environmental risks since these 
parties have the power to both define the questions (what should be investigated) 
and the answers (who’s opinion is acceptable/important, or which thresholds or 
methodologies are acceptable). Usually, the answers relate directly to solutions 
that will reinforce the sources of influence held by power structures (Beck, 1992) 
in the sense that agents or groups with the necessary power or influence can 
determine what the most important (environmental) problems are, and then what 
resources will be used to find solutions and implement them (Lomborg, 2001).  
 Subpolitics 
World-shaping decisions are consequently being made outside the scientific 
arena, and are intended to prevent or manage social response to perceived 
problems by finding generally acceptable solutions. The influence coming from 
the political arena might be based on formal politics and power systems, or 
alternatively on what Beck (1992) terms sub-politics. According to this view, 
formal politics only encompasses the political debate within debating structures 
such as parliament. All other decisions that are taken outside these arenas, even 
if they eventually inform the political debate, qualify as subpolitics. Subpolitics is 
present where knowledge is created and decisions are made outside the realms 
of specialist knowledge, through: 
 “…ad hoc individual participation in political decisions, bypassing 
the institutions of representative opinion-formation (political 
parties, parliaments) and often even lacking the protection of the 
law” (Beck, 1999, 39) (Emphasis by original author). 
Hajer (1995) gives the examples of laboratories, scientific councils, 
environmentalist movements and media campaigns as arenas where subpolitics 
occur, with Blowers (1997, 850) identifying the “conflicts between interests” of 
business, nation-states, intergovernmental organisations, science and 
environmental groups. All such subpolitical locations or structures offer 
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opportunities for negotiation and subjective decisions that can then be used to 
inform the political debate on the basis of an ‘expert knowledge and 
recommendation’. Such expert systems cannot easily be challenged outside the 
realm where they were conceived, and can therefore remotely determine political 
decision-making. In addition, the concept of a ‘public’ can represent another 
subpolitical extension of the political process though the dissemination and 
support of popular opinions.  
By implication, we have politics that infuse the realm of knowledge creation as 
well as the various fields of knowledge application. On the one hand, it infiltrates 
the sphere of specialist knowledge creation, but on the other, popular opinion on 
scientific subjects or perceptions of risks is commonly based on superficial media 
reports that were intentionally sensationalised. The popular opinion then informs 
political or economic positions within the democratic system, leading to major 
decisions being made without the benefit of sound specialist advice. This is 
especially true in situations where specialist knowledge about indefinite risks 
such as climate change might be hard to come by or difficult to comprehend. The 
more complex a problem, the more leeway it has to spread and intensify before 
the effects can be identified, classified, quantified and reported on (Beck, 1992).  
Subpolitics can therefore, based on different perspectives on the same subjects, 
continuously influence decision-making, knowledge creation and knowledge 
application whilst it generally plays into the hands of powerful structures or 
institutions that need to protect their economic interests. In combination with 
subjective or non-independent media, it will also feature as a polarising force in 
the global arena. 
If we therefore accept that it is possible that the global consumption-driven 
political economy is driving environmental research, then it becomes a real 
possibility that the environmental problems of the day are mere reflections of 
threats to continued resource exploitation since these would be the topics that 
find exposure in the media. The responses to the threats are therefore similarly 
informed by economic drivers.  
Subpolitical activity and influence affect many aspects of our world, and probably 
all aspects of environmental science. Lélé (1991, 616) for example, describes the 
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concept of sustainable development in a manner that refers to subpolitical 
influences:  
“Given this confusion in terms, perceptions and concepts, the 
policies being suggested by the mainstream of sustainable 
development thinking cannot and do not conform to the basic idea 
of ecologically sound and socially equitable development. They 
are often seriously flawed, and reflect personal, organisational and 
political preferences.” 
Similarly, Howes (2005, xxii) identifies the various levels of influences, which 
includes subpolitical action, of the environmental movement: 
“This diversity of structure, size and purpose is reflected in the 
variety of strategies adopted by the [environmental] movement. 
These range from behind the scenes lobbying and letter writing 
campaigns to consumer boycotts, protests or direct actions, taking 
legal action and even running candidates for office. More recently, 
groups have sometimes adopted a partnership approach that 
enables them to work with individual firms or governments to 
improve environmental outcomes.”  
 Public opinion 
Subpolitics in the public sphere are related to the uncertainty on which decisions 
are based. In risk societies, social action and reaction are determined by 
perceptions of risk, not actual scientific validity (Beck, 1992). Beck (1999) 
describes it as a particular state of being between security and destruction, since 
our perception tells us that things are not alright, but we cannot fully understand 
the threat since our actions are preventing the risks from becoming reality. The 
implication is that we act and make decisions on the basis of future happenings: 
 “…the actual social impetus of risks lies in the projected dangers 
of the future. In this sense there are hazards which, if they occur, 
would mean destruction on such a scale that action afterwards 
would be practically impossible. Therefore, even as conjectures, 
as threats to the future, as prognoses, they have and develop a 
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practical relevance to preventative actions. The centre of risk 
consciousness lies not in the present, but in the future. In the risk 
society, the past loses the power to determine the present” (Beck, 
1992, 34) (Emphasis by original author). 
The really challenging aspect is that our actions are in fact preventing the ‘future’ 
from ever occurring. It means that our freedom of decision-making is not informed 
by real consequences (Beck, 1999). On the other hand, however, the uncertainty 
of the risk society knowledge base means that we are not bound by politics, law 
and science to the same extent as in previous social orders. We are at liberty to 
act on the perceptions that we hold and the levels of risk that we deem 
acceptable (Lacy, 2002).  
Public opinion is unfortunately at risk of resorting to ‘moral’ or ‘risk’ panics – 
sudden flashes of interest in challenges to the status quo (Cohen, 1980). Such 
panics occur whenever “A condition, episode, person or group of persons 
emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests;” (Cohen, 
1980, 9). Perception of the threat is therefore paramount, and for this reason 
moral panics are highly reliant on societal agents with the ability to shape public 
opinion. Cohen (1980, 9) specifically identifies the mass media, political figures 
and expert systems:  
“…[the nature of moral panics]…is presented in a stylised and 
stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are 
manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking 
people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and 
solutions;” 
A ‘moral panic’ centred on climate change would therefore have two dimensions: 
1. the nature of the conveyance of information on the issue, and  
2. the interests and agendas of social agents that use information on the 
particular issue.  
The first dimension is firmly rooted in the uncertainty of risk society knowledge 
systems. In this information age, a myriad of different messages get conveyed 
through mass media. A message with some sort of public appeal (such as 
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climate change, which has appeal through its universality and scale) could 
therefore easily lead to a risk panic. Scientific research and debate would 
therefore be called in to explain the issue, provide answers and solutions, but 
also to provide legitimate support for particular viewpoints. The publicity that the 
issue gets within the mass media means that the media could be used as a 
medium to fuel further panic, convey personal agendas or garner support for 
ideas or persons. 
On a political level, politicians, academics and other persons of social standing 
rely on the support of voters or power interests, and they therefore respond to 
popular topics such as climate change in order to keep the public satisfied and 
powerful allies reassured. Should a risk panic strike, they need to show that they 
are taking an action or at least taking up a position on the subject. The 
consequence is that the issues of the day in public rallies and political forums 
come to be driven by subpolitics rather than objective science. In Cohen’s words 
(1980, 191): 
“Magistrates, leader writers and politicians do not react like 
laboratory creatures being presented a series of random stimuli, 
but in terms of positions, statuses, interests, ideologies and 
values. Their responsiveness to rumours, for example, is not just 
related to the internal dynamics of the rumour process…, but 
whether the rumours support their particular interests.” 
Cohen’s reference to ‘magistrates’ identifies a particularly important part of the 
‘moral panic’ process – the vilification or legitimisation of the risk. A high profile 
environmental case could for example become subpoliticised through the 
uncertain context being created by intentionally biased court documents, urgent 
media reports and public pressure. The outcome of the case might lead to certain 
levels of environmental degradation being designated as acceptable by the 
courts and this process would therefore legitimise some of the environmental 
risks, leading to a smaller public outcry and consequently less public forcing of 
subpolitics. As easily, however, the opposite might occur – the legitimisation of 
the outcry through judgments that make pronouncements over environmentally 
degrading activities. (Also see Beck’s example of the Brent Spar oil platform 
incident (Beck, 1999; Beck and Willms, 2004)) 
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 Formal politics 
The positions of power inherent in a formal political system rely on two broad 
spheres of support – economic interests and public opinion (Blowers, 1997). 
Economic interests include both business and international influences, and tend 
to reside in a structure controlled by elite individuals, families or enterprises and 
strive towards centralised power. In contrast, public opinion is represented by the 
democratic system and comprises a pluralistic power structure consisting of 
various pressure groups (Beck, 1999). The two interest groups will therefore be in 
conflict with each other at times, but the support of both is required to maintain 
dominance in a democratic political dispensation. Both should consequently be 
pacified by policies and responses to general risks such as climate change. 
With respect to climate change risks, the interests of business and general 
industry (economic interests) will be served in two possible ways (Beck and 
Willms, 2004). Firstly, business must be protected from the actual effects of 
climate change, insofar as it might affect production, distribution or consumption 
of products. Unbridled modernisation that generates and fuels climate risks must 
be controlled to an extent that natural resources, the ability to distribute products 
and the consumption capacity of markets are not degraded by climate related 
influences. Industries will consequently strive to manage the climate-affecting 
factors that are perceived as threatening in a manner that will externalise any 
risks. Essentially, climate change responses therefore need to direct global 
modernisation in a way that reduces the risks posed by industrialisation to 
industrialisation. This reflexive situation implies a certain amount of introspection 
on the side of industries, which could potentially lead to changes in the way in 
which industries participate in the modernisation process. Secondly, in order to 
prevent external pressure from eroding its control over production processes, 
industry must avoid being exposed as guilty of contributing to climate change or 
opposing climate change related interventions. Whether through government 
regulation or consumer pressure, powerful economic entities will resist change 
that is external because of the loss of control that it represents. External pressure 
will tend to erode profitability unless the changes can be designed and controlled 
in a manner that suits industry. 
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A third, less defined manner of maintaining credibility is by ensuring political 
support. This is, however, a circular reference since economic interests form part 
of the system that legitimises political power. In fact, Howes (2005) found that 
with regards to environmental issues the governments of the United Kingdom, 
Unites States of America and Australia were all wary of either blaming or 
upsetting industry. Political support instead tends to favour policies that pursue 
GDP growth and employment levels. However, in some cases political support 
may actually translate into popular support if the political will and rhetoric can 
convince its supporters of a particular viewpoint – be that environmental or 
otherwise.  
On the other hand, public opinion (democratic interest) on the whole will be 
supportive of a political power if: 
• Risks are perceived as acceptable, 
• The apportion of blame is accepted, and/or 
• The controls over risks are considered adequate.  
Risks will be accepted by anyone who feels powerless to affect the presence or 
nature of the risks, or in cases where the risk is considered not to be of significant 
concern. As discussed earlier in this report, risk perception is crucial. Political 
powers need to convince the public that the risks they face either don’t exist, are 
not of substantial threat or can be controlled sufficiently. The advantage for the 
political system is that much of the public realm functions on selective information 
distribution, and it can therefore manipulate the treatment of information in a way 
that will support particular objectives. 
 Legitimisation and individualisation through uncertain science and law 
At the heart of the risk society theory lies the following quotation:  
“For dangers are being produced by industry, externalised by 
economics, individualised by the legal system, legitimised by the 
natural sciences and made to appear harmless by politics” (Beck, 
1999, 39). 
Beck implies that the dynamics of the global political economy play into the 
interests of global risks by legitimising acceptable limits of risk, whilst absolving 
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the sources of risks through organised irresponsibility (Beck, 1999; Beck, 2000). 
Policy responses to modern risks are vital in this system, since they play the dual 
role of legitimising acceptable risks and regulating the generation and distribution 
of risks. This of course also puts them at the centre of the power play between 
public and economical interests, warranting a closer look at the systematic 
factors that lead to the political will to generate and implement policies (Healy, 
1997). 
Scientific knowledge and legal procedures are the processes employed within the 
arenas of economics and public opinion to externalise and justify risks, as well as 
convey an assurance of the acceptability of the risk control measures. Both 
certainty and uncertainty in science and law are applied to achieve these 
objectives. Certainty in science can be used to prove or disprove a point, whilst 
uncertainty will be employed to cast doubt on a position or argument or establish 
ranges of acceptability (Bulkeley, 2001). Beck (1992, 173) picks up on the fact 
that scientifically acceptable arguments can be used to the advantage of powers 
within society, be it economic or political (or both):  
“As they become more differentiated (and not necessarily as a 
result of their deterioration or moral fleetness of foot), the 
sciences, including the natural sciences, are transformed into self-
service shops for financially well endowed customers in need of 
new arguments” (Emphasis by original author). 
The legal process will use scientific knowledge in the same way – certainty when 
a point needs to be proven and uncertainty when the certainty needs to be 
attacked or causality disproved. The disconcerting factor is the realisation that 
both the certainty and uncertainty can potentially originate from the very same 
scientific work. 
The real danger in the climate change field is that the uncertainty inherent in a 
self-confrontational science will allow for certain thresholds of pollution, 
environmental change or degradation, thereby legitimising climate change risks. 
The legal process takes this legitimisation a few steps further (Beck, 1992; 
Blowers, 1997). Firstly, it will try and deny the causality of actions or the 
responsibility for the risks. Secondly, it will attempt to individualise risks in a 
manner that will focus on smaller components of the risks that are easier to 
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identify and comprehend, or focus on individual affected parties. Lastly, the legal 
process can be used to protect the legitimisation of thresholds against revisions 
that might lead to stronger control over risk generating activities.  
From a precautionary environmentalist perspective though, the process of 
legitimisation has three inherent ‘flaws’: 
1. The cumulative effects of risks (cumulative areas of impact or 
combinations of risks) are neglected when acceptable risk is defined 
individually. 
2. Scientific findings are merely partially representative of real values, which 
add another level of uncertainty to the definition of acceptability. 
3. It leaves the ‘affected’ to prove that they have been affected by the 
‘acceptable risk’. 
These problems, however, do not prevent the ligitimisation of acceptable risks 
from proceeding and forming the basis of policies and guidelines.  
 Political Ecology and Social-Ecological Resilience 
Per definition, policies, guidelines and standards represent the attempts by 
political, economic and social systems to regulate activities and processes in 
order to steer them in generally acceptable directions. Any environmental 
response, and therefore also climate change responses, can consequently be 
viewed as an outcome of the congruence between environmental matters and 
social systems. It therefore becomes important to consider the system of 
interaction over and above the individual components, and hence see climate 
change responses as part of a political ecology.  
“Reflexive modernisation is the age of uncertainty and 
ambivalence, which combines the constant threat of disasters on 
an entirely new scale with the possibility and necessity to reinvent 
our political institutions and invent new ways of conducting politics 
at ‘sites’ that we previously considered unpolitical” (Beck, 1999, 
93). 
One of these historically ‘unpolitical’ areas described by Beck is ecology, since 
the natural sciences always commanded an unchallenged sovereignty over its 
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sphere of knowledge. However, natural resources such as land and raw materials 
have equally become arenas of political and economic debates, and it has 
therefore become necessary for ecological debate and response to enter the 
political realm in order to influence socio-political and econo-political decisions. In 
fact, even scientific knowledge itself has become a commodity that can be traded 
since it has a seminal influence on production systems and their legitimisation. 
Generally speaking, political ecology is the field of study that analyses the 
influence that social, state, corporate and transnational powers have on creating 
or exacerbating environmental problems and influencing environmental policy 
(Gray and Moseley, 2005). It therefore provides for a perspective on natural 
resources that is aware of the influences of power systems in society as well as 
the relationships that are present between entities and systems of power.  
Political ecology has, however, found a of field of application in a recent 
discourse that evolved out of ecological resilience science that echoes the search 
for a greater understanding of the social sphere when dealing with historically 
‘natural’ systems, namely social-ecological resilience. Resilience refers to the 
ability of a dynamic system to withstand changes to the influences affecting it, 
and that is typically what resilience studies have described. However, when 
applied to a social context, resilience also refers to the adaptive capacity of a 
social system and its potential to change to more or less of a desired state of 
relative stability (Folke, 2006; Gallopín, 2006; Smit and Wandel, 2006). Social 
adaptive capacity would rely on the various economic and political power 
systems and the interactions between them present within the particular social 
context, and hence the relation to political ecology. In combination, the concepts 
require scientific inquiry to not only describe the various influences on a social 
system and its ecological context, but also evaluate whether the system should 
strive for resilience or rather adapt to change by progressing to a different state of 
relative stability (Tompkins and Adger, 2004), and inform the actors responsible 
for driving the change on how to achieve the desired state (Vogel et al., 2007). A 
considered position on where and how resilience should be achieved will have an 
influence on response strategies and their level of self-confrontation or reflexivity.  
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The Different Responses – Policy, Regulation and Self-Regulation 
The final part of the framework presented in Figure 4 that requires further 
consideration is the process that lies between the risk response and further 
modernisation – the actual manifestation of responses to risk. This transformation 
of risk response into real action can take two forms – either the actors of modern 
society will change on their own accord (self-regulation), or society needs to rely 
on official response policies (policies and regulation) to direct action. It is 
necessary to explore some of the salient aspects of these determinants of action, 
since the response strategy under review in this study contains elements of both 
categories, and such an analysis would provide guidance on how to understand 
the functioning of the NCCRS within the climate risk arena. 
 Policy and regulation 
Responses (direct or indirect) to environmental risks need to be regulated in 
order to maintain a culture of best practice amongst similar companies and 
ensure that the changes do not merely create even worse problems. In a 
complex social system, many different types of response strategies are possible, 
and each response will have a particular sphere of application, proponent and 
medium of control. All official responses can, however, be classified according to 
their legal basis as either policy or regulation.  
Policies can be considered as the backbone of response strategies, but at the 
same time they also function as responses in themselves. In essence, a policy 
needs not be any more than a position statement. However, in order to provide 
further guidance, they can also extend to contextualisation and specific 
guidelines. Contextualisation will provide opportunity to better motivate the policy, 
whilst the guidelines would make the policy practical.  
Inevitably the causes behind a reaction will determine the actual outcome. The 
motivation behind a policy therefore reveals a lot of the perspective and 
pressures that gives rise to the final policy. The implication for climate change 
policy is therefore that the drivers behind the policy will probably be instrumental 
in determining who or what is ultimately compromised or benefited through 
regulation. 
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Regulation on the other hand refers to any active attempt at managing a process 
or action in order to control its outcome. Regulation has three dimensions (Hajer, 
1995): 
• The need to define what is regulated,  
• The need to contain (satisfy) social reaction against the aspect that is 
regulated, and  
• The resolution of a problem or remedy to a situation.  
From a perspective of risk society responses, however, these dimensions could 
respectively represent: 
• Conceptualisation of risk,  
• Quantification of risk, and  
• Management of the redistribution of risk. 
This implies that attempts at regulation could, intentionally or unintentionally, be 
mere reflections of social concerns watered down due to industry pressure or 
completely fail to reflexively affect the manner in which risks are created through 
modernisation.  
Howes (2005) lists the following as the ways in which changes in environmental 
performance can be effected: 
• Regulation 
• Specifying technology 
• Specifying standards 
• Setting ambient standards 
• Economic prompts such as incentives and disincentives 
• Information war (public embarrassment, public relations, environmental 
impact assessment) 
Current best practice international policy tends towards the setting of standards 
rather than the specification of technology, since standards allow industries more 
flexible choice in how to meet the objectives (Howes, 2005). An example is the 
Carbon Credit/Clean Development Mechanism process which allows industries to 
best determine the manner in which they would like to meet emission standards, 
 62 
as opposed to being forced to implement less optimal or more costly changes 
that ultimately strive towards the same standards. 
 Erosion of regulation 
The trend in the past few decades has been for environmental threats to reach 
global proportions far quicker than the awareness of, and response to the threats 
(Beck and Willms, 2004). Typically, national regulation over individual potentially 
damaging activities continued, whilst a global problem was growing because of 
the insufficiency of the control or the lack of a globally appropriate integrated 
strategy. This is demonstrated quite clearly by the reactive nature of the various 
international agreements over environmental regulation such as the Montreal and 
Kyoto protocols. In actual fact, self-regulation by industry often outpaced 
international agreement on regulation – take for example environmental reporting 
by industries that might have preceded any government attempts at creating 
inventories.  
Various factors aggravate the erosion of traditional control over environmental 
issues (Matten, 2004). For a start, the uncertainty and lack of scientific evidence 
on environmental risks make their regulation uncertain since even though 
catastrophes become the only certain confirmation of a system’s limits, the 
reflexivity of society ensures that our response strategies prevent the actual 
residual risk from ever being known exactly. Further, the modern risks have 
diffuse origins, and are therefore difficult and unwieldy when it gets to regulation.  
Matten (2004) also found that fragmentation of responsibility, division of labour, 
division of production processes and specialisation lead to the inability of 
individual institutions to adequately address such many faceted problems. Often, 
the risks are managed according to indicators or surrogates, which can lead to 
misappropriation of blame and focus – like blaming emissions for the impacts of 
an entire industrial system. As indicated earlier in this report, the globalised 
character of industry contributes to this problem of diffuse origins. Even though a 
multinational company might be headquartered in one place, it needs not have 
any of its environmentally degrading activities within that particular country. All of 
its production processes could relocate in countries with less stringent 
environmental regulation, and it could potentially even be shifted between 
countries depending on the changes in regulation. This results in regulation over 
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a particular company becoming subservient to regulation over its individual 
smaller parts, and therefore ineffective in managing the total impact of the 
corporation. The end result is that uncertain responsibilities and points of control 
leave no one specifically responsible for the consequences of entire lifestyles or 
social systems that are causing inherently indeterminate problems. Beck 
describes this situation as organised irresponsibility (Matten, 2004). 
Nation states cannot adapt fast enough to keep up with the reflexive society that 
is constantly adapting to globalised risk. Governments act on democratic 
consent, and therefore are reluctant to intervene in lifestyles and living standards, 
leaving environmental regulation to become outdated too soon. Further, since 
globalisation is inevitable, and we need to recognise its implications. One of the 
core implications is the growing divide that opens up between traditional 
regulatory systems and contemporary risks. As Beck (2002, 4) puts it:  
“The novelty of the world risk society lies in the fact that we, with 
our civilizing decisions, cause global consequences that trigger 
problems and dangers that radically contradict the institutionalized 
language and promises of the authorities in catastrophic cases 
highlighted worldwide.”  
He goes on to state:  
“…in an age in which faith in God, class, nation and the 
government is disappearing, the recognized and acknowledged 
global nature of danger becomes a fusion of relations in which the 
apparent and irrevocable constants of the political world suddenly 
melt and become malleable” (Beck, 2002, 4). 
What he implies is that traditionally, control over environmental matters was 
exercised by entities of a scale that did not transcend national boundaries, since 
the sources of environmental risks or the risks themselves did not transcend 
those limits. Environmentally degrading activities and their effects used to be 
localised and therefore easy to manage, but the new face of environmental 
threats are, however, global in nature, since everyone contributes to some extent 
to their origin and the effects are also distributed throughout the world (Beck and 
Willms, 2004). 
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Globalisation and the need to then manage globalised risk has since, however, 
given birth to supernational regulatory structures such as trade agreements or 
power blocks, and even the multinational corporation as trans-national regulator 
(importing standards or self-regulating) (Matten, 2004). As Van Gennip (2005, 4) 
finds: 
“Beck discerns a shifting balance between what were once 
considered global issues and those typically understood as local 
challenges. Increasingly, the latter need to be posed, discussed 
and resolved through transnational frameworks. Politics and 
states have not caught up with this imperative, although many 
non-governmental actors have begun to think and operate along 
these lines. Beck suggests that over time, we could see a 
reinvention of politics. For example, the creation of cosmopolitan 
parties, perhaps akin to the groupings that today operate in the 
European Parliament” (Emphasis by original author).  
A significant difference, however, exists between the sources of risk and the 
efforts to control them. Whereas global risks may be generated by individual 
multinational companies with convergent intentions, the matching controls often 
rely on politically negotiated responses pieced together from divergent priorities 
and strategies. Multinational corporations also have both economic power that 
often exceeds those of governments and political power (such as the power of 
transnational withdrawal), which make them powerful forces and strong 
influences in world politics (Beck and Willms, 2004; Matten, 2004).  
Regulation of the global threat therefore can only adapt in two ways – it needs to 
transcend the limits posed by national boundaries, or it has to rely more on self-
regulation. Both alternatives are, however, fraught with their own limitations. Even 
though regional or multinational regulation is more powerful than nation state 
control, the bigger the organisation, the more actors there are to disagree and 
participate in power struggles. In addition, it can be argued that the international 
forums are basically made up of collections of nation states, which are ultimately 
mere reflections of the power structures within their own boundaries. In addition 
to the general conflicts of interest, such multiparty strategic participatory bodies 
also need to investigate the relationship between values and science due to the 
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inherent uncertainty about risks, precaution and response (Stirling, 2004). Self-
regulation on the other hand, however, concentrates power and control in the 
hands of the very actors responsible for risks and risk-causing influences, and by 
implication, they are vulnerable to self-preserving thinking and action rather than 
a rigorous scientifically argued restriction on their freedom.  
 Self-regulation 
Multinational corporations have political power as well as economic power and 
their responses to climate change therefore have the potential to contribute 
substantially to the global response. Different responses are possible though. 
Kolk and Pinkse (2004) indicate that corporate climate change strategies can be 
represented on a four-phase continuum that is similar to classifications of 
corporate social responsibility. On this continuum, the responses can range 
between reactions that deny responsibility, to proactivity, where developments 
are anticipated. In between, defensive (reluctant admission) and accommodative 
(acceptance of responsibility) modes are found.  
In terms of practical application, the defensive posture can involve active 
opposition to an international climate treaty with emphasis on the costs involved 
and the lack of scientific evidence for global warming, whilst an opportunistic or 
hesitant strategy allows for companies to prepare themselves for regulatory and 
market changes, but with a cautious approach in public. A proactive approach 
would be for a company to create awareness about its apparent responsibility as 
well as to implement changes to its operations. This move will be triggered by 
real or perceived environmental reasons but also because it will offer market 
opportunities (Kolk and Pinkse, 2004). 
Traditional state-led regulation of modern industrial processes progressively gets 
undermined by the advances in scientific knowledge and the levels of expertise 
internal to modern corporations. Specialised information becomes an item of 
trade, and regulatory institutions do not necessarily possess enough expertise to 
effectively investigate and interrogate the activities of modern industries. Where 
the traditional institutions fail, new institutions, strategies and actors start to act as 
regulatory force. This means that increasingly the responsibility or opportunity to 
shape regulation is being shared by government and private entities. Although 
this is not new, it certainly is increasing in influence (Beck, 1994). What is also 
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evident, however, is that government regulation or oversight will not disappear 
(Matten, 2004). This is due to the fact that nation states still remain responsible 
for creating an enabling environment for industrial and business activities, whilst 
also being influenced by factors outside of the economic realm and responsible 
for various aspects of the operation of an industry.  
Self-regulation therefore becomes increasingly indispensable as the knowledge 
and expertise required for regulation become ever harder to obtain or 
comprehend outside of the specific industry (Matten, 2004). In a way, self-
regulation becomes a form of ‘reflexive regulation’ – regulation that is based on a 
legal theory and related practical approach to regulation that is self-reflective and 
self-critical. This means that a legal mechanism, based on a self-reflective 
reaction can be used for practical regulation. However, drawing on the expertise 
and knowledge of players within the concerned industry means that the risk for a 
biased position is immense (Matten, 2004). 
 Symbolic politics (Greenwashing) 
Not all environmental responses have substance. According to Matten (2004) 
organised irresponsibility can manifest in climate change responses through the 
use of symbolic politics. Symbolic politics refer to the declaration of goals and 
measures as an end in themselves rather than a commitment to a desired future 
state. Intentions may be represented anywhere on a spectrum between window 
dressing or concrete actions, but may obscure a lack of substantive action to a 
point of non-action and non-regulation. This is particularly relevant to climate 
change responses since cost implications will inevitably follow substantive 
responses, and industries can therefore benefit from rhetoric that does not 
require costly change.  
The use of symbolic politics is not restricted to industries, however, government 
can also use the diversion tactics to further its objectives. In this manner, 
apparently environmentally responsible regulation or policies may in lack 
guidelines for practical application, yet convey a message of governmental 
commitment to particular environmental issues.  
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Symbolic politics can work in the following ways (Matten, 2004): 
• True intentions or outcomes can be disguised, such as a green tax used 
to supplement public income rather than ring fencing it for application in 
environmental causes. 
• Uncertainty can be masked through generalisation – for example the 
banning of GMOs can gain support because it is acceptable, not because 
of real risk. 
• Costs can be reduced if uncertainties can be used as proxy. Risk 
management could therefore negate the need for expensive scientific 
research. 
• Integration by symbols – e.g. getting support for ‘catchy’ concepts such as 
‘reduce, reuse, recycle’. 
• Communication of abstract ideas or broad concepts by reducing them to 
simple practical actions. 
The implication is, however, that subversive intentions or structurally limited 
actions may hamper or prevent more comprehensive or action-based responses. 
A situation is created wherein no particular actor or actor can be held responsible 
or accountable to the public.  
The Risk Society Framework 
In terms of climate science and response therefore, both political and scientific 
understanding of modernisation need to inform the debate about how to deal with 
climate change risks. The global nature of the risks and drivers, however, also 
means that a consideration of the global political and economical relationships is 
required in order to understand and regulate transnational risk drivers in a world 
of nation-state control.  
What should be noted from the above discussion, is that society does not always 
need to opt for the common interest solution, or the most accurate and objective 
information, and that not all responses qualify as reflexive or self-confrontational. 
Potentially, climate change responses in the form of scientific research and policy 
formulation may be reduced to methods of reducing the spectre of climate 
change chaos to a risk which can be mitigated or to which we can adapt without 
necessitating a material change in the basic process of modernisation or the 
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creation of modern risks. Also, economical and political entities such as oil 
companies or nations can obtain a grasp of the risk that enables them to react in 
a way that reduces their vulnerability to the risk, or redefine the risk, potentially at 
the detriment of other parties. The reaction may not even be ‘real’ in the sense 
that it translates to real action – the mere existence of a response policy could be 
used as ‘proof’ of awareness and response. Instead of all responses leading to a 
reflexive change in the modernisation process, circumstances are manipulated in 
order to accommodate the risks through means of adaptation and new 
descriptions of the risks. Response actions will therefore merely support the 
status quo of the modernisation process. Such a scenario, where risk is redefined 
or accommodated, is therefore a critical addition that needs to be effected to the 
basic framework of Figure 4. 
Partial reflexivity could, however, be present where the adaptation actions lead to 
incidental changes to the modernisation process that changes the process on a 
fundamental level.  
From the discussion presented above, it becomes possible to populate the basic 
framework presented in Figure 4 in more detail, as is seen in Figure 5.  
In particular, it becomes possible to indicate how awareness and self-reflection 
becomes a parallel cycle, as a variation of the ‘unaware’ reflexive modernisation 
process. This mirrors Beck’s explanation that these two forms of late modernity 
can exist simultaneously, are interconnected, and can therefore both lead to 
similar modernisation responses. It is therefore not possible to separate the 
outcome of a reflexive process from that of a self-confrontational reflective one 
since the two are merely layers of the same response process in society, and the 
distinction is artificial. 
By implication, any response that results in reflexive, self-confrontational change, 
should be considered valid as part of a reflexive modernity and reflex action in 
society. The self-critical scientised, politicised and popularised debate that led to 
the decisions and actions must be classified as part of the reflective process 
though.  
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The policy response under scrutiny in this report, the South African NCCRS, 
appears in the framework as an example of self-regulation and policy under 
either ‘reflexive response’, ‘redefinition and accommodation’ or ‘self-
confrontational responses’. The interchange between scientific knowledge, 
conflicting opinions, political and economic interests as well as actual policy 
responses that become evident in the framework, provides the particular aspects 
of a risk response that can be used to analyse the NCCRS in order to assess 
whether, and how, risk response determines the content and effect of the 
NCCRS. 
This chapter deconstructed the process of generating policy 
responses through means of a conceptual risk response 
framework. The framework identifies the various linkages that exist 
as parts of the reflexive process that facilitates the transformation 
of knowledge into policy. From the description, it becomes clear 
that ecological politics play a central part in the policy compilation 
process, and that uncertainty is an inherent part of the science 
surrounding modern globalised risks such as climate change. 
What remains in this research, is to evaluate how well the risk 
society concept and risk response framework can now be applied 
in practice, and whether they offer any valuable contribution to the 
development of response strategies. The following chapter 
therefore describes the results of an evaluation of the South 
African National Climate Change Response in accordance with the 













Figure 5: Risk and potential non-response in a risk society 
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CHAPTER 4  METHODOLOGY: ASSESSING THE NATIONAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE RESPONSE STRATEGY 
The National Climate Change Response Strategy 
In order to examine the risk response framework proposed in Chapter 3 in a 
practical manner, the South African National Climate Change Response Strategy 
(South Africa, 2004) is selected as a case study. The National Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), as shown earlier, published this 
South African response in 2004, following preparatory work under the auspices of 
the UNFCCC (Initial National Communication (South Africa, 2000)) and USAID 
(Country Studies Program (South Africa, 2003)). Reports and studies that formed 
part of these two programmes also provided a great deal of the source material 
for the NCCRS. Up until the latter half of 2008, it represented the principal 
reference document for climate change responses in South Africa and still 
provides a central framework through which response actions should be 
coordinated. It is therefore imminently suited as evaluation case study as it is 
representative of the response to climate change by the South African society in 
general, and as such, can be used as a proxy for the state of reflexivity achieved 
by the country as a whole.  
The case study analysis is intended to achieve two aims - to establish how 
closely the South African strategy conforms to the description of a risk response, 
and to identify aspects of the risk society framework that might limit or offer 
further direction to climate change responses. It essentially entails a content 
analysis that offers the opportunity to test the risk response framework and 
evaluate it for relevance. However, the application of risk society principles to the 
current climate change response in South Africa also allows for a debate on the 
implications of the risk society theory for a developing country. 
The analysis is presented in two parts: firstly a description of the data collection 
and research process, and secondly a discussion of the results. 
Data Collection 
As indicated briefly in Chapter 1, the first part of the research (Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3) dealt with the conceptualisation of the research topic. It culminated in 
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both a reference framework for the analysis of risk responses and an overview of 
the characteristics inherent to a risk society. The ultimate aim of the research is, 
however, to determine whether the South African climate change response is 
representative of a risk society, and if so, how much. The reference framework 
from the first phase is therefore applied to the NCCRS as case study, in order to 
see how generally the framework applies and whether the original 
conceptualisation is accurate.  
The analysis is based on a questionnaire that builds on the information gathered 
during the literature review and conceptualisation phase. The questionnaire was 
compiled by converting potentially relevant characteristics of risk societies into 
questions about the NCCRS, which allows responses to the questionnaire to be 
used as indicators of the presence of the characteristics in the response strategy. 
It must be noted though that this list does not lay claim to necessarily contain 
questions relating to all aspects of risk society since it is primarily focussed on the 
risk response framework as opposed to risk society in general. Further review 
and amendment of it, or similar question sets, is certainly encouraged.  
The questionnaire was used in two ways – it was first applied by the author as a 
detailed analysis of the NCCRS document, and secondly distributed to a group of 
key participants in the climate change arena in South Africa in order to confirm or 
refute the author’s assessment of the strategy and to identify further intricacies of 
the risk society concept.  
This method was selected instead of a coding system due to the inherent 
terminological uncertainty and multiplicity present in risk society debates. For 
example, the concept of ‘reflexive modernisation’ is interpreted and used in three 
different ways by Beck, Giddens and Lash (Beck, 1994; Giddens, 1994; Lash, 
1994). It is therefore extremely ‘risky’ to rely on specific identifiers in text and 
responses to point toward the presence of risk society and related concepts. In 
addition, negative responses were deemed as equally important to the 
investigation, but these may not be obvious by the mere absence of key terms 
and concepts. A more prudent approach is to retain the context in which such 
identifiers are located.  
During the detailed review of the NCCRS document, both discourse and content 
analyses were employed. This was achieved by reviewing the summary and main 
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text of the strategy document separately and then comparing the reviews side-by-
side. Such comparison interrogated the content for risk society indicators, but 
also allowed for the identification of differences in structure and content between 
the various parts of the document. It was deemed appropriate to also consider 
structural differences between the summary and main report, as these could 
have material influences on which response guidelines get to see practical 
application. The questionnaire with the document review of the NCCRS is 
provided as Appendix 2. 
The second part of the data collection phase involved the circulation of the 
questionnaire to a group of key stakeholders during the latter parts of 2007. This 
control group was representative of civil society, academia and government 
sectors, with respondents targeted as a result of their close association with 
current climate change response policy work or original negotiations and debates 
that informed the NCCRS. They are therefore practitioners or stakeholders that 
either use the NCCRS as reference in their day-to-day activities or were involved 
in its development. Structured interviews were selected as preferred research 
method in order to obtain qualitative, but comparable responses from the 
respondents. The structured nature further meant that in cases where access to 
respondents were problematic, the interview structure could be used in a self-
administered manner.  
Respondents were selected through a process of referrals, but this did not 
prevent problems of access. As a means of introduction, respondents were 
contacted directly by telephone, and offered the opportunity to participate in the 
research. In most cases respondents agreed to peruse the questionnaire and a 
short background information document before committing to participation. The 
background document provided a brief introduction to the risk society concept 
and the aim of the research. As part of the ethics process of the School of 
Geography, Archaeology and Environmental Studies, a consent form was also 
provided that introduced the author and emphasised that participation was 
voluntary, not binding on any respondent, and will not result in references to 
specific respondents in the final report. More than half chose not to participate 
further. The most common reason cited for not participating was time constraints, 
despite all efforts to accommodate respondents in the manner of involvement. 
Even the National Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, who is in 
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fact the authority responsible for the NCCRS, indicated that time and capacity 
constraints, as well as a high number of requests for participation in research 
make it difficult to commit time to this particular project. Without personal 
introductions by contacts or mutually known mediators, it appeared as if most 
respondents did not see the value in participating in research at this level or of 
this philosophical nature.  
Fourteen respondents were originally identified as potential participants. This is 
not an exhaustive list of the possible range of respondents, but was deemed 
adequate for the level of investigation involved. It was also not anticipated that 
the response rate would be particularly poor. Of the fourteen, one was 
disregarded due to a limited involvement with, and knowledge of the NCCRS, 
and eventually only seven responses were obtained. This was not considered to 
be a fatal flaw in the research though, as the sectors represented by these 
responses offered a good cross section of stakeholders, and included national, 
provincial and local government, parastatals, academia and civil society.  
In terms of the format of feedback, respondents were offered a choice between 
direct interviews, telephonic interviews or self-administered questionnaires. All 
three methods used the questionnaire that was used for the content review of the 
NCCRS. The questionnaire contains only open-ended questions, and since the 
responses were analysed afterward for content rather than in-depth insight, could 
therefore be self-administered or recorded during a structured interview. The 
direct interviews consequently kept strictly to the questions in the questionnaire in 
order to make a comparison between the responses from the various 
respondents possible. Direct interviews were requested by three government 
officials, with self-administration opted for by the other respondents. Informed 
consent was obtained where necessary. It was found that the direct interviews 
allowed some of the government respondents to voice concerns and opinions 
that were outside of the scope of the research. This might be indicative of the 
presence of significant personal drive to get climate change issues highlighted in 
more areas of debate, but inadequate opportunities or forums that offer the 
opportunity.  
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CHAPTER 5  FINDINGS: MODES OF REFLEXIVITY AND THE NATURE OF 
RISK PERCEPTION  
Following the application of the conceptual climate change response framework 
(Chapter 3) to a real-world scenario (Chapter 4), the research can reflect on three 
aspects, namely: 
• The application of the risk society concept to a developing nation’s climate 
change response strategy 
• The usefulness of the actual risk society framework and  
• The insights it offers into the realities of risk response policy in modern 
risk societies.  
The basic premise of the framework is that risk societies are born out of modern 
technological advances that create novel risks of global proportions. These risks 
are conceived in many different ways, due to the various influences that 
determine the public, scientific and political knowledge of the risks. The 
responses to the risks can then be formed either through an unaware or 
unintended reflex, or via a self-aware process that reflects on the risks and 
possible responses. The reflection may, however, lead to a self-critical response 
that does change the nature of the original risk, thereby simulating the 
unintended reflexive responses.  
With the climate change response framework in mind, the analysis needs to use 
the NCCRS to engage on where risks and responses come from (i.e. the origin 
and nature of climate change risks), how they are conceived (manufactured 
and/or perceived), and how they are responded to (reflexive or reflecting 
responses).  
Risk society in a developing country 
The Origin and Nature of the Climate Change Risk 
The first question to ask is whether the NCCRS engages the type of risk that 
Beck envisaged – i.e. modern, diffuse, and global. In this respect, the analysis 
finds that climate change is indeed viewed as a new modern risk by the NCCRS. 
One respondent was adamant that “The whole point of the strategy is to avoid 
future damages and negative impacts, not respond only to short term tangible 
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effects”. Importantly though, the NCCRS does not identify specific causes or 
agents of change.  
The NCCRS generally implicates modernisation as cause of the climate change 
risk through its complete reliance upon the findings and conclusions of work done 
for and in connection with the UNFCCC and IPCC. The strong indication from 
particularly the IPCC that modernisation is to blame for climate change is 
mirrored in the NCCRS’s references and preoccupation with industrial 
development in South Africa, particularly mining and energy. Furthermore, 
specific discussion is allowed on South Africa’s energy and carbon intense 
economy and emissions that will increase with further economic development. 
By not identifying, however, particular lead causes or contributors to climate 
change risks, the strategy effectively steers away from specific response actions 
that would target these agents or sectors. Vagueness in the conception of the 
strategy therefore sets it up for further ambiguity in its recommendations since, 
effectively, nothing in particular is being addressed.  
The strategy also does not hesitate to identify climate change as a risk of global 
proportions. Risks are described as global and universal, with local impacts 
inseparably linked to global aspects yet unique to each context. The local 
uniqueness is related to peculiarities of local energy use and modernisation 
pressures, but these cannot be delinked from the global problem, since local 
contributions add to a global energy and carbon wastage concern. In addition, the 
globalised nature of the issue is reflected in the strategy’s strong reliance on 
global debate and response actions such as those promoted by or under the 
umbrellas of the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and IPCC.  
From the description of the nature of the issue, it becomes clear that the NCCRS 
concurs with similar international response strategies that climate change is 
considered a recent, global risk with diffuse origins and unintended 
consequences, as envisaged by Ulrich Beck. However, Beck’s proof of the 
existence of a risk society, namely the uninsurability of modern risks, is not 
touched on by the NCCRS. The lack of references to insurance, however, does 
not exclude the possibility of the ‘proof’ applying to the South African case. Most 
impacts that are mentioned in the NCCRS such as agricultural production 
changes can only be insured on a seasonal or specific basis, but not in general. 
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Such specific insurance is not the same as insuring society against climatic 
change. The respondents concur with this finding, since in response to the 
question of whether the risks identified in the NCCRS can be insured, all 
respondents indicated that the general climate risks have no insurance, with only 
two respondents identifying the possibility of insuring specific end effects of 
climate change such as damage from extreme events.  
Industrial Era Ideology 
According to the risk society theory, industrial era ideology should progressively 
make way for individualised reflexive responses that respond unintentionally to 
risks (Beck, 1992). The review of the NCCRS therefore needs to indicate whether 
such ideological responses are still present, and if so, how they relate and 
compare to the reflexive responses. Since industrial ideology would be centred 
on class differentiation and comparisons of economic development measured 
against a Westernised ideal, references to these aspects may be considered as 
potential indicators of a non risk-aware society. It has to be questioned though 
whether any references that are present give rise to risk responses that apply 
industrial-era thinking in ways that extend beyond the norm, thereby changing the 
actual nature of climate change risks themselves.  
As it turns out, references to the dichotomous system of world economic 
development are present in the NCCRS. There is for example the obvious 
reference to exploitation: 
“The natural resources are in the poorer, developing countries, 
which are exploited by the richer developed countries” (South 
Africa, 2004,1). 
These ideological references are not obvious, however, since none of the 
respondents readily identifies any, although two respondents suspects that some 
ideology might feature as a small part of the strategy. Upon closer inspection of 
the NCCRS, one finds that global economic differences are mentioned, as are 
the differences between so-called developed and developing nations or regions. 
For instance, the first paragraph of the executive summary states: 
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“The developing world faces greater challenges than the 
developed world…” (South Africa, 2004, iii). 
The strategy actually has numerous references to the difference between 
‘developed’ and ‘developing’ nations. These are linked to the ideology and 
concept of sustainable development, with particular comments about the historic, 
inequitable and unsustainable north/south divide of the world’s economy and 
prosperity. In addition, climate change is blamed on the wealthy North, with the 
brunt of the impacts facing the poor South. The NCCRS is, however, not the only 
climate change related document that brings the concept of economic 
development into the debate. The recent IPCC summary document (IPCC, 2007) 
also refers to developmental differences and sustainable development as a 
conceptual solution.  
The classical developmental references in the document therefore point towards 
a comprehension of society from an early modernisation perspective, as 
compared to a late modernity described by Beck (1992), and is further 
substantiated by the complete absence of references to a welfare state or risk 
society. Further, local economic realities are used in the NCCRS as drivers for 
the response, pulling the debate away from environmental issues towards 
economic developmental debates. This is particularly evident where the strategy 
compares the expected impacts from the Country Studies Program with the 
developmental principles and ideals of the region.  
The immediate prospect of non-applicability of the risk society theory therefore 
arises. However, interesting aspects come to the fore when the developmental 
references are re-considered as particular parts of, or contributions to the risk 
society framework. 
The manner, in which an ideology-based worldview could undermine a risk 
society-conceptualisation of the same, is through altering the perception of risk or 
preventing the perception from becoming risk-aware. A ‘blame’ allocation theory 
born out of economic inequality, for example, might prevent the further 
development of a climate change response to fully fledged mitigatory actions 
since the mitigation would be left to the countries who can afford it or who are 
perceived as having benefited from the actions that caused the current climate 
change risk. However, both the detailed review the NCCRS and the responses to 
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the questionnaire find that the references to economic dependency theory are 
mostly related to definitions or discussions of local economic vulnerabilities and 
opportunities. By implication, the description of economic realities therefore aids 
in the conceptualisation of climate change risk. It is consequently possible to 
consider such economic perspectives as an influence akin to scientific definition 
of climate change risks.  
The implications of having alternative influences operate within the framework at 
such an early point in the generation of a response are significant. It implies that 
there is a possibility for multiple lines of progression from the generation of risks 
to the actual conceptualisation of response strategies. In this particular case, 
economic realities are employed to conceptualise and define the risks, but this 
means that economic development considerations can similarly generate 
contesting and self-critical expert opinions leading to differential arguments for 
and against certain response actions, and ultimately another influence in the 
political process of determining a response strategy.  
Economic considerations will always form a very specific part of political 
negotiation processes. It is therefore an aspect that needs further investigation – 
whether the economic considerations used in the conceptualisation of risks are 
the same as the considerations that in part determine the outcome of the political 
wrangling that decides the response strategy.  
In the NCCRS, a clear difference between the two is not evident. Whilst local risk 
conceptualisation is focussed mainly on local economic development issues, it 
also confirms sustainable development as a core principle of the response by 
referring to it on the first page of the summary. This implies that both short and 
long term response strategies are possible, since immediate socio-economic 
risks require short term solutions but sustainability a longer timeframe. It shows 
how development considerations are used to inform the determination of a 
response strategy on the one hand, but on the other hand also the ultimate 
decisions on specific response actions and regulation measures. 
On the face of it therefore, it appears as if the conceptualisation of risks (related 
to economic vulnerability) are not materially different from the reflective process 
of determining how response actions will affect economic development.  
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The most important finding here is confirmation of Beck’s stance that risk 
conceptualisation and early modernisation perspectives are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Both appear to have a contribution to the functioning of a risk 
society. It should be kept in mind though that a response that is not self-aware 
with regards to its ideological baggage, can be manipulated by it.  
Conceived Reality and Manufactured Uncertainty 
An aspect of risk societies that turns out to be central to the conceptualisation of 
a risk framework is the presence of manufactured (conceived) risk. Modern risks 
are ‘manufactured’ in the sense that they are known only through the information 
provided by expert systems, and not through actual experiential proof. By 
implication, it is necessary to consider two critical aspects of the risks in the 
NCCRS. Firstly, the information sources of the NCCRS must be evaluated, since 
they determine what is known as risks, and therefore whether a reflex or 
reflective approach is adopted. Secondly, the manner in which the information is 
reflected upon must be investigated, as the amount and nature of reflection 
determines the outcome of the response process – i.e. either as an 
accommodation of risk or a self-critical change to the risks.  
The NCCRS confirms that risks are manufactured by relying on a local definition 
of the climate change risk based on impact projections of the Country Studies 
Program and the IPCC findings that extend fifty to a hundred years into the 
future, in order to inform and invoke change in the present. The respondents 
agree with the detailed document review that much of the NCCRS’s risk 
perception is conceived rather than experienced. According to the respondents, 
the risks that are being responded to are “possible future effects” or “market 
threats”, and according to the strategy document, “...possibly the greatest 
environmental challenge facing the world this century...” (South Africa, 2004, iii).  
In other words, despite this ‘intangibility’ of the risks, they are nevertheless 
considered very ‘real’, and demand responses in order to mitigate the threats 
posed to socio-economic well-being. The risk responses are therefore directed at 
‘manufactured’ risks, since the respondents consider the possible climate change 
effects as future economic threats as opposed to directly experienced biophysical 
effects. This perspective reflects the general premise of the risk society theory 
that modern risks are the direct results of human ingenuity, but that they are only 
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known through means of scientific knowledge since they cannot actually be 
experienced on human scales of time and awareness. 
This implies that the manufacturing of knowledge of risks relies on the application 
of expert systems which, in turn, represent a particular level of uncertainty that 
influences the origins of the strategy on the one hand and its effectiveness on the 
other. The use of expert systems during the conceptualisation of the NCCRS 
serves well to illustrate this vulnerability of risk societies, since this predisposes 
the strategy to unopposed content and recommendations. Even a DEAT 
representative acknowledges that some of the scales from which modelling 
results were drawn were inappropriate, yet there is no concrete initiative to 
revise, update and improve the strategy. The recollections of the respondents fail 
to identify any other specific references of the NCCRS other than the three 
commonly accepted ones – the Country Studies Program, Initial National 
Communication, IPCC Third Assessment Report. This leads to the respondents 
raising a concern that not enough local information, i.e. information related to 
current South African realities of socio-economic development, was used in the 
compilation of the strategy.  
This shortcoming adds to a concern about the lack of a comparison of the 
datasets or opinions used as source documents. Such as comparison would 
have served to identify inconsistencies and update the information where the 
forced combination of scales and time sets required it. In particular, the NCCRS 
uses the Country Studies’ information which in turn relies on a 50 year projection 
partially based on 1996 IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) data, and 
combines these projections with 2001 IPCC findings of the Third Assessment 
Report (TAR) in the NCCRS, various sectoral government initiatives, the 
prescribed Kyoto Protocol procedures and the summarised climate change 
situation report presented by the 2000 Initial National Communication to the 
UNFCCC. This results in the NCCRS acknowledging some real (or confidently 
expected) climatic changes, whilst at the same time mentioning the uncertainty 
about the scale and implication of climate change. It is a further admission that 
the risks are conceptual and uncertain since debate around the expected impacts 
means that we are conceptualising the risk, not experiencing it.  
 81 
The research did indicate though that expert systems per se are not the problem, 
but rather the manner in which they are applied. As indicated, expert systems 
such as climate change science are essential in generating information and 
knowledge about risks and possible responses, and should therefore be present. 
The risk rather lies, on the one hand, in the unverified or unquestioned use of the 
knowledge they generate, and on the other, in the amount of uncertainty they can 
create. In the case of the NCCRS, the interview results indicated that there are 
some matters that fall outside the general scope of the NCCC that may benefit 
from expert contributions, such as macro-economic policy issues. However, in 
the absence of peer review, such fundamental contributions have the potential to 
determine both the perceptions of risk and the general nature of responses 
during the process of reflecting on risk.  
Furthermore, the NCCRS fails to provide feedback loops that could prevent 
inaccurate or inadequate perceptions from being perpetuated. In particular, the 
strategy does not create opportunities for critical assessment of the base findings 
and the recommended actions that are taken up into the strategy. No effort is 
made to differentiate between risks or to identify acceptable limits of risk. Rather, 
legitimisation for any action is found in the general and widespread vulnerability 
that is identified. A reality is therefore constructed that advocates any response 
action, whether it is relevant and necessary or not. This could leave the response 
strategy or policy without the necessary direction to effect a change to the drivers 
of climate change risks; a result that is far from optimal in a modern context 
where risks need to be managed and fundamentally altered rather than simply 
avoided. By implication, a questioning of the information sources must form part 
of any future revision of the NCCRS, the envisaged sector-based strategies that 
should follow from the main response, or any similar risk response strategy, in 
order to evolve over time. This reflection on the strategy may (should) even 
extend as far as becoming reflexive, in the sense that the self-criticism draws into 
doubt the very origins of the strategy, and therefore also the process that brought 
about the reflection.  
In addition to the above, it is noted that the NCCRS is in part based on reactions 
to secondary/indirect impacts such as responses to others’ climate change 
response actions. Such secondary impacts are even further from a rational 
reality-based climate change awareness and rather reflect conceived responses 
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to perceived risks. The NCCRS therefore provides for a tertiary response to 
climate change risks. By implication, any inaccuracy in the base information or 
deductions would be systematically reinforced throughout the process of 
compiling a final response strategy.  
Uncertainty and Contested Science 
According to the Risk Response Framework, the process of conceptualising and 
generating a risk response strategy is fraught with all sorts of uncertainties such 
as contesting scientific opinions, imperfect communication, expert systems 
without peers and unchallenged systematic errors in both reflexive and reflective 
states. Uncertainty is, for instance, implicit in the NCCRS. In particular, the 
definition of risk and conceptualised impacts are very uncertain, especially due to 
the suspect data combinations.  
The danger lies in the fact that these uncertainties can grow in the absence of 
any form of scientific or social self-criticism. This could result in a policy response 
that either defers action due to uncertainty, or promotes uncertain and ineffective 
responses as a result of over-sensitivity to external influences.  
The first danger, the use of uncertainty to defer action, is addressed specifically 
in Article 3.3 of the UNFCCC which indicates that uncertainty should not preclude 
action (UNFCCC, 2006). Generally, but not completely, the NCCRS avoids this 
trap. Response actions are advocated even in the face of uncertainties related to 
the scientific understanding of climate change, the impact of climate change on 
the developing world and the specific impacts of climate change in South Africa. 
A wide range of possible adaption and mitigation strategies is considered, and 
action encouraged across the board. Beck’s idea of organised irresponsibility is, 
however, present to defer action. Because no specific outcomes are envisaged 
by the NCCRS, a system of ‘organized unaccountability’ is created where 
stakeholders are not allocated particular responsibilities and response tasks, and 
effectively all response actions are legitimised by the uncertain standards and 
triggers for action. Ultimately, this reduces the effect of the strategy, especially 
with regards to reflexive changes that rely on intentional interventions that might 
not be fully aligned with the status quo.  
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In part though, the partial avoidance of the first uncertainty trap is driven by the 
second risk associated with uncertainty, namely uncertain and ineffective 
responses. In the absence of certainty, the NCCRS promotes any form of 
response action, as long as there is some level of developmental benefit 
associated with it. Potentially, this implies that the overall strategy is nothing more 
than a reaction to external pressures rather than a driver of considered and 
intentional change. The external influences could manifest in the form of foreign 
direct investment or local socio-economic development needs, leading to 
response strategies that fail to engage positive reflexive change, and therefore 
merely perpetuates the existing modernisation tract. 
Uncertainty is therefore definitely present in the South African climate change risk 
response context. The following particular areas of uncertainty are identified in 
the NCCRS: 
 Systematic uncertainty 
The NCCRS is mostly descriptive, listing existing response strategies and 
programmes rather than critically evaluating and integrating them. As one 
respondent puts it: “It is not a study, therefore does not contain all the ‘proof’ 
data”. It does imply though that different datasets, time scales and assessment 
methods can be combined in the process, leaving any errors or shortcomings in 
the base data to represent built-in systematic uncertainty. The NCCRS, for 
example, acknowledges some systematic uncertainty in that it identifies local 
uncertainties in the Country Studies that result from the relatively course climate 
change modelling performed in the IPCC SAR, some remaining core climate 
change uncertainties such as the CO2 fertiliser effect, as well as the global 
uncertainties of the IPCC TAR. Even a respondent from DEAT admitted that the 
strategy represents a first attempt at consolidating local research, and that it 
contains gaps in terms of local research and appropriate scales. 
However, the strategy still uses findings from the Third Assessment Report in 
combination with the findings of the Initial Communication. The Initial 
Communication was based on the earlier work of the Country Studies reports 
which, in turn, are based on the IPCC Second Assessment Report (South Africa, 
2000; South Africa, 2003; South Africa, 2004). The strategy therefore combines 
two instalments of the IPCC Assessments without questioning whether these 
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might have contesting findings or whether the older information would have an 
implication for any subsequent risk assessment work also used in the strategy. 
The science and recommendations of the SAR have therefore not been adapted 
or updated to reflect the TAR even though the updated TAR is used in the 
NCCRS. Uncertainty is therefore created at the very core of the NCCRS by using 
current knowledge and combining it with outdated vulnerability findings without 
verifying or re-evaluating the findings. 
The respondents differed only slightly in their responses to a question on 
systematic uncertainty. Five respondents identified some uncertainty, a sixth 
found none, and the last respondent had no comment. It is therefore not a given 
that inherited uncertainty will always come to the fore without a specific 
investigation or targeted assessment. The uncertainties can therefore as easily 
be overlooked during use or review of the NCCRS. 
 Expert systems 
Expert systems are used extensively to inform the strategy. No other alternatives 
to the UNFCCC debate circles are used as key references, whilst neither the 
UNFCCC nor the related Country Studies are reviewed or critiqued. Industry 
specific expertise is also acknowledged in the main report where they are 
promoted as potential loci of self-regulation located within various institutions.  
Otherwise, a number of the local stakeholders who are referenced as participants 
in the drafting of the strategy have narrow scopes in terms of their particular 
focus areas. There is also a heavy reliance on the various government and semi-
government bodies represented on the National Committee for Climate Change. 
By implication, these participants can be experts at what they do and advise on, 
without the necessary peer review capacity existing internally or externally of the 
structures in which they operate. It also opens up the possibility that integration of 
various positions and information sets may not be a simple and accurate process. 
At the same time the close association with the National Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism could imply the steering of debates in 
directions that are influenced by the political sphere.  
One respondent raised an interesting point relating to expert systems, namely the 
absence of expert systems where they are in fact required. Despite the heavy 
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emphasis on economic risks and vulnerability, expert contributions from the 
financial sector (National Treasury and Department of Trade and Industry) is 
limited to an estimation of the cost of operationalising a central coordination 
function for the NCCRS as well as arguably popularist and unsubstantiated 
statements about unviable or prohibitively expensive response actions. 
Furthermore, despite acknowledgement that long-term climate change mitigation 
is a core requirement of a response strategy, the strategy fails to utilise its 
experts to engage on the macro-economic policy of the country. A case can 
therefore be made for more expert contributions on matters that fall outside the 
general scope of the National Committee on Climate Change (NCCC).  
Undeniably though, expert opinions are used in the NCCRS without the means to 
peer review them. The result is a strategy that does not incorporate the means to 
differentiate between real and imagined risks, and therefore substantial and 
insubstantial climate risks.  
 Contested opinions, including reflexive questioning 
The presence of contesting opinions in a strategy would mean two things – 
uncertainty exists and is potentially being explored in a reflecting manner, and an 
opportunity is created for reflexive questioning of the strategy. Reflexive 
questioning would be considered by Beck to be part of ‘reflecting’ on risks, as 
opposed to an autonomous reflex reaction. However, it is potentially crucial for 
the development of risk responses, since the cyclical flow of reflexivity can take 
ever-changing individualised responses forward in order to change the nature of 
the development process. At a meta-level, therefore, reflexive response that 
results from reflection on risks and response strategies, can satisfy Beck’s 
requirement for unintended and reflex-like response despite the reflection that 
determined the response. 
Contesting views or inputs into the NCCRS were, however, limited, and 
consequently also the amount of reflection that is present. Although international 
climate change debates (IPCC) and differences in responses are mentioned In 
the NCCRS, alternative views are not considered. In fact, one respondent 
indicated that a particular weakness in the compilation of the strategy was the 
fact that so-called climate change dissidents were not involved. It is also 
noteworthy that many potential grass-roots level critics or contributors such as 
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the private sector, different tiers of government or non-governmental agencies 
appear largely absent from the response formulation process. The content review 
of the strategy indicates that the strategy was commissioned by the NCCC, and 
compiled by an external service provider. By implication, therefore, stakeholders 
had to have been part of the NCCC or alternatively part of the compilation 
process in order to contribute to the strategy in terms of content or critique. 
Participation in the NCCC is, however, reserved for major stakeholders and its 
operation as a committee would automatically reduce the influence of any 
dissenting view and consequently a balanced peer review. Furthermore, the 
composition and representation at the NCCC would remain within the control of 
the DEAT, further reducing the potential for inclusion of views that might differ 
from those in national government. This concern is emphasised in the comments 
received from the respondents, who freely identifies stakeholders that could 
provide valuable contributions such as civil society, the broader public, 
engineering sectors, financial sector, non-governmental organisations, local 
authorities, small businesses, et cetera. Two telling comments were also 
provided by the non-governmental sector in response to questions regarding 
involvement in the NCCRS: 
“Response to comment was cosmetic.” and 
“Seems a bit top heavy in terms of government inputs.” 
The references provided in the strategy indicate that, with regards to participation 
and contribution during the compilation of the strategy, it did not draw on any 
information or expertise outside of national government initiatives. References to 
other stakeholders that do appear in the document relate to potential actions on 
their part to implement the strategy, and not to specific involvement in the drafting 
of the strategy.  
The exclusion of non-NCCC representatives would have promoted a less 
contested view in the strategy formulation. Because uncertainty regarding 
information on available opportunities or non-negotiable action requirements 
dominates any possible uncertainty in baseline information, the absence of 
contesting views in general means that reflective development of the strategy is 
restricted since its fundamental components are never questioned. Hence, this 
‘shortcoming’ of the strategy could explain its focus on maintaining the status quo 
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of the modernisation path of the country instead of questioning and reflexively 
changing its very nature.  
The structure of the strategy also contributes to the unchallenged nature of its 
assumptions and recommendations. No uncertainties are acknowledged in the 
Executive Summary, other than a brief mention of the ongoing international 
debate relating to climate change. The summary is the section of the strategy that 
will be used most often because of its prominence and easier accessibility. 
Therefore, even though some uncertainties such as the potentially crucial 
integration of strategies and actual response action plans are discussed in the 
main strategy document, they will not receive the attention they might deserve.  
According to the risk response framework, this limited reflection therefore leads to 
accommodation or redefinition of climate change risks, as opposed to change 
that will self-confrontationally change the drivers of the risks. 
To an extent, the pursuance of the status quo suggests that symbolic politics 
might be present, i.e. more real intentions are hidden behind rhetoric. Symbolic 
politics can operate and provide a form of window dressing or greenwashing that 
relies on imperfect communication to hide true intentions. An argument can 
therefore be presented that the NCCRS, with its focus on the attraction of CDM 
investment and technological transfer, is merely a thinly disguised economic 
development strategy as opposed to an attempt to address climatic change. In 
support of this argument would be statements in the strategy document 
supporting the fact that the point of departure of the strategy is achievement of 
development objectives rather than a response to climate change, or the 
references to the rectification of global economic inequalities. 
The mere avoidance of uncertainty, through limited opportunity or reflection, 
however, does not exclude uncertainty from the strategy completely. It is used to 
advance the idea that action plans for the strategy need to be further developed 
before any particular action can be implemented and also to postpone costly 
intervention such as changes that will affect the macro-economic context, or very 
long term mitigation. Even short term action plans are deferred due to the lack of 
information on specific economic opportunities. Again, this is typically what is 
envisaged by the response framework as ‘accommodation and redefinition’. The 
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risks of climate change are accommodated under the guise of insufficient proof of 
a threat, and therefore redefined as acceptable.  
A question must be asked though – will a full-scale investigation into the 
elements that determine the macro-economic direction of the country lead to 
reflexive change and therefore significant response actions? Too much reflecting 
(investigation) certainly has the ability to incapacitate science, but at the same 
time could promote discourse that leads to reflexive change.  
 Imperfect communication 
The process of reflecting on risk is a sub-political negotiation that creates a 
response strategy from pre-existing scientific knowledge and risk perceptions. 
This ‘ecological political economy’, for lack of a better phrase, receives and 
processes information and knowledge and then distributes its findings and 
guidance. Consequently, it relies on communication of information and ideas, 
both in terms of the assembly of scientific knowledge and the dissemination of 
strategy. Uncertainty can therefore be created simply by imperfect 
communication.  
Communication and the manipulation of information play a significant part in the 
politicising of risk in modern society. The advent of the global information society 
freed up the flow of information throughout the world, which left modern society 
with access to whatever information is preferred and with the freedom to apply 
the information at will. This freedom is a double-edged sword, however, since any 
form of control over information becomes an instrument of power. Since risk is a 
construct, the communication around risks becomes critical in determining the 
nature and extent of the identified threat, and consequently also the subsequent 
responses, as is the case with the stakeholder participation process of the 
NCCRS. The strategy was conceived, driven and ultimately approved by the 
NCCC, yet all the respondents found it possible to identify stakeholders that were 
not part of the formulation of the NCCRS.  
Several mechanisms are at work when imperfect communication is put under 
scrutiny. To begin with, the base data or scientific findings might not be 
communicated well. The NCCRS, for example, acknowledges that better 
awareness of climate change impacts is required in government circles (South 
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Africa, 2004). This implies that climate change information might not have 
penetrated or were not communicated effectively outside of academic and 
scientific circles. In addition, the heavy reliance on individual strategies from 
government committees means that information is not used in a pure form since 
the NCCRS becomes little more than a reformulation of previously analysed 
information or knowledge. This is a definite form of information loss through 
imperfect communication, but also adds to systematic uncertainty. 
The NCCRS is, however, not intended as a scientific reference document, and 
since not everyone has the necessary background to understand scientific 
language and concepts or the limitations inherent to scientific inquiry, some 
concepts have to be simplified. Manufactured modern risk, for example, doesn’t 
communicate well outside of the climate change science fraternity or outside of 
academic language. Clearly, the availability of information (i.e. the existence of a 
strategy) is not a guarantee that the information will either reach its intended 
audience, or in fact be used to inform actions and decision-making. It should be 
noted though that not all the respondents concur that there is simplification of 
concepts in the NCCRS or that simplification is indeed negative. Responses to a 
question on whether catchy concepts are used in the strategy varied from “much” 
(academia) to “nothing, possibly implicitly” (government), whilst a respondent 
representing the NGO perspective accused the strategy of using simplification to 
skirt the difficult or contentious choices and decisions, yet another view from a 
governmental stance defended catchy concepts as simply making intuitive sense. 
The media was mentioned by two respondents as a particular agent of 
communication relevant to the climate change debate. Media plays a significant 
role in the forming of opinions on a global level. It could lead public opinion, but 
also result in polarised opinions, which would lead to further debate and 
uncertainty. Mass media gained virtually unlimited access to people’s perceptions 
of risk as a result of globalised communication networks. This pervasiveness, and 
the indisputable ability of the media to influence public opinion makes it a 
powerful tool in the hands of agents and structures that wish to shape public 
opinion in ways that would enhance their hold on social or political power. 
McCright and Dunlap (2003) demonstrates this well by showing how the use of 
mass media and specific information was used to promote specific political views 
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in the United States in order to steer climate change debates in a particular 
direction that suited groups with financial interests in non-renewable resources.  
At the same end of the response communication process, simply poor 
communication would perpetuate the lack of climate change awareness, and 
prevent the response strategy from reaching all relevant stakeholders. This issue 
was raised by one respondent in a reference to the complexity of communicating 
climate change concepts in indigenous languages. Insufficient awareness would 
restrict criticism since potential critics might not be aware of the strategy, and 
various uncertainties would not be laid bare for questioning. In this regard, it is 
furthermore interesting to note that although the strategy calls for more 
awareness of climate change impacts, it does not actively promote any 
awareness of the NCCRS as the official national response to the risks. This 
inevitable limits the scope for criticism and hence reflecting on the response 
strategies.  
Economic Policy 
In the proposed risk response framework, political and economic considerations 
represent part of the link between knowledge of climate change risks and a 
strategy to respond to it. In a reflexive risk society, it would encourage reflexive 
change, and a reflecting ‘risk’ society, which prevents the automatic reflexivity 
from occurring. The presence of economics and politics in the NCCRS will 
therefore determine whether it represents a risk aware response as opposed to 
an unseen and unaware reflex reaction. It has the potential to also determine 
whether reflexivity will be present or not due to an influence on the perception of 
risk and judging of the appropriateness of responses. This investigation therefore 
also needs to understand how the dominant power systems in society use 
information, politics and law to reinforce their particular viewpoints and power 
structures.  
From the outset, economic considerations are an integral part of the strategy. 
Respondents identified economic opportunities and threats as conceived risks, 
and the debate is obviously and intentionally pulled away from environmental 
issues towards economic developmental debates. This is evident in the NCCRS 
document through statements such as: 
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“…[since] climate change response actions can potentially act as a 
significant factor in boosting sustainable economic and social 
development, a national strategy specifically designed to bring this 
about is clearly in the national interest, supporting the major 
objectives of the government including poverty alleviation and the 
creation of jobs” (South Africa, 2004). 
This preoccupation with economics is further shown by the referenced sources 
and contributors that are predominantly focussed on the primary resource 
economic sectors rather than environmental agencies. In this regard, one can 
refer to the Acknowledgements and Bibliography of the NCCRS that focus on 
government departments and major stakeholders of the energy sector (The 
Department of Minerals and Energy, SASOL, ESKOM), with the balance of 
representation made up by academic or research institutions and only a single 
‘pure’ environmental group (The Sustainable Energy and Climate Change 
Partnership). The problem that arises is that in the absence of certainty, 
economic considerations rather than climate science are allowed to determine 
the perceptions of risk and the limits of acceptable risk. The strategy can 
therefore take any substantiation in combination with, or instead of, 
environmental concerns to determine the type and nature of risk responses.  
To an extent this turns the supposedly purely scientific and environmental field of 
climate change risk response into an economic and political ecology, since it 
directs action into areas where there is ‘money to be made’. Many mechanisms 
are employed in order to reinforce the economic intentions behind the strategy. 
By focusing on specific information and sidelining contesting views, for example, 
the strategy may reinforce of its particular perspective. In particular, it is found 
that established global opinion, centralised around the IPCC and UNFCCC and 
informed by the Countries Studies reports, is used exclusively. This information 
is, however, not interpreted or evaluated in detail. The only mention of other 
opinions is the proviso in the summary regarding the ongoing international 
debate: 
“Detailed action plans with defined time-scales will be formulated 
meaningfully on a case by case basis, in the context of the ever 
changing political backdrop to climate change, technological 
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progress and the robustness of the assumptions about what can 
be expected to transpire from the international negotiation 
process, together with the relevant commitments that are likely to 
flow from them” (South Africa, 2004). 
In the absence of any critical review, the only possible recommendation that can 
come from the strategy is to ‘follow the current trend’. This recommendation is 
reinforced by the heavy reliance on established climate related government 
initiatives and debating groups. Although the strategy mentions a fair spread of 
different government advisory groups, other non-governmental advocacy groups 
are not fully included and might therefore have, currently, it would seem, to have 
very little influence in climate change developments. This is potentially very 
important since government committees are usually constituted on the basis of 
co-operation rather than scientific information sharing. By implication, any 
information will be toned down (or up) or counteracted by other perspectives 
without the benefit of rational scientific inquiry. 
The global nature of the climate change debate also plays a role in determining 
the particular political and economic response. Economic development is a self-
admitted goal for the strategy, and part of this pursuit is a readiness to latch onto 
economic opportunities presented by international climate change reaction, or in 
the words of one respondent: “Local aspects [are] used to justify a free ride for 
SA”. It can therefore be assumed that the driving factors behind international 
responses will be transferred into local reaction strategies, and that a need to 
participate and compete in a globalised system would play a role in determining 
national priorities.  
The ‘economy above all’ strategy also finds support in the general absence of 
thresholds or limits of acceptable or tolerable risk. No mention is found in the 
NCCRS document of any specific regulatory actions, and the joint recollection of 
the respondents indicates that regulation was merely considered as a threat, and 
not a firm response action. Not having thresholds for acceptable climatic change 
means both unrestricted action and non-action and also means that the 
responses are based on opinion, rather than motivated actions. Legitimisation is 
therefore avoided, since none of the reaction strategies or actions can ever be 
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countered or supported by knowledge triggers. Apportion of blame and 
responsibility is similarly avoided.  
Some perception-based legitimisation of the strategy is, however, achieved 
through the use of symbolic politics. Symbolic politics is present in the following: 
• Economic aspects of the strategy weigh heavier than any other, and seem 
to prevent ecological or environmental concerns from taking the 
necessary limelight 
• Uncertainty regarding the details is hidden behind the general call for 
reaction (adaptation). The actual actions are therefore not spelled out, just 
the proposals in general. 
• Uncertainties are used as motivation for less pro-active mitigation. 
• Catchphrases such as human development and sustainable development 
are used to substantiate the strategy 
• The simplification and explanation provided in the main report is not taken 
through into the summary. The summary remains complex and without 
clear guidance on the real actions required. This takes a lot of sting out of 
the strategy, since its readers have to interrogate the strategy in more 
detail in order to get to the real suggestions. 
As a consequence of the above, the strategy does seem to be a document that is 
an ‘end in itself’, rather than a plan of action with concrete recommendations for 
response actions. A more conclusive determination of whether the South African 
scenario represents a typical reflexive risk society response can, however, only 
follow once the presence of such reflexivity has been confirmed.  
Reflexive Modernisation 
If reflexivity is present in a risk society (general reflexivity, not only Beck’s idea of 
a reflex reaction), then the causes of perceived risks would be altered through the 
further development of the same process that gave rise to the risks. Ideally, 
according to Beck, this has to occur without the influence of intentional self-
confrontation that generates debate about risks and responses (Beck, 1992). If 
modernisation is to blame for climate risks, for example, more modernisation 
should be employed to alter the nature of the originally ‘flawed’ modernisation 
process. The outcome should therefore be a new manifestation of modernity that 
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prevents the originally perceived risks from becoming reality due to an ‘over-
application’ of modernisation. By implication, if South Africa represents a risk 
society, reflexivity would manifest in the NCCRS as inevitable 
(unquestioned/uncritical) action plans to adapt the nature and possibly the 
direction of the modernisation process in an attempt to free the immediate socio-
economic reality from the anticipated future risks.  
This does appear, to some extent, to be the case in the NCCRS. First of all, the 
strategy recommends that South Africa adopt any climate change related 
initiatives that have demonstrated economic benefits - in other words further 
modernisation that fits the current modernisation process. These response 
actions, however, do not need to make any substantial difference to the nature of 
the modernisation process, and hence could easily represent the ‘reflexivity by-
pass’ path of the reflecting scenario which directs action through accommodation 
and redefinition of the climate risks. This is certainly the feeling of the 
respondents, who indicate unanimously that the strategy encourages too little 
change to the development path. They also describe the changes that are likely 
as being too reactive and not sufficiently profound or systemic.  
The possibility, however, remains that the response actions could bring about 
change in the modernisation process, whether incidental or intentional. The 
NCCRS, for example, indicates that climate change response will have incidental 
impacts on the nature of the modernisation process in the form of changes in the 
way South Africa consumes energy and releases carbon into the atmosphere. 
This is further evident in the description of the envisaged changes to the energy 
sector. The strategy acknowledges, and DEAT’s response to the questionnaire 
confirms, that adaptation to climate change risks would have implications for the 
energy sector which is currently heavily reliant on coal-based generation, since 
most adaptation strategies would involve cleaner and more sustainable 
production and therefore also cleaner and more sustainable energy sources. 
Even response strategies such as technological transfer are intended primarily as 
a reduction in the local economic vulnerability of the current South African 
modernisation and development, yet unintentionally it will also address the global 
climate change problem, clearly initiating reflexive change.  
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The alternative to such incidental reflexive change would be direct, intended 
actions such as capped carbon dioxide emissions. The national response, 
however, does not extend this far, since it shies away from changing the macro 
economic development strategies of the country: 
“To be successful, climate change action will eventually require a 
reversal of the global devaluation of natural resources, including 
energy. In this regard, a comprehensive national climate change 
strategy should ultimately address macro-economic considerations 
and not limit itself to a sector-by-sector approach. However, this is 
beyond the scope of the current document” (South Africa, 2004, 
22). 
In Figure 6 above, the NCCRS is depicted according to the envisaged risk 
response framework and to the preceding discussion. As can be seen, it does fit 
the model put forward by the framework as a response to climate change that is 
directed through the reflecting, or self-aware process, yet achieves partial 
(incidental) reflexive modernisation. The reflexivity is present in the adoption of 
response actions such as improved technology that follow from the reflection on 
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Figure 6: The NCCRS according to the risk response framework 
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that is present in the general ‘everything goes’ approach promoted by the 
strategy. 
Modes of reflexivity 
The idea of accidental or incidental reflexivity deserves a closer investigation, 
since it appears as if it is the only type of reflexive change that will result from the 
implementation of the NCCRS. It can also shed light on how Beck’s idea of ‘pure’ 
reflex reaction should be compared to a reflexive response that results from a 
reflective self-confrontational pathway.  
Most respondents felt that the strategy fails to engage the primary drivers of 
climate change risks, whether due to its structural limitations or South Africa’s 
limited role in the global system, which clearly points toward indirect change 
being the only end product. The question to ask therefore is what determines 
whether direct or indirect reflexivity is pursued.  
 Manufactured risk 
Since the perception of risk is the foundation of risk responses, it should be 
considered whether the nature of the identified risks could be a major factor in 
determining how much, and what form of reflexivity is present in a response 
strategy. In the case of the NCCRS, the response is aimed at countering the 
economic impacts of climate change, in reaction to the outcomes of the Country 
Studies Program that highlighted the country’s economic vulnerabilities at the 
time of writing of the Country Studies. The least costly means of achieving this 
aim would be a redefinition of the risks through adaptation, and hence limited 
reflexivity. If, on the other hand, the risk was defined as a biophysical risk, then 
the strategy would have had to engage on a reduction in the actual extent of 
climate change drivers and adaptation practices would not change the nature of 
the risks to biophysical threats. This link between the conception of risk and the 
resultant response was mentioned by a DEAT respondent, who indicated that the 
level of adaption action will be determined by the nature of the identified risks.  
A graphical depiction that shows the different modes of reflexive change present 
in the NCCRS, linking them to the perceived economic risks, is presented in 
Figure 7. Economic development (modernisation), for example, which leads to 
 97 
ecological impacts, and in turn economic impacts, is used as reference 
framework. In response to the economic impacts economic responses can affect 
the ecological impacts (incidental energy efficiency through adaptation) or the 
original economic drivers (reflexivity). Lastly, changes to the resultant economic 
impacts would also be possible through adaptation that relies on redefinition, and 
would represent the non-reflexive reaction.  
This analysis points toward the notion that non-reflexive responses could be 
attributed, in part, to the principles underlying the strategy. The NCCRS clearly 
states that addressing climate change is a secondary priority: 
“…South Africa’s position is to view climate change response as 
offering just one specific avenue of opportunity for achieving the 
sustainable development objectives of the national policies and 
legislation that are concerned with both development and 
environment issues” (South Africa, 2004, iii). 
This focus on development issues rather than climate change, coupled with the 
reluctance to engage the issue of direct and substantial intervention is important 
since, instead of modernisation solving climate change problems, the idea in the 
NCCRS seems to be that the climate change issue can solve, or at least assist in 
addressing modernisation problems. This becomes possible through piggy-
backing development debates such as North to South technology transfers onto 
the climate change debate whilst the issue of addressing the core drivers of 













Figure 7: The modes of reflexive change present in the NCCRS 
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The strategy pursues responses that will limit the vulnerability of the country’s 
economy, thereby protecting the status quo of the modernisation process. It is 
therefore possible that should the response strategy fail to find any response 
actions that bring about more modernisation, there would not be changes to the 
modernisation path and hence no reflexive change. The focus would remain on 
nationalistic adaptation measures with no pro-active intervention borne out of a 
more strategic global need for change. 
This is certainly the feeling expressed by one respondent who referred to a 
“…nationalistic approach to risks [with] some, very preliminary and roughshod 
adaptation”. All respondents, however, refer to adaptation measures as opposed 
to simple redefinition of risks. It might indicate that the strategy does in fact 
advocate some action, but this could just as well be an indication of uncertainty 
being present, since it does not address the need for improved information and 
knowledge. Science in this context is therefore not reflexive. 
 External reflexivity 
Reflexivity could also be an externally driven process. The NCCRS will result in 
some measure of reflexive modernisation, but the changes will not be purely the 
result of a reflexive process in the local context, since many of the adaptations 
will result from international climate change responses such as an international 
need to offset carbon emissions. By implication, the reflexivity is inherited along 
with new technologies or practices and therefore external. Such externally driven 
reflexivity may not be sustainable in the long term. In the South African case, a 
large part of its reflexive modernisation would be a consequence of opportunism 
rather than a local longer term adaptation strategy, and hence could be reversed 
once the opportunity has been taken advantage of. 
 Institutional determinants 
This questioning around incidental reflexivity can be taken even further by asking 
whether it is possible to identify institutional aspects that determine when the 
simple, non-interventionist, alternative solutions are pursued and when full 
reflexive change.  
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The preceding analysis of the characteristics of risk societies pointed out how 
legislation, for a start, can be used to legitimise acceptable levels of pollution 
through legally determined thresholds or the allocation of shared responsibilities. 
Such legitimisation would allow for a reduced incentive for reflexivity in cases 
where the pollution is protected by law. However, the thresholds set by the 
legislation need to be informed by some process or knowledge base, and 
therefore a second, indirect influence could determine the amount of reflexivity. 
Potentially, this could be repeated at each juncture where a particular opinion or 
viewpoint is internalised in an administrative or political decision.  
Imperfect communication can also play a part. The structure of the NCCRS 
reveals a contribution to the presence of differential reflexivity, with the summary 
that focuses on awareness of climate change, but the wording of the actual 
strategy text that promotes integrated solutions. In practice it is the summary and 
possibly the detailed recommendations from the strategy that will be used most 
often in decision-making whilst the main text of the strategy remains as 
occasional reference material. This implies that there will be a focus on creating 
awareness of the issue, rather than an active attempt at addressing the issues. 
Full reflexivity is therefore not yet reached, since operationally South Africa is 
more reflexive/progressive and willing to put in practice real innovative changes, 
but promotionally/strategically the country is reluctant to even use such language. 
The drivers behind the policy could also be blamed for imposing structural 
limitations on the potential for reflexivity in scientific knowledge. Because of the 
preoccupation with support for existing economic development policies and 
government initiatives, the strategy never questions any of the initiatives and 
documents it draws together. Ogunseitan (2003) warns against such 
complacency, with specific reference to the Country Studies Program, since the 
unquestioning acceptance of the research framework could direct research 
efforts away from local priorities. As indicated previously, the combination of main 
NCCRS source documents does create information gaps and inconsistencies, 
which could be avoided through self-awareness at critical junctures.  
This absence of critical questioning further means an acceptance of the 
correctness of the source data and therefore no reflexivity in the process of 
knowledge creation, since the status quo is merely perpetuated. It also points 
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towards the use of expert systems or the reinforcing of accepted or popular ideas 
rather than the unsanctioned questions and answers that might come from a 
more critical approach towards climate change impact assessments. The 
response therefore does not actively pursue better knowledge. Scientific progress 
will be used, where available, to direct specific actions whilst the general policy 
direction is made independent of scientific progress. 
Even the future review of the strategy points towards a non-reflective nature – all 
respondents agree that there is no provision to review and improve the strategy 
and its foundations in future. It is noteworthy that this view is shared by a DEAT 
respondent despite an acknowledgement that the strategy is not perfect. 
(Re)action strategies 
 Policy and Regulation 
Policy and regulation are the mechanisms that give structure and final direction to 
risk responses. They are therefore the last point at which it is determined 
whether, and how much reflexivity will be present in the overall response 
strategy. It therefore becomes necessary to understand how the interaction 
between the process of policy compilation, and the creation and implementation 
of a regulatory framework can influence the ultimate response.  
As with the idea, that the definition of the identified risk can determine the level 
and nature of reflexivity that is present, so too is it necessary to question whether 
the nature of the regulatory framework in a risk response strategy can determine 
the amount of reflexive change. Such a wider scope will broaden the 
comprehension of the range of determinants of reflecting or reflexive change, and 
offer an improved understanding of the differences between the determinants.  
As indicated previously in the discussion, regulation differs from policy in the 
sense that it represents an active attempt to manage and control the outcomes of 
a particular process or action, whereas policy merely describes the desired state. 
Policy would therefore overlap with regulation in the sense that it defines the 
subject of regulation, but will not extend to the active resolution or management 
of the risk situation. Although regulation is customarily nothing more than the 
enforcement of standards and thresholds advocated in policies, it can, however, 
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exist independently of policy as an unprincipled response – something akin to 
taking precautionary medicine ‘just in case’. Both policy and regulation 
nonetheless need to control the presence and nature of response actions in order 
to ensure that the actions satisfy the objectives of the actors who originally 
required the change actions.  
The NCCRS is very upfront about its basic approach of placing economic 
development at the forefront of any response decisions or actions. This policy 
direction can therefore be expected to guide any further response actions, 
whether through regulation or just a statement of intent. A DEAT respondent 
admits, however, to the fact that the NCCRS does not present a strong regulatory 
framework since it does not offer any standards, thresholds or quantified targets, 
merely the mention (threat) of possible regulation. Review of the strategy further 
indicates that the general vulnerability identified in the Country Studies Report is 
used to motivate for any type of response without any attempt to define 
acceptable thresholds of risk.  
In summary therefore, the NCCRS has a strong policy position, but no regulatory 
structures, which leaves it at risk of being ineffective as a strategy to shape risk 
reduction approaches in the context of climate change.  
Policy and regulation necessarily reflect some underlying determinations that 
result from the process of reflecting on risks. The entire regulatory framework is 
shaped by self-confrontational science, the ecological political economy, et 
cetera, since these would be the influences that determine the nature and content 
of policies. Regulation, on the other hand, has the freedom to use these 
considerations to determine where and how to exercise control. By implication, 
therefore, a regulatory framework can determine whether the objectives of a 
policy environment (whether reflexive or not) actually come to fruition or not. 
In order to change from an ‘early modernisation’ (more of the same) response 
framework to a reflexive change to the drivers of climate change risks, regulation 
has to enhance the potential reflexive recommendations stemming from policy 
compilation processes. It is therefore important that the regulatory instruments 
originate from a perspective that understands and aims to achieve reflexivity. It 
might even be possible that a well conceived regulatory system could overcome 
or counter a policy that fails to address the need for reflexive change. However, 
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conversely, poorly conceived regulation or poor application can spell ruin to 
policy that directs action correctly. 
When measuring the NCCRS against such considerations, it becomes evident 
that the document does not actively promote any regulatory frameworks, but 
offers a strong economic development policy foundation that can be used as 
reference for regulation. In spite of this, the possibility exists that there could be 
forms of external regulation inherited along with transferred technology and tools 
that follow from international climate response interaction.  
An aspect of regulation that came to light during one of the interviews conducted 
for the research, for example, is that regulation also determines the amount of 
awareness in industry. This is due to the reluctance on the part of industries to 
effect change to their production processes, unless there are demonstrated 
economic benefits or legal requirements that forces change. Their awareness of 
the climate change response strategy would therefore automatically improve 
(albeit in a perverse manner) as the amount of regulation increases. 
Also, because the strategy does not have a reference tool to evaluate the 
response actions that are recommended from the strategy’s main sources, it 
becomes possible to recommend simple, non-interfering response actions that 
will address economic concerns rather than climate change risks. This is 
particularly evident in the fact that the custodian of the strategy, DEAT, was the 
only respondent to believe that the strategy will make a difference in the country’s 
development path, despite expressing that it is merely hoped that further 
modernisation will be sustainable. 
In order for response actions to make a meaningful difference, therefore, either 
thresholds that trigger response actions or specific objectives need to be set. The 
absence of such a system that distinguishes unacceptable risk and related 
regulatory procedures would probably reduce reflexive reaction to a minimum as 
a consequence of the natural tendency for the global free market system to resist 
costly change. It can consequently be questioned whether, as with the nature of 
the identified risks, the nature of the regulatory framework in a risk response 
strategy determines the amount of reflexive change that survives the self-
confrontational reflective process centred found in the political, public and 
academic arenas.  
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 Erosion of regulation and self-regulation 
Arguably, the greatest opportunity for development of the NCCRS lies in the 
absence of a system for regulation or structured control of response actions. This 
is a consequence of the fact that the strategy offers a strong policy position – a 
response to socio-economic risks – but weak mechanisms to ensure that the 
intended outcomes are achieved. The absence of clear regulation is potentially a 
reflection of the erosion of traditional regulation and concept of organised 
irresponsibility which Beck identified. Since the strategy does not actually set any 
targets or measures, no one will be held accountable or responsible for the 
outcomes (or lack thereof).  
Risk societies would necessarily tend towards self- and transnational control and 
regulation in order to better match the globalised and diffuse nature of modern 
risks. In support of Beck’s concept of liberation from national control and 
regulation through reflexive modernisation, the NCCRS shows how the 
politicising of risk, however, does not necessarily mean a further entrenchment of 
regulatory control. That traditional national regulation is steadily being eroded, in 
favour of supernational regulatory standards, is indicated by the near absence of 
references to local regulation in the NCCRS, as compared to the detailed 
contextualisation in terms of global programs of emissions control, regulation and 
trading. None of the respondents, for example, identified any regulatory 
measures or timeframes for action plans in the NCCRS either. Instead, global 
organisation and administration of climate change response strategies are used 
as references or programmes to be part of. Externally devised processes such as 
the UNFCCC and its CDM projects will merely transfer externally determined 
regulatory standards to the recipient location. South African reaction strategies 
for example are plugged into global debates and activities, despite the fact that 
the national response is primarily driven by local debates that do not have climate 
change as a core issue. By implication, the climate change risks are regulated 
through externally dictated or determined processes and standards. Regulation 
therefore becomes a ‘secondary’ reaction strategy, very similar to the incidental 
reflexivity identified earlier.  
Notwithstanding an apparent reactive response, based on international climate 
change agendas, the strategy does acknowledge that expertise exists within both 
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government and industry. Regulation might not be proposed per se, but the 
strategy does indicate that some industries or sectors are, or need to become 
self-regulating. An example of a currently active self-regulation programme is 
found in the local reports compiled in support of the UK-based Carbon Disclosure 
Project (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2008). The acknowledgement of the need for 
industries to internalise a portion of their climate change responsibility implies 
that the strategy concedes that both normal regulation and self-regulation could 
be possible. The possibility therefore exists that the problem has become too big 
and complex for traditional regulatory practices. In the case of the Carbon 
Disclosure Project, one merely has to consider the global scale of operations of 
the largest carbon emitters in South Africa to realise that nation-state control has 
been eclipsed. 
The development and use of different forms of regulation in a response strategy 
must be accompanied by an appropriate amount of circumspection though, as 
each form of regulation would have its own particular shortcomings. Traditional 
national regulation would be a simple start, but the strategy needs to ensure that 
the regulation is not used to legitimise unacceptable levels or forms of risk 
through legally determined thresholds or the allocation of shared responsibilities. 
On the other hand, self-regulation could represent a healthy form of reflexive 
regulation because it is self-critical, but at the same time it could represent a form 
of expert systems that would be beyond scrutiny. Lastly, transnational measures 
could offer opportunities for innovative global solutions, but as is evident in the 
current debates around international emissions reductions and trade, they could 
just as well mire down because of its scale.  
 Symbolic politics 
The strong non-climate change agenda put up as core policy underlying the 
strategy points to the fact that there are symbolic politics present in the strategy. 
This is evident in the manner in which the human forcing of climatic change is 
played down by the NCCRS, with only the consequent threat that climate change 
poses to sustainable development used as motivation for response actions.  
Although the information found in the NCCRS’s source documents uses likely 
physical climate impacts to inspire a call to adaptation actions, most of the 
impacts and response actions in the NCCRS are economic in nature rather than 
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holistically environmental. The strategy very directly links these impacts and 
responses to more certainty about the economic realities of the country and less 
certainty about possible climatic changes. One respondent remarked, for 
example, that climate change and immediate human needs issues are competing 
for the same budget, which is a view that results directly from uncertainty around 
sustainable development. The strategy therefore uses the popularised concept of 
‘sustainable development’ as symbolic of any socio-economic debate to motivate 
for action. Certainty about related aspects may therefore inspire more response 
than certainty or uncertainty about the main physical threat of climate change and 
the fact that human action is to blame for the situation. This is a typical example 
of how reaction (local response to real effects) will always overshadow prevention 
(strategic global intervention).  
The structure of the strategy is also arranged in a manner that non-action is 
protected. The main report indicates that further information and opportunities 
need to inform the response actions, and hence it only recommends continued 
monitoring. In contrast, the quick-reference summary advises immediate action, 
creating the impression that the strategy advises strong intervention.  
Manifestations of Risk Responses and Reflexivity 
By stepping back from the detailed analysis for a moment, it is possible to lastly, 
and briefly, reflect on two general aspects of responses to risk – the uncertainty 
inherent to risk perception, as well as the manner in which ideological politics 
determine responses.  
Manufactured Risk 
The uncertainty inherent to all aspects of modern risk societies implies that 
particular forms of self-awareness and management are required as controls, in 
order to inform, rather than hinder reflexive progress – even if it extends to 
‘reflection’ more than ‘reflexivity’. Any climate change response consequently 
needs to be aware of the uncertainties that informed it, yet respond in 
accordance with the magnitude of the likely risks. This becomes possible in a risk 
society since it is the very uncertainty that frees the components of modern 
societies such as the public sphere, politics and law from the absolutes of 
science. Although, in the case of the NCCRS, the natural sciences are used to 
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inform the overall strategy, the scientific findings are not alone in determining the 
recommended responses. Other influences such as politics (North-South 
developmental issues) and economics (poverty and unemployment) contribute to 
turn the uncertainty around impacts and vulnerability into response strategies. 
The combination of uncertainty and self-reflecting questioning implies that we 
need not accept blindly what is said by the scientists/experts/media, but rather 
democratically determine which or how much risk (or uncertainty) we are willing 
to accept. The response strategies of the NCCRS consequently allow society to 
determine whether the risk is directly related to climate change or rather 
economic considerations, and therefore which response actions are preferred.  
With all this in mind, it becomes crucial to remember who and what contributes to 
the manufacturing of risk, since the originators have different priorities, 
perspectives and agendas that might or might not require a change in the way we 
conceive or create risks. Similarly, a close watch over the drivers behind 
response policies is warranted, since the constructing of risk perceptions 
determines the pattern of reflexive questioning and nature of the response 
strategies.  
Politicising Risk 
Given that the conceptualisation of risk can take place in many different contexts, 
and is not shaped purely by the presence of expert scientific contributions but 
also political and subpolitical influences, it stands to reason that not all 
perceptions of the same risks would be identical. The research indicates that 
such differences in the nature of risk perception have direct bearing on the 
resulting response strategies. This is evident from the correlation between the 
economic vulnerability risks and socio-economic developmental responses that 
are prevalent in the NCCRS, as opposed to risks and response actions purely 
related to biophysical aspects. Amongst other things, therefore, risk responses 
need to be conscious of the manner in which the presence of politics and 
subpolitics affects risk perceptions and consequent response strategies. 
The NCCRS is an initiative driven by a central government committee, and is 
therefore very closely related to mainstream political direction – as is likely shown 
by its ‘status quo’ recommendations. However, as is indicated by discussion 
earlier in this report, political decisions need to satisfy both economic interest and 
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democratic opinion in order to maintain control over power structures. These two, 
economic drivers and public opinion, are the spheres in which subpolitical 
influences can operate alongside traditional politics to determine risk responses. 
Various mechanisms will be present – the focus on economic costs and benefits, 
legitimisation of risk, manipulation of information communication in the media, 
etc. The challenge is to identify these influences and understand their influence 
on opportunities for reflexive change, potentially incorporating them as part of a 
process of reflexive criticism.  
The presence of industrial era ideology in the NCCRS is an example of how the 
supposedly natural science concept of climate change is being politicised as a 
political ecology. However, it also raises a question regarding the use of politics 
in risk societies. In Beck’s conceptual risk society, modernisation should evolve to 
a new level of decision-making freedom where ideology does not get a chance to 
manifest. Ideological politics should therefore be the medium through which risks 
are traded and responded to, but not the determinant of the responses. In 
practice though, and with specific reference to South Africa, early modernisation 
thinking appears to be the main form of risk politicising, and therefore 
intentionally or unintentionally, both the medium and main driver of the reflexive 
modernisation that is present. By implication, therefore, Beck’s idealistic concept 
of a risk society that is freed from ideology appears to be just that – an ideal.  
Chapter 5 delved deeper into the character of the South African 
climate change response, as brought to the fore by the risk 
response framework. A thread is identified that runs from the 
conceptualisation of risk, and the uncertainty that it creates, all the 
way through to the eventual response direction and actions, which 
has the potential to affect the very nature of the response. It 
determines how self-critical the response is, how it deals with the 
various forms of political influence, how it gets communicated and 
ultimately whether it will effect real reflexive change to climate 
change drivers. In the case of the NCCRS, the thread starts with 
economic drivers, and results in incidental impacts on climate 
change risks. Chapter 6 reflects on the implications of risk 
responses that are restricted to incidental reflexivity for both 
philosophical and practical contexts. 
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CHAPTER 6 FINDINGS: THE CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 
IN ACTION 
In this penultimate chapter, the research reflects on the original questions posed:  
1) Whether the risk society theory offers a framework to which risk 
responses conform; 
2) To what extent the South African Climate Change strategy available at the 
time of writing this report fits the description of a risk response; and  
3) Whether aspects of the risk society framework might limit, or provide 
further direction to climate change responses.  
The research presented a conceptual framework of typical risk-based responses, 
and used it as reference for the assessment of a climate change response policy. 
Various aspects of general risk society theory were scrutinised, and various 
structural components of the theory identified that have a direct bearing on the 
nature of the risk responses. It also allowed the selected aspects to be applied in 
a practical context in order to identify further peculiarities associated with the risk 
society theory in a real-world scenario. Examination at both levels, theory and 
practical application, enabled the identification of aspects inherent to risk 
response in modern societies. The findings from this research will hopefully begin 
to augment knowledge of risk society theory as well as risk response policy work. 
During this process, some of the criticism of Beck’s theories is also addressed by 
the application of the concept to a real case study. 
The following overview consequently summarises the findings of the study, and 
engages on some of the critique levelled at Beck, as identified in Chapter 2. 
The Climate Change Risk Response Framework 
In order to better conceptualise Beck’s theory of risk societies, the key aspects of 
his theory, namely modernisation and risk, were assembled in a simple flow 
diagram (Chapter 3, Figure 4) showing how each component drives or influences 
the other in a circular flow of causal reactions. The diagram makes it obvious that 
reflexive responses to modern risks can, or at least should ultimately, alter the 
original drivers of the risks, a process described by Beck as reflexive 
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modernisation, which may lead to a new state of ‘cosmopolitan’ existence (Beck, 
2004).  
Societies do not, however, simply become reflexive overnight. Some degree of 
accommodation and redefinition of risk, as opposed to reflexive adjustment of the 
risks, is likely to remain. It is, therefore, unlikely that they will completely 
transform into perfect risk societies, on all levels. An in-depth analysis of the 
various primary constituents, key concepts, interrelationships and cyclical 
processes inherent to the risk society theory were used to add a reflexivity by-
pass alternative to the original flow diagram as a more realistic representation of 
modern risk societies. This scenario is presented as Figure 5 in Chapter 3, and it 
gives structure to the difference that Beck identifies between reflex and reflection. 
Reflection becomes a self-conscious questioning of risk and risk response 
context as opposed to an autonomous reflex reaction. 
The research was, however, intended to focus on the responses that follow from 
modern risks, and not the theory of risk societies as a whole. Consequently, the 
‘reflection’ box present in Figure 5 was expanded further in order to identify the 
various influences and processes that contribute to the conceptualisation of 
climate change responses. The suitability of the framework was checked by 
applying it to a real-world scenario, in this case the South African climate change 
response that was available at the time of writing this report, with the intention to 
confirm its validity as reference tool.  
As is shown here, the framework provides insight into the dynamics of risk 
societies and their potential for self-confrontational and reflexive change, as 
proposed by Beck and Giddens. Three broad categories of dynamic processes 
inherent to modern risk societies were identified in this research, namely 
manufactured risk, political economies and response policies. In combination with 
the assessment of the NCCRS, however, the framework also provided further 
insight into the manifestation of the risk society theory in the modern world by 
characterising the nature of risk responses and reflexivity in a developing 
economy. This successful application of the framework indicates that it has 
definite potential as a tool for analysis, and as a reference for the understanding 
of responses to risk in modern societies.  
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Risk Responses and Modes of Reflexivity 
According to Beck (1992), the functioning of modern societies is not focussed on 
trading in resources, but rather on the trade in risk. Specifically, responses to 
modern risks would be mindful that climate change risks cannot be avoided, and 
therefore the trading in risks offers the opportunity to weaken or change the 
drivers of global warming and climatic change through reflexive modernisation.  
In reality though, the research indicates that, despite all the conditions being 
present for a risk society, the intention of the NCCRS is to maintain the current 
conditions of development as opposed to attempts at changing the drivers of 
climate change risks. This is shown by the intention of the NCCRS to use the 
climate change debate as vehicle for the attraction of foreign investment and 
technologies as adaptation strategies in order to satisfy short-term developmental 
risks and needs. It is also echoed by the nearly unanimous agreement from the 
respondents that the NCCRS will not change the South African modernisation 
process. In terms of risk responses and reflexive change, therefore, the NCCRS 
does not envision, or drive a reflexive change towards a new state of risks.  
A very important finding though is that it does not, however, mean that reflexivity 
will not be present. By comparing the NCCRS to the typical risk response 
framework, it is found that there are different modes of reflexivity that could be 
present in any risk response. In particular, the NCCRS exhibits an external, 
secondary and incidental reflexivity, as opposed to reflexive change that should 
be internal or a reflective change that would be intentional.  
Incidental reflexivity refers to reflexive change that occurs as a secondary effect 
of other responses or interventions. In the South African case, the reflexivity 
results because of the transfer of external standards and knowledge, and not 
because of a primary process of affecting the drivers of climate risks, hence it 
being ‘incidental’ rather than ‘internal’. Reflexivity is therefore externally driven 
rather than a direct result of an internal process of review and adjustment. It also 
does not satisfy Giddens’ definition of reflexivity which Beck calls ‘reflection’, that 
envisages an intentional and self-aware process of self-confrontation as it 
embraces any handout without much critical assessment.  
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The different modes of reflexivity appear to be determined by various systematic 
or institutional determinants. From the NCCRS, it appears that the reflexivity 
could be determined by the nature of the risk that is identified and responded to. 
Despite climate change being a global issue, the South African response focuses 
on the local economic risks posed by climate change and, since these are quite 
pressing, also directs immediate adaptation in the direction of economic 
development opportunities. As a consequence, long-term mitigation receives less 
attention, and therefore does not contribute to a reflexive change of the drivers of 
the climate change risk.  
This finding links to the fact that risk conceptualisation and early modernisation 
perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive. As Beck indicated, reflexive 
responses and reflecting debate can occur simultaneously, as part of the same 
risk society. Indeed, both appear to have a contribution to the functioning of a risk 
society in South Africa. This is evident because the main driver for the South 
African climate change risk response is the risks posed to the local need for 
socio-economic modernisation within a developing economy. In addition, the 
strategy recommends responses that will rely on more modernisation, but at the 
same time involve a level of reflexive change to the nature of the modernisation.  
Implications for Science 
Giving structure to risk responses 
 Risk response frameworks 
The framework of risk response formulation which is used to analyse the NCCRS 
is one of the primary contributions of this research report. The framework gives 
structure to the policy formulation process, which alleviates to an extent the 
concern expressed by Bulkeley (2001) that it is not easy to do systematic 
analyses of (and with) Beck’s work.  
In this particular research setting, the detailed framework is used as a systematic 
evaluation of the South African National Climate Change Response Strategy. 
This serves the joint purpose of testing the applicability and accuracy of the 
framework, and assessing the NCCRS from a risk society perspective. In both 
instances, the framework provided satisfactory results, as indicated in more detail 
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in Chapter 5 of this report. The wider application and testing of the framework is 
therefore encouraged.  
 Reflexivity by-pass scenario 
A particularly important aspect illustrated in the response framework is the 
presence of responses to risk that do not contribute to reflexive change in 
modern risk societies. Whereas the risk society theory envisages that risk 
responses should bring about unseen and unintended changes to the nature of 
the risks that are responded to, the research proves how easy it is for non-
reflexive responses to exist within risk societies. In the case of the NCCRS, for 
example, the strategy fails to trigger any specific response actions that aim to 
affect the drivers of climatic change. Instead, the strategy merely suggests 
various possible response actions that share the central aim of using adaptation 
to reduce vulnerabilities.  
The identification of the reflexivity by-pass within risk responses makes it possible 
to further investigate how risk responses are generated, why reflexivity is 
avoided, where reflection fits in and ultimately also what it means for the need to 
achieve reflexivity in modernisation. 
Modes of reflexivity 
 Internal versus external reflexivity 
When modernisation is pursued through means of reflection (i.e. by making it the 
topic of discussion in science, politics and public debate), the progress runs a 
higher risk of merely perpetuating a status quo which fails to alter the 
fundamental drivers of the risks posed by climatic changes. The investigation into 
the nature of reflection, however, indicates that direct reflex is not a prerequisite 
for reflexivity. Instead, incidental or secondary reflexive change can be present, 
albeit with far less overall effect on the extent of the risk. In the South African 
case study, the NCCRS exhibits no intention to achieve any reflexivity, yet some 
of its recommended response actions will necessarily change the nature of the 
country’s contribution to climate change. These secondary effects will result from 
the adaptation to external opportunities for technological transfer and Clean 
Development Mechanism implementation projects that have actual effects on the 
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drivers of climate change. In the research, this is termed ‘incidental reflexivity’, 
and it generally describes reflexivity that is external or secondary. 
This concept of incidental reflexivity points to a particular failing of modern risk 
societies, also identified by Bulkeley (2001) and Demeritt (2001), namely that 
reflexivity is yet to achieve Beck’s envisaged state of utopian reflexive 
modernisation. Instead of having a society with sufficient freedom to 
unintentionally and automatically steer risk responses towards reflexive 
modernisation, examples are provided of risk response scenarios where changes 
to the modernisation path are dependent on ‘accidental’ reflexivity. Further 
debate and application around the concept of reflexive modernisation and risk 
societies would have to consider this fact closely, in order to understand the 
limitations that it places on the developmental progress of modern society. 
Another critical question to be asked in order to take this line of investigation 
forward, is whether or not incidental reflexivity satisfies Beck’s definition of 
reflexive modernisation as being unintended reflex reaction. 
 Determinants of reflexivity 
From the research it appears as if two aspects in particular, namely risk 
perception and thresholds of significant risk, are critical determinants of the 
amount and nature of reflexivity that is present in risk societies.  
In the first instance, it was evident in the analysis of the NCCRS that a socio-
economic risk focus led to recommended response strategies that addressed 
socio-economic development, as opposed to climate change mitigation. The 
nature of the perceived risk therefore determined the process of response 
formulation and therefore also the amount and nature of reflexive change. This is 
a finding that will be not only be relevant to assessments of climate change 
responses, but to all risk responses. It reflects what Murgida and Gonzáles 
(2005) experienced in South America, Horlick-Jones (1995) in some westernised 
megacities (London, New York and Los Angeles), and Adger (2006) in general – 
that the nature of risk perception is central to the determination of responses, and 
that the risk perception is in turn determined by the various political and 
subpolitical influences that make up the social context. The research also 
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addresses to some extent the concerns expressed by Lacy (2002) that Beck’s 
analysis lacks a broader discussion of risk construction.  
The identification of risk perception as a critical factor adds a specific dimension 
to research in the field of risk responses though, by highlighting how crucial local 
definitions of risks are. Response strategies and actions should therefore not be 
considered in isolation from the risk perceptions that they address.  
The second aspect, the indeterminate thresholds of significant, tolerable or 
acceptable risk, has important implications for reflexive change. Without a 
definition for the limits of acceptable risk, either no responses, or responses that 
have little or no impact on the nature of the modernisation process and drivers of 
climate change become likely. This results from the ability to legitimise any 
response action that has some form of tie to the identified risk, as opposed to 
actions that have targets to reach or specific risk drivers to affect. Inevitably, this 
will affect the balance between adaptation and mitigation strategies. In this 
respect, the research echoes the findings by Dessai et al. (2004) that it is crucial 
to define locally relevant definitions and thresholds of danger if robust response 
policies are to be pursued.  
Constructivism  
 Perception of risk 
An important theme that is identified in the research, and which is common in all 
scientific fields related to risk responses, is the realisation that perceptions shape 
responses to risks (Dessai et al., 2004; Adger, 2006). Bulkeley (2001) notes that 
Beck’s thesis on risk society identifies a cultural and institutional context that 
contributes to the construction of contemporary environmental risks, whilst Lacy 
(2002) points to the failure to fully address risk-construction as a shortcoming of 
Beck’s work. The risk society-based evaluation of the South African climate 
change response strategy confirms these findings, by pointing out how early 
modernisation ideology, and specifically economic dependency theory is used 
alongside the natural sciences to define climate change risks. 
The problem faced by the sciences is firstly how to define, and secondly, how to 
deal with the uncertainty that is highlighted by this focus on perceptive variance. 
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In both respects the proposed risk response framework can prove useful since it 
offers an assessment tool that gives structure and definition to the reflective path 
that determines risk perception as opposed to the un-aware reflexive response 
conceived by Beck. Once the various influences that shape reflection are known, 
they can be evaluated further to determine their respective contributions to the 
risk conceptualisation. 
In the case of climate change risks, for example, industrial era ideology can 
potentially be identified as an influence on risk perception. The influence can then 
be critiqued, in order to improve the relevance of the risk concept and match the 
response strategies better to the conceived risk.  
 Influences on the response creation process 
The analysis further points out that the very same aspects that determine risk 
perceptions shape the entire policy formulation process that lead to the actual 
risk responses. Factors include globalisation, manufactured risk and uncertainty, 
scientific debate, formal and informal politics, and the various forms of regulation. 
The identification of these factors through means of the application of the risk 
framework allows for a critical look at the various factors, and hence an 
understanding of their roles in determining the nature of the end product. 
One of the issues that came through strongly in the research is the politicising of 
ecology and environmental risks through ideological determination or socio-
economic development perspectives. This is not unlike the findings by Pielke Jr. 
(2005) who finds a similar determination in the international definitions of climate 
change, and the work by Klein et al. (2005) that describes a strong link between 
development issues and climate change responses. This research in fact adds 
further questions to the list posed by Klein et al. (2005) querying the nature of 
effective and efficient climate policies. More examples of research in this respect 
are found in the work by Christiansen (2003) and Jacobsson and Lauber (2006).  
The research has shown that in the South African scenario, concerns about 
socio-economic welfare, and some influences from industrial era ideology or 
dependency theory, override any ecological concerns in determining climate 
change risk responses. The fear that economic interests could be shaping 
socially-constructed values for use in environmental policy is identified by 
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McGonicle (1999), and interventions recommended in order to steer economic 
development on a more sustainable path. The NCCRS, unfortunately, adopts an 
approach that will accommodate any form of response action that supports the 
course of economic development. It must therefore be considered how this 
political economy can be redirected and turned into a political ecology instead. A 
more ecological approach would possibly focus more on issues such as 
sustainability in resource use, and hence change the nature of risk perception 
and the formulation of responses to the risks. It will also allow a more prominent 
position to the resilience school of thought that balances socio-economic welfare 
firmly on top of a healthy or stable natural resource base.  
The creation of risk perceptions and risk responses necessarily also has to rely 
on expert systems as a consequence of the conceptual nature of modern risk 
manifestations. Specialist inputs are required to describe risks, their impact and 
their causes. As shown by the risk response framework though, scientific 
information can be subject to self-criticism, manipulation for political or 
subpolitical gain, distortion through poor communication, and ultimately selective 
application before it is taken up in risk response strategies. This mirrors the need 
for a thorough understanding of the web of science-practice interactions, as 
identified by Vogel et al. (2007), as well as a critical appraisal of knowledge 
construction and its use in policy formulation identified in Beck’s work by Demeritt 
(2001, 328): 
“For Beck...the prospect of sweeping public scrutiny of science 
represents the final achievement of the Enlightenment’s 
emancipatory potential.” 
The inherent problems of using expert systems in the process of knowledge 
creation are also identified by Munnichs (2004), as are the concerns regarding 
the interplay between science and uncertainty by Demeritt (2001). These 
concerns are valid in the case of the NCCRS, as the research points out how 
source documents are used without question, despite the risk of culturing 
systematic uncertainties. Weiss (2002) responds to these fears by calling for 
more self-awareness on the side of the scientific community in order to overcome 
the shortcomings inherent to the communication of technical or scientific 
information to non-experts (see also Patt and Dessai, 2005), and the research 
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finds that this can also be extended to elementary aspects of policy formulation 
such as a neglect of awareness strategies or language barriers.  
In a way, however, Beck was correct in advancing the idea that reflective 
questioning can act as a countermeasure. Self-confrontation and criticism of 
expert scientific perspectives should lead to better, or at least more 
representative science, and potentially, could even form the basis for dialogue 
between the diverse perspectives and policies such as the adaptation versus 
mitigation debate which Tompkins and Adger (2005) describes. The proposed 
risk response framework can aid in this process, by providing a reference that 
can be used to identify junctures in the policy formulation process where self-
awareness should be employed to stimulate questioning of expert systems or 
communication failures.  
Relevance in the Third World 
The case study shows that the politicising of risks has implications for studies of 
vulnerability, adaptive and mitigative capacity, and resilience, since it results in 
response strategies that tend towards short-term adaptation tendencies to better 
match the urgency of basic human needs as opposed to longer term mitigation 
actions. Although, in itself, the research does not advise on which response 
strategies are preferred, it does offer a tool that can be used to systematically 
evaluate the origins and expected outcomes of various strategic response 
directions, and therefore their relevance to particular contexts – a need identified 
by Klein et al. (2005).  
What has not been investigated though is whether non-, or partially reflexive 
reaction is in fact undesirable. The South African response is far from fully 
reflexive, as it advocates adaptation only to the point where reflexivity becomes 
incidental, but this could in fact be the correct approach for a local scenario 
contextualised by development needs and global disadvantages. This stands in 
stark contrast to the iterative process employed in the case of the IPCC 
Assessments. Siebenhüner (2002) describes how organisational learning and 
reflective mechanisms helped shape the Third Assessment Report. Interestingly, 
it does mirror the Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2008) that admits to a far 
more extensive reflective process that allows for all the linkages between climate 
change drivers, risks, impacts and vulnerabilities and socio-economic 
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development to be assessed, thereby acknowledging that any responses to 
climate change risks will have reflexive consequences for the nature and drivers 
of the risks.  
In summary therefore, the research report adds value to the existing scientific 
debate regarding reflexivity in science, and in particular the process of policy 
formulation, by highlighting critical elements in the South African climate change 
risk response context. Similar analyses in different contexts will refine the 
proposed risk response framework further, or at least provide a better 
understanding of its usefulness as a tool for systematic analysis of real-world risk 
societies. Differentiated application would also provide insights into the 
differences between various manifestations of Beck’s risk society. As an initial 
suggestion, a similar analysis of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report is 
recommended. Such an analysis would compare the reflexivity inherent in 
international climate change science to local or regional examples, thereby 
pointing out potential weaknesses in risk conceptualisation related to the 
developing world.  
Implications for climate change response strategies or policies 
Self-awareness/reflexive self-assessment 
Probably the strongest message for risk responses that is communicated by this 
research report is the central role played by self-awareness. The presence of 
reflective criticism during the conceptualisation of the response will ensure a 
comprehension of the nature of the risk perceptions informing the response, 
whereas a critical stance during the policy formulation phase would do the same 
for the political and subpolitical influences. The objective would ultimately be to 
enhance or neutralise the influences, depending on whether they support or 
counteract the targets set for the response strategy/policy. In this respect, the 
proposed risk response framework, or similar analytical tools, should be used to 
identify the various elements and relationships that contribute to the response 
formulation process.  
It would, for example, be useful to apply a risk society perspective during the 
compilation stage of any new climate change response strategy, in order to 
identify, and where required neutralise, some of the industrial era references that 
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could affect the self-confrontation or overall reflexivity that results from the 
implementation of the strategy. 
The use of expert systems is an aspect of risk societies that is closely related to 
the issue of risk perception. Experts have to be consulted as part of the 
comprehension of climate change risks, but it is possible for their unchallenged 
sovereignty to have drastic implications for risk perceptions and response 
strategies. Response strategies therefore need to take cognisance of the sources 
of information, the availability of peer review mechanisms as well as the 
limitations posed by the communication of information. Such questioning would 
constitute a form of reflective scientific inquiring that can aid in drawing many 
different pools of thought together, or simply to get to the essence of a particular 
perspective. 
A last aspect that needs close self-scrutiny relates to communication issues, as 
pitfalls abound when people are not relying on first-hand information. The 
summary section of a long report will necessarily contain less detail than the main 
body of the report, but that creates an ideal opportunity for critical bits of 
information or context to be ‘lost’ once main text items are taken up in the 
summary. By implication, self critical awareness needs to ensure that the 
structure of a document does not influence its content and objectives.  
Similarly, care must be taken to avoid symbolic politics from diluting or distorting 
the information being presented in response strategies. Contentious or uncertain 
terminology such as ‘sustainable development’ must be identified and relevant 
definitions decided on in order to prevent the uncertainties from finding their way 
into response strategies.  
Measures of effect 
Performance standards for climate change responses can only exist if thresholds 
are provided either as limits of acceptable risk, or alternatively as measurable 
goals. As one respondent indicated:  
“If you know how immediate and big a risk is, then you can decide 
on reaction.” 
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The NCCRS proves that the absence of thresholds creates uncertainty in terms 
of which risks are being responded to, which response actions are critical, what 
types and levels of effects are desired and how much change to the drivers of 
climate change must be pursued. A lack of thresholds will be even more crucial in 
cases where the strategy needs to inform regulatory processes. If no reference 
framework exist, then the measurement of performance becomes impossible, 
and a system where no-one in particular is responsible for the response actions 
(organised irresponsibility) takes control. The absence of thresholds also has 
impacts on which response actions are considered legitimate, since there would 
not be a yardstick for the evaluation of different responses. Response action 
could therefore easily by-pass the reflexivity required for fundamental changes to 
the original drivers of the risks. Such a system must therefore be actively avoided 
in similar strategies or future revisions of the NCCRS.  
Even though it sounds like an obvious statement, the research indicates that risk 
responses would be ‘risk specific’. In other words, the perception of risk 
determines the nature of the responses, and therefore also their effectiveness. In 
the case of the NCCRS, the definition of risk as socio-economic in nature has a 
major influence on the recommendations regarding response actions, since they 
too become focussed on immediate socio-economic considerations. The danger 
lies in the fact that despite the socio-economic focus, the response actions are 
not guaranteed to have any significant impact on the scale of climate change in 
general, and hence could imply a failure to achieve sustainability in the 
developmental drive. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
From the investigation into the NCCRS, therefore, it becomes evident that in a 
highly diversified and heterogeneous world, the presence of a society that 
responds completely reflexively to risk cannot be assumed. Various shades of 
reflexivity are likely to be present. Consequently, the research focussed on the 
reflective character of risk response scenarios that by-pass reflexivity within 
modern societies. In the South African case study examined here, the results 
show that both Beck and Giddens were correct in their conceptions of the modern 
risk society. Beck believed that autonomous risk responses will direct action back 
onto the causes of the risks, in order to transform and change the risks, whereas 
Giddens envisaged responses that are self-aware and reflecting. The two 
positions are shown to have equal validity since, on the one hand, risk responses 
can be manipulated through the by-pass scenario to not be reflexive. Instead, 
society can focus on redefining the risks in a manner that does not lead to 
change in the causes of the risks. However, part of the nature of the responses 
can lead to an unintended reflexivity which satisfies Beck’s vision. 
Attaining Beck’s ideal of a fully reflexive modern risk society is consequently not a 
magic solution to all the troubles facing modern times. It comes with a host of 
new challenges and intricacies. The factors mentioned in this report are only 
some of the aspects that risk responses need to be aware of. Beck already 
identified this ‘iceberg’ effect when he first published his theory: 
“Is it sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, their photochemical 
breakdown products, hydrocarbons, or something else as yet 
totally unknown, which are giving us the final and eternal autumn – 
the falling leaves? These chemical formulas appear to stand 
alone. Behind them, however, companies, industrial sectors, 
business, scientific and professional groups move into the firing 
line of public criticism…Those who find themselves in the public 
pillory as risk producers refute the charges as well as they can, 
with the aid of a ‘counter science’ gradually becoming 
institutionalised in industry, and attempt to bring in other causes 
and thus other originators. The picture reproduces itself. Access to 
the media becomes crucial…Good arguments, or at least 
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arguments capable of convincing the public, become a condition of 
business” (Beck, 1992, 31-32). 
From the research, it appears as if a ‘healthy’ state of completely unseen and 
unintended reflexive modernity will be difficult to achieve amidst the conflict 
between economic and political powers, and the uncertainties inherent in 
scientific inquiry. This is certainly shown in the South African case, where the 
response formulation process simply leads to indecisiveness. It therefore 
becomes clear that the South African response to climate change can benefit 
from a more structured revision that takes cognisance of the need to reflexively 
address the perceived causes of climate risks. This is required if the strategy 
intends to make a real impact on the risks society faces, rather than merely 
adapting through accommodation or redefinition of the risks. 
The research, however, does support the finding by Matten (2004) that the value 
of Beck’s work lies in “...providing an interdisciplinary explanatory framework for 
the new character of environmental problems and the institutional failure of 
modern societies in tackling risk.” This is shown by the successful 
conceptualisation and application of a risk response framework that is based on 
the characteristics inherent to Beck’s thesis. 
A final question to ask therefore is: Does a risk society perspective provide for a 
new discourse on environmental issues, thereby changing the way we deal with it 
- i.e. the questions asked and answers generated?  
The research has shown that yes, a risk society perspective certainly can assist 
in understanding the finer nuances and finding gaps in at least the South African 
official climate change response. It elucidates the complications centred around a 
clear definition of which risks are being responded to, and how they are 
perceived, and in addition creates the opportunity for a revision of recommended 
response strategies that will ensure that responses go beyond symbolic politics 
and effect real change in the causes of the climate risks.  
Of course response strategies will always be influenced by the short-term 
priorities and agendas of the political and economic conditions, but the 
arguments presented in this study should assist in motivating for more 
meaningful approaches to the spectre of climate change. The question not yet 
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asked though, is what the NCCRS would have looked like if climatic change was 
the perceived risk, and socio-economic impacts the context, as opposed to the 
socio-economic risks merely being framed by climate change debates. 
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APPENDIX 2 – QUESTIONNAIRE TEMPLATE WITH DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSE STRATEGY 
Questions NCCRS Summary NCCRS Main text 
Does the NCCRS respond to modern 
risks, and if so, what are the 
characteristics of these risks? 
  
1. Climate change (CC) implies 
gradual changes to the global 
biophysical environment. What 
risks do these changes pose? 
The risks imply disruptions of the world’s weather and climate patterns, 
including impacts on rainfall, extreme weather events and sea level rise. The 
impacts will be found in the health sector, maize production, plant and animal 
biodiversity, water resources, and rangelands as areas of highest 
vulnerability to climate change. The mining and energy sectors are 
particularly vulnerable to climate change mitigation measures. 
Serious disruptions of the world’s weather and climate patterns, including 
impacts on rainfall, extreme weather events and sea level rise. This will 
lead to adverse effects on the economy, public health and the quality of the 
environment; significant effects on various sectors of South African society 
and the economy, pollution, health, water, weather patterns, agriculture, 
forestry, biodiversity, finances, energy and mining. Global impacts can be 
expected, but local impacts are the concern. 
2. What are the lead causes of the CC 
risks? 
Industrial development is blamed in South Africa, since reference is made to 
SA’s energy and carbon intense economy and emissions that will increase 
with further economic development. 
The strategy refers to the industrial era as cause by apportioning blame to 
fossil-fuel combustion, especially energy generation, and transportation. 
3. How does globalisation add to the 
risks? 
CC is acknowledged as global, but more significant for the economically and 
physically vulnerable developing world. 
Climatic changes are universal, whilst the actual effect will differ according 
to location and vulnerability. 
4. Is there insurance available for the 
risks identified in the NCCRS? 
No mention No mention 
5. Does the NCCRS consider 
intergenerational aspects such as 
delayed onset impacts?  
Only by referring to sustainable development Based on a 50year projection 
How does the perception of, and 
information about risks affect the 
NCCRS? 
  
6. Does the NCCRS respond to real, 
tangible impacts or merely possible 
future effects associated with CC? 
Nothing experienced yet, but some direct impacts are foreseen, such as 
extreme weather events and health risks. Otherwise, a lot of conceived risks 
are mentioned, such as impacts on human development indicators, industries 
(farming, mining, energy), and biodiversity, as well as impacts resulting from 
CC response actions. 
Some real climatic changes are acknowledged, but the uncertainty about 
the scale and implication of climate change is mentioned and with that 
admitted that the risks are conceptual. 
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Questions NCCRS Summary NCCRS Main text 
7. How does global opinion contribute 
to the conceptualisation of the 
risks? 
International obligations i.t.o. the UNFCCC and Kyoto are acknowledged 
along with developmental programmes (NEPAD). International CC debates 
(IPCC) and differences in responses are mentioned. The uncertainty of the 
international debate is given particular mention. 
Global debate about required responses and related global consequences 
informs the strategy. 
8. How do local influences contribute 
to the conceptualisation of the 
risks? 
Local definition of the risk greatly relies on the Country Studies reports. Local definition of the risk greatly relies on the Country Studies reports. 
9. Which sources are used as 
references for the NCCRS? 
The IPCC TAR is the most scientific source, followed by the South African 
Country Studies reports. All other possible sources are government position 
documents or legislation. 
TAR, government initiatives, Kyoto procedures, Initial Communication, 
Country Studies reports 
10. Are there uncertainties or 
assumptions such as incomplete 
data collection, vague conclusions 
or precautionary recommendations 
brought forward from the source 
documents? 
NCCRS is based on the TAR and Initial Communication  
The Initial Communication was based on the Country Studies reports. 
The Country Studies acknowledges local uncertainties due to relative course 
CC modelling in IPCC SAR (globally uncertain) and remaining core CC 
uncertainties such as CO2 fertiliser effect. Its science and recommendations 
have therefore not been adapted to the TAR even though the updated TAR is 
used in the NCCRS. 
NCCRS is based on the TAR and Initial Communication  
The Initial Communication was based on the Country Studies reports. 
The Country Studies acknowledges local uncertainties due to relative 
course CC modelling in IPCC SAR (globally uncertain) and remaining core 
CC uncertainties such as CO2 fertiliser effect. Its science and 
recommendations have therefore not been adapted to the TAR even 
though the updated TAR is used in the NCCRS. 
11. Which specialists or experts 
(sources that can only be critically 
reviewed by similar experts) are 
used to inform and compile the 
NCCRS? 
References include the IPCC and Country studies program, but otherwise no 
specific sources are mentioned. 
Many specific contributions from specialist or expert stakeholders are 
acknowledged, reference made to the transfer of technology and the 
appointment of CC specialists in government. It also mentions the expert 
knowledge residing in industry being required for technical review of CDM 
projects, and centres of excellence. 
12. Will the NCCRS be reviewed, and if 
so, how?  
No other opinions are considered, because the CC reaction is seen as 
vehicle for further development and not CC mitigation. 
Uncertainty regarding integration of response action is considered. 
Economic modelling studies and scenario analyses are recommended to 
provide further guidance. A lot of systems are proposed to deal with 
uncertainty regarding implementation and integration of strategies 
13. In future, will the NCCRS seek to 
improve the sources of CC 
information and science? 
Progress in scientific knowledge and policy trends will only be used to direct 
actions, not the direction of the policy. 
Some further research and technical evaluation are required to inform 
responses to the main SA industrial threats, but the existing scientific 
findings are used as is 
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Questions NCCRS Summary NCCRS Main text 
14. What is the NCCRS more in need 
of - better information about the 
nature of CC risks or more 
information on adaptation 
measures? 
Research is intended to improve the UNFCCC obligation for better 
understanding and a reduction of uncertainty in general. This seems to refer 
to redefinition rather than solutions. 
Vague suggestion that research will better define the risks ito direct 
impacts, and also reference to the UNFCCC obligation to improve 
understanding and reduce uncertainty in general. Also a call for R and D to 
address energy conundrum. The focus is stated as being adaptation 
though. 
15. What reliance is there in the 
NCCRS on catchy concepts such 
as ‘sustainable development’? 
Maybe – human development indices are used to motivate for the adaptation 
approach 
An effort is made to reinforce alarmist figures to highlight the need for the 
policy, whilst here and there the strategy relies on the contested 
‘sustainable development’ concept 
16. Does the strategy use simple 
concepts to communicate complex 
or abstract ideas? 
No – no clear and concise guidelines are provided for action, therefore the 
complexity remains. 
Yes – sustainable energy is reduced to household energy efficiency and the 
‘key actions’ actually refer to a number of specific interventions. 
Politics   
17. Are ideological references present 
in the NCCRS? (e.g. socialism, 
capitalism, environmentalism) 
Sustainable development and human welfare indices. This is reinforced by 
the distinction between developed and developing nations and their relative 
wealth. It implies a capitalist or socialist developmental perspective rather 
than risk response. A pro-technology approach is adopted as potential 
solution. 
Sustainable development references abound, and a particular comment 
about the historic, inequitable and unsustainable north/south divide of the 
world’s economy and prosperity. Mention is specifically made to natural 
resources being located in poorer, developing countries, which are 
exploited by the richer developed countries. In addition, CC is blamed on 
the wealthy North, with the brunt of the impacts facing the poor South. 
18. How are the proposed solutions to 
local risks affected by global 
influences? 
Research, agreement and action by developed nations are seen as the 
global solution, with developing countries offering support or implementation 
opportunities (CDM projects). This is partially due to international pressure for 
CC commitments. Global co-ordination in science and policy is mentioned, as 
are supranational response programmes. International response action and 
its relation to global inequality also mentioned. 
References are made to the UNFCCC and Kyoto negotiations, IPCC 
findings and G77+China bloc, as well as int’l competition for CC response 
benefits such as funding and CDM. CDM administration is also 
internationally organised. Global greenhouse gas stabilisation will have 
local investment and trade implications. CC is specifically seen as an 
opportunity to promote local sustainable development principles. 
19. How are the proposed solutions to 
global risks affected by local 
aspects? 
Commitment to UNFCCC obligations, Southern Africa role player, opportunity 
for CDM implementation 
Commitment to UNFCCC obligations, Southern Africa role player, 
opportunity for CDM implementation 
20. Who is involved in the NCCRS? 
DEAT,  
SANBI, Academia, CSIR (Country Studies) 
ARC, Mining, CAIA, CSIR, Resource Departments, Health, DST, DTI, Dept 
Transport, Env Justice, Eskom, IEF, DEAT (NCCC), NRF, Stats SA, 
SANBI, SASOL, Treasury, SE&CCP, Academia, IIEC-Africa, PEER Africa 
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Questions NCCRS Summary NCCRS Main text 
21. Who is not involved in the NCCRS? 
Local and provincial authorities, Environmental groups General society, Academia, Industry, Environmental groups. These are all 
listed as future participants. Otherwise also private and non-governmental 
sectors, other tiers of government. 
22. Does the strategy hide its true 
intentions (i.e. is the original reason 
for the strategy different from the 
intended outcomes)? 
No – the true intentions are not hidden – environment (and risks) is used as 
vehicle for growth 
No – the true intentions are not hidden – CC should not detrimentally affect 
economic development 
Reflexivity   
23. Is the response aimed at 
accommodating risks through 
adaptation measures or redefinition 
of the risks? 
Research is intended to improve the UNFCCC obligation for better 
understanding and a reduction of uncertainty in general. This seems to refer 
to redefinition rather than solutions. 
Vague suggestion that research will better define the risks ito direct 
impacts, and also reference to the UNFCCC obligation to improve 
understanding and reduce uncertainty in general. Also a call for RandD to 
address energy conundrum. The focus is stated as being adaptation 
though. 
24. Will the response intentionally 
affect or prevent the primary 
causes of the risks, or will such 
changes be incidental? 
Only insofar as the proposed adaptation will influence production techniques 
in a manner that will also mitigate the CC contributions. 
It finds solutions in adapting to the risks, not changing the risks except 
where the proposed adaptation will influence production techniques in a 
manner that will also mitigate the CC contributions. 
25. Will the national response change 
the nature of our modernisation and 
development path, or can we 
continue as is? 
Status quo of economic development to be preserved All responses to be consistent with development needs and government 
priorities, except the energy sector that will probably face changes 
26. Does the NCCRS propose more 
modernisation or scientific progress 
to address CC issues? 
CC is seen as opportunity to promote modernisation. Technological 
change/improvement will reduce local vulnerability and address the global 
problem. 
Maybe, CC offers opportunities for development that will aid in adaptation. 
It does not address the original risk, only the impacts with risks affected as 
by-product. CC is seen as opportunity to promote modernisation. 
Responses   
27. Which response actions are 
informed by certainty regarding CC 
risks? 
Although some uncertainty in base data is acknowledged, the information 
and recommendations of the source documents are accepted as is, and 
adaptation measures aimed at economic gain advised. 
No attempt is made to quantify the uncertainty, yet as many responses as 
possible are advised 
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Questions NCCRS Summary NCCRS Main text 
28. Which response actions are 
informed by uncertainty regarding 
CC risks? 
Research and action plans relating to mitigation will compensate for changes 
in international debate and trends 
The uncertainty regarding actual impacts is used to allow for any 
intervention. Mitigation is treated lightly due to the strategy not wanting to 
affect the macro-economic context. 
29. Does the NCCRS differentiate 
between substantive and non-
substantive risks? 
No effort evident, not even in the Country Study. The need for adaptation is 
assumed based on an acceptance of ‘general vulnerability’. 
No – all risks are considered worthy of a response 
30. Which indicators and measures of 
responsibility are proposed, or is 
the mere existence of the policy 
enough? 
Existence. No measures of performance are instituted. Existence, since no targets are set 
31. Does the NCCRS propose any 
regulation? 
Regulation is to occur through means of the DME energy initiatives, DTI, 
DWAF and N/GCCC, not the CCRS specifically 
Some regulation on emissions and water management 
32. Does the NCCRS envisage any 
self-regulation? 
No mention of self-regulation, only self-monitoring. No, still reliance on law reform 
 
